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“I told you – 
I cannot think of anything without imagining it, 
without giving it shape in my mind’s eye and ear.”
Possession - A.S. Byatt

1
Introduction
12
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Imagine that you are going on a holiday to a place with beautiful, tropical 
beaches. You try to compose a mental picture of yourself on the beach: what 
will it be like to actually be there? And which shirt (purple or blue?) should 
you take along to look best on the white sand? While packing your suitcase, 
you might envision the most efficient way to pack it – how will you make 
everything fit? This kind of activity requires you to mentally picture many 
things: your goal, the beach, and the suitcase, as well as the objects you are 
trying to squeeze in. You must take into account their size and texture, to 
know which ones you can squeeze in and which objects have to be handled 
with care.
Both during packing the suitcase, and now, when trying to imagine it, you 
are likely using mental imagery. Imagery can be the composition of a new 
event (you, on a beach that you have never been to), or it can be involved 
when recovering information from memory (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 
2006): for example when you imagine how you will fit your belongings, 
which you probably know well, into the suitcase. To eventually solve the 
packing issue, you might even compare different arrangements with ‘the 
mind’s eye’ (Ishai, 2010; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001).
As you might have noticed while imagining packing your suitcase, 
imagery can be very vivid. When you imagine yourself on the beach, it is 
almost as if you are already there: you can hear the waves rolling in, you can 
smell the salt of the sea and you can see the palm trees waving in the wind. 
As an experience, imagery can be very much like perceiving the sounds, 
the smell and the view of the beach. Imagery, however, is different from 
perception in that it can be voluntarily turned on or off; or maintained at will 
for a prolonged period of time (Kosslyn et al., 2006). 
In this thesis, I will investigate what mental images actually are. 
Specifically, I will investigate how the brain creates mental images, what 
role the visual cortex plays in visual mental imagery, and to which extent 
imagery is like perception.
The mental imagery debate: what is the format of a mental image?
Questions about the format of mental images bear a direct link to 
questions about the nature of thought and have attracted philosophers for 
over centuries (Waller, Schweitzer, Brunton, & Knudson, 2012). However, 
mental images are inherently private; it is not possible to see or experience 
anybody else’s mental images and that makes it hard to study them. Due to 
these difficulties, the study of mental imagery has progressed slowly; often 
jumping forward with the introduction of new experimental paradigms or 
techniques.
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In the early years of psychology, results from studies that used 
introspection already linked the experience of imagery to the experience 
of perception (Waller et al., 2012). During the era of behaviorism, mental 
imagery was completely dismissed as a subject of study, however, from the 
sixties onwards the behavioral paradigms developed in the years before 
turned out fruitful methods for studying mental imagery as well. Studies 
from the following decades showed that imagery often obeys the same rules 
and principles as perception (Farah, 1988; Finke, 1985; Finke & Kosslyn, 
1980; Marzi, Mancini, Metitieri, & Savazzi, 2006). For example, Podgorny 
and Shepard (Podgorny & Shepard, 1978) had participants judge whether 
a probe dot fell on or off a specific stimulus shape constructed from several 
black-colored squares in a 5x5 grid, and found that reaction times patterns 
were similar when the stimulus shape was perceived and when the stimulus 
shape was imagined. Furthermore, mental rotation of objects was found to 
take progressively longer for larger rotational angles, as is also the case for 
actual rotation (de Lange, Roelofs, & Toni, 2008; Podgorny & Shepard, 1978; 
Shepard & Metzler, 1971).
The findings of overlap between imagery and perception sparked the 
beginning of a long standing debate (Farah, 1988; Kosslyn et al., 2001; 
Kosslyn et al., 2006; Pylyshyn, 2003a) about the format of mental images. On 
the one hand, it has been suggested that mental images are of a conceptual, 
propositional nature (Pylyshyn, 1981, 2002, 2003a, 2003b). This idea is 
attractive as it suggests a language-like code for mental representations, which 
would make them directly accessible for speech and writing. According to 
Pylyshyn and others, behavioral similarities are the result of tacit knowledge 
about perceptual processes (Farah, 1988; Finke, 1985; Pylyshyn, 1981). On 
the other hand, it has been suggested that mental images are depictive, 
or even photograph-like (Finke, 1980; Kosslyn, 1981; Kosslyn, Ganis, & 
Thompson, 2003; Kosslyn et al., 2006). This suggestion is in accordance with 
the introspective experience of imagery and aligns well with the behavioral 
studies that show a similarity in behavior for perception and imagery. 
According to Stephen Kosslyn, one of the most prominent researchers 
of mental imagery and the strongest proponent of the depictive theory 
“a mental image occurs when a representation of the type created during the 
initial phases of perception is present but the stimulus is not actually being 
perceived; such representations preserve the perceptible properties of the 
stimulus and ultimately give rise to the subjective experience of perception” 
(Kosslyn et al., 2006, p. 6). Kosslyn suggested that perception and imagery 
are very similar in nature, and predicted that they share the same neural 
mechanisms and networks, including the primary sensory cortices (Kosslyn 
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et al., 2001; Kosslyn et al., 2006). The issue of sensory cortex involvement, 
particularly primary visual cortex, is a crucial one in the imagery debate: 
depictive representations require that all aspects be represented in some way; 
moreover, these representations should have a ‘functional space’ to represent 
their structure (Kosslyn et al., 2006). Early visual cortex has a retinotopic 
organization whereby parts of the visual world that are adjacent, are also 
processed in adjacent parts of the brain (Box 1). This means that this region 
not only functionally represents space, it literally uses space on the cortex to 
represent space in the world and hence, involvement of early visual cortex 
would provide evidence for a depictive account of mental images (Kosslyn et 
al., 2006). The propositional account, on the other hand, does not predict any 
such activity in early visual regions (Slotnick, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2005). 
Part of the imagery debate has therefore revolved around questions such 
as: to what extent are perceptual areas activated during imagery (Podgorny 
& Shepard, 1978); are perceptual areas activated in the same way during 
imagery and perception (Marzi et al., 2006; Slotnick et al., 2005); and do the 
rules of perception also govern imagery (Podgorny & Shepard, 1978)? 
The case for mental imagery:  
findings from cognitive neuroimaging
The advent of neuroimaging allowed directly comparing the activity 
in early visual cortex during imagery and perception and provided a leap 
forward in the study of mental imagery. Especially fMRI (Box 2) has been 
very instrumental in discovering V1 involvement for internally generated 
content.
According to the depictive account, overlapping activity for imagery and 
perception is predicted for all senses. Imagery related activity has indeed 
been found in primary auditory cortex (Kraemer, Macrae, Green, & Kelley, 
2005; Meyer et al., 2010) and primary olfactory cortex (Bensafi, Sobel, & Khan, 
2007; de Araujo, Rolls, Velazco, Margot, & Cayeux, 2005), however, most 
studies into mental imagery (and likewise the imagery debate) have focused 
on the visual domain. Visual perception has been extensively researched; 
moreover visual cortex has a very systematic organization that makes it 
easy to study (Box 1) and to compare imagery and perception. Furthermore, 
vision is the dominant sense for humans (D’Esposito & Postle, 2015), and 
vision might be the dominant modality for imagery as well. Think back to 
yourself at the tropical beach. Which was stronger: your smell of the salt of 
the beach or your view of the waving palm trees or the clothes you would 
wear? For these reasons, in this thesis I have also focused on visual mental 
imagery.
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Box 1: the visual cortex
The visual system processes the information that comes in from the eyes and 
allows conscious perception of the outside world. After light falls on the retina 
and activates the rods and cones, neural signals travel via the optic nerve to 
the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN) and on to the primary visual cortex (V1) 
in the back of the brain. Due to the crossing of the nerves at the optic chiasm, 
information from the left side of space goes to the right side of the brain and 
vice versa. Cells in V1 process what we call low-level aspects of the visual scene, 
such as oriented lines, spatial frequency, edges and colors, but also location in 
space. The information is sent on to progressive visual areas, which process 
increasingly complex features of the visual scene. After initial processing in early 
visual regions, visual information is analyzed along parallel pathways. Broadly 
speaking the ventral (‘what’) pathway is concerned with stable relations between 
features that allow object recognition and memory, while the dorsal (‘where’) 
pathway is concerned with arbitrary spatial relations needed to act upon the 
world (Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, Ungerleider, & Mishkin, 2013).
Higher visual areas in the ventral stream are predominantly organized by their 
sensitivity to specific features (Engel, Glover, & Wandell, 1997; Tootell, Hadjikhani, 
Mendola, Marrett, & Dale, 1998), such as color (V4) and motion (V5), or specific 
objects such as faces (Fusiform Face area, FFA) and houses (Parahippocampal 
Place Area, PPA); O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000). These areas generally show 
more activity for preferred stimuli than for other stimulus features or categories.
Apart from coding for object features, the visual system also codes for spatial 
locations of objects, using “space on the cortex to represent space in the world” 
(Kosslyn et al., 2006, p. 15). This is most clearly observed in early visual areas, 
which have a strong retinotopic organization: cells that are adjacent in the retina 
also project to neighboring cells in the primary visual cortex. Objects contiguous 
in the world, and hence also on the retina, are thus also represented next to 
each other on the primary visual cortex. Due to the small receptive fields of the 
V1-neurons, a very fine spatial layout is preserved. Later visual areas have a 
retinotopic organization as well, but spatial information is less strictly preserved 
as these cells have increasingly larger receptive fields. Areas in the dorsal stream 
will further process the spatial information so that objects can be acted upon.
The systematic organization of visual cortex can be of great benefit for 
studying it; the visual system is the mostly studied sensory system in humans, 
monkeys, cats and other animals, using techniques that range from behavioral 
testing via fMRI to single cell recordings and computational models. Although 
the visual system has been long regarded a (passive) relay station for bottom-
up sensory input, it is increasingly viewed as a location where bottom-up and 
top-down inputs interact.  Therefore, early visual cortex is currently implicated 
in many cognitive functions that were previously ascribed only to higher order 
brain areas, such as attention, prediction and memory. In this thesis, I investigate 
the role of the visual system in mental imagery.
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Functional specialization in higher visual areas occurs also 
during imagery
Higher order visual areas, with a functional specialization during 
perception, have been shown to have a similar functional selectivity during 
mental imagery. Human motion area MT+ activated during imagery of 
rotating checkerboard wedges (Slotnick et al., 2005), mental rotation tasks 
(Seurinck, de Lange, Achten, & Vingerhoets, 2011) and instruction-based 
motion imagery based on rules (Kaas, Weigelt, Roebroeck, Kohler, & 
Muckli, 2010). Imagery of the original color of objects presented in grayscale 
activated V4, a color processing area (Rich et al., 2006). Imagery of (famous) 
faces resulted in activity in FFA and imagery of familiar places led to activity 
in the PPA (Johnson & Johnson, 2014; O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Sung & 
Ogawa, 2008). In this last study, the selective activity patterns were so clear 
in some participants that an observer, who did not know what participants 
where imagining at which moment, was able to correctly identify whether 
a face or a place was imagined on 85% of the trials (O’Craven & Kanwisher, 
2000).
Patients with selective visual deficits have been described to have selective 
imagery deficits as well (Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978; Farah, 1988; Zago et al., 
2010). People impaired on color perception often also show impairment 
on color imagery; patients with selective ‘what’ or ‘where’ impairments 
of perception present with similar impairments of imagery; impaired face 
imagery has been described for a patient with face perception difficulties 
who was unimpaired when imagining buildings and places (Farah, 1988). 
Together, these studies suggest a close correspondence between the activity 
for imagery and perception in higher visual areas.
Early visual cortex is not consistently implicated during mental 
imagery
Mental imagery related activity in early visual cortex has been proposed as 
a crucial determinant of the depictive account of mental imagery (Kosslyn et 
al., 2006). However, unlike higher visual areas, activity in early visual cortex 
has not been consistently found. Patient studies have presented a double 
dissociation between imagery and perception: Zago et al. (2010) reported on 
a patient with cortical blindness due to a V1 lesion who had spared mental 
imagery; while there are also reports of patients with spared perception and 
general imagery abilities, but impaired visual imagery (V. Moro, Berlucchi, 
Lerch, Tomaiuolo, & Aglioti, 2008).
 In healthy participants, early visual cortex activity has been reported by 
several researchers. For example, imagery of object and non-object drawings 
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Box 2: MRI, fMRI and univariate analyses
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) is a brain imaging method that makes use 
of the principle of nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR). When placed in a strong 
magnetic field, the nuclei of hydrogen molecules align (Vollhardt & Schore, 
2007). If a radio-pulse is sent through, the nuclei flip out of alignment. When 
the nuclei subsequently return to their arrangement in the magnetic field, they 
send out a signal which is measured by the MRI. Since different tissue types (e.g. 
skin, bone, blood vessels) have different properties, they respond differently to 
the combination of magnetic field and radio-pulse. By recombining these MRI 
signals into a 3D image, a detailed, static picture of the brain can be obtained.
Functional MRI (fMRI) can be used to measure brain activity. It makes use 
of the different magnetic response properties of oxygen-poor and oxygen-rich 
hemoglobin, the oxygen-carrier in the red blood cells. The blood-oxygen level 
dependent signal (BOLD signal) increases as parts of the brain become active: the 
neurons use oxygen and as a result blood flow increases, leading to an altered 
ratio of oxygen-rich and poor blood. Although the exact relationship between 
neural processing and blood flow is still unknown, BOLD has been shown to 
relate to neural activity reflected in local field potentials (Logothetis, Pauls, 
Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001; Magri, Schridde, Murayama, Panzeri, & 
Logothetis, 2012). The BOLD signal can be obtained per voxel (volume-element), 
a (measurement) unit of the brain that is typically about 2 by 2 by 2 millimeters in 
size (but it varies, depending on the scanner settings used). By repeatedly scanning 
the brain in set intervals (between 0.2 – 3 s generally, but again, depending on 
the scanner settings), the signal can be measured over time. The BOLD response 
is sluggish, and peaks in response to activity occur typically between 4 and 6 
seconds after a stimulus has been shown or a task has been performed.
Increased blood flow due to activity can only be measured with respect to 
a baseline. In cognitive neuroscience typically a participant performs multiple 
tasks while in the fMRI scanner so that different conditions can be compared with 
each other. With fMRI, the difference between the two conditions, per voxel, is 
of interest. Using linear regression models, it can be tested which voxels show a 
change in blood flow that varies with task condition or stimulus. For example, to 
find a region that responds to pink elephants, activity obtained while participants 
observe a pink elephant is compared with activity when a participant observes a 
blank screen. To control for multiple comparisons, multiple nearby voxels need 
to show an effect in the same direction for it to be considered statistically reliable. 
Conventional fMRI analyses allow therefore the detection of macroscopic brain 
regions that a as a whole can be assumed to be involved in the specific task (Mur, 
Bandettini, & Kriegeskorte, 2009). I apply univariate analyses in chapters 2-5.
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Mental representations for perception and imagery can 
directly be compared using multivariate pattern analyses
Even if imagery and perception activate similar parts of the brain, as 
some neuroimaging findings suggest, they do not necessarily involve similar 
kinds of representations (Farah, 1988; Pylyshyn, 2003a). To truly say that 
imagery and perception involve the same representations they must not 
only activate the same areas, but they must do so in a similar way (Marzi et 
al., 2006; Pylyshyn, 2003a; Slotnick et al., 2005; Stokes, Thompson, Cusack, & 
Duncan, 2009). Multivariate Pattern Analysis (MVPA; Box 3) offers new ways 
to directly compare the brain activity patterns for imagery and perception 
and promises another leap forward in imagery research made possible with 
a technical innovation. MVPA analyses are sensitive not only to the overall 
activity of a region but also to the patterns of activity within a region. To 
investigate the extent to which internally generated activity in visual cortex 
resembles the fine-scale population coding responsible for stimulus-driven 
perception, classifiers can be trained on perception data and applied to 
classify mental imagery (Cichy, Heinzle, & Haynes, 2011; Reddy, Tsuchiya, 
& Serre, 2010; Stokes et al., 2009; Thirion et al., 2006). This cross-validation is 
extremely relevant for investigating the overlap of imagery and perception: 
if classifiers trained on perception can decode imagery, or vice versa, this 
indicates that relevant neural codes must be at least partly shared.
This cross-validation approach has been used in a few studies so far 
and these have provided evidence that imagery and perception involve 
(Mazard, Laou, Joliot, & Mellet, 2005) and imagery of concrete or abstract 
features of animals (Klein, Paradis, Poline, Kosslyn, & Le Bihan, 2000) 
activated V1. In several studies that found early visual cortex activity during 
mental imagery, V1 was activated in a manner consistent with the retinotopic 
organization of the early visual cortex (Klein et al., 2004; Slotnick et al., 2005). 
These findings are in line with the prediction from the depictive account 
that mental images are encoded in a spatial format (Kosslyn et al., 2006). 
However, several others did not find activity in early visual cortex during 
mental imagery (e.g. Knauff, Kassubek, Mulack, & Greenlee, 2000), or even 
reported a down-regulation of V1-V3 during imagery (Kaas et al., 2010). An 
early meta-analysis confirmed the complicated pattern, with nineteen fMRI 
studies that showed activity in early visual cortex, but also eight studies 
that did not (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). The inconsistent findings have 
remained puzzling so far - either early visual cortex is not always involved 
in mental imagery, or overall activity might not be the appropriate measure 
of mental representations.
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overlapping representations in higher visual areas. Stokes et al (2009) were 
able to decode which letter (X or O) participants were imagining from area 
LOC. Reddy and colleagues (2010) could decode imagined stimuli, from four 
categories: fruits and vegetables, famous faces, tools and famous buildings, 
from the object responsive areas in ventral temporal cortex. Both studies did 
not find reliable stimulus representations in early visual cortex.
Two other studies suggested that spatial layout is decodable from early 
visual cortex in at least some individuals. Thirion et al. (2006) were able 
to decode and reconstruct imagined spatial shapes from the primary and 
secondary visual cortex in some participants. Finally, Cichy and colleagues 
(2011), who were able to decode object identity from object-areas, could 
decode object location (left or right hemifield) from early visual regions. 
Whether V1 contains representations of imagined stimuli, above spatial 
location, remains to be determined.
The content of the mental images might determine whether 
early visual cortex is involved
As with the studies investigating activity in V1, some decoding studies 
found similar representations for imagery and perception in early visual 
cortex and some others did not find this. A possible explanation for the 
varied findings is the different types of representations under investigation. 
The studies trying to assign objects to a specific category, could decode 
in higher visual areas (Cichy et al., 2011; Reddy et al., 2010). However, 
same-category objects often do not look much alike visually, thus making 
it unlikely that in V1 the within-category patterns are more similar than 
between-category patterns. The decoding studies that found early visual 
areas, on the other hand, tried to discriminate between individual stimuli, 
which were discernible by their spatial layout (Thirion et al., 2006), or to 
discriminate retinotopic location (Cichy et al., 2011). Likewise, the exact 
stimuli used might determine whether early visual cortex is activated during 
mental imagery. Generally, early visual cortex activity was observed when 
retinotopic or spatial knowledge was required (Klein et al., 2004; Slotnick 
et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2008). This suggests that the overlap between 
imagery and perception might be dependent on the stimulus being imagined. 
As imagery is a top-down process in the sense that it is initiated without 
external stimulation, it could be envisioned that imagery related activity 
does not always reach the early sensory areas, just as not all bottom-up 
input will eventually reach higher cognitive areas in parietal and prefrontal 
regions. The extent to which the early visual cortex is involved might be 
dependent on various factors such as task demands, the specific stimulus 
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being imagined and the analytical methods. To investigate to what extent 
visual areas are involved during mental imagery, imagery of different types 
of stimuli and under different task demands should be directly compared.
Current questions about mental images revolve around the 
extent of similarity between imagery and perception
Over time, the focus of the debate has shifted. For many researchers it 
is less relevant whether images are depictive or propositional (Farah, 1988; 
Finke, 1985; Podgorny & Shepard, 1978); of most interest is the potential 
similarity of imagery and perception. This question is also the topic of most 
current mental imagery research (Naselaris, Olman, Stansbury, Ugurbil, & 
Gallant, 2015; Reddy et al., 2010; Stokes et al., 2009) and for good reasons. 
First of all, the overlap between imagery and perception is of theoretical 
interest, as it can give insights into cognitive systems for memory, perception 
and thinking: the nature of thought. Secondly, a shared use of brain systems 
could lead to interference between perception and imagery. Some studies 
suggest that imagery and perception affect each other (Johnson, Mitchell, 
Raye, D’Esposito, & Johnson, 2007; Mohr, Linder, Dennis, & Sireteanu, 2011; 
Mohr, Linder, Linden, Kaiser, & Sireteanu, 2009; J. Pearson, Clifford, & Tong, 
2008; Wais, Rubens, Boccanfuso, & Gazzaley, 2010; Yi, Turk-Browne, Chun, 
& Johnson, 2008). For example, imagining photographs can lead to false 
memories of having actually seen the photograph (Gonsalves et al., 2004), 
and anticipatory imagery of fearful faces can result in decreased fearfulness 
during subsequent ratings of actual fearful faces (Diekhof et al., 2011). 
Thirdly, mental imagery has been implicated in certain mental disorders 
(D. G. Pearson, Deeprose, Wallace-Hadrill, Heyes, & Holmes, 2013). For 
example, psychosis and hallucinations might be the result of erroneous 
blurring of imagery and perception (Amedi, Malach, & Pascual-Leone, 2005; 
Darling, Uytman, Allen, Havelka, & Pearson, 2015) and anorexia nervosa 
entails flawed perception of the own body as being fat, justifying self-
starvation (Johnson et al., 2007; Mohr et al., 2011). Finally, mental imagery 
offers potential for brain-computer interfaces: if the content of mental images 
can be read out from the brain, it could be used a source of control for a 
computer and a means of communication for locked-in patients (Hermes et 
al., 2011; Naselaris et al., 2015). Hence, understanding the nature of mental 
imagery and its relationship with perception can prove highly beneficial in 
understanding human behavior in healthy and medical contexts.
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Outline of the thesis 
After 40 years the imagery debate has moved forward considerably but 
it has not been resolved. Univariate analyses of activity in V1 have offered 
mixed results, suggesting that mental imagery is not directly reflected 
in overall activity patterns in early visual cortex. MVPA offers novel 
opportunities to investigate the similarity between imagery and perception, 
regardless of overall BOLD activity. Although a few MVPA studies have 
shown that higher visual areas contain representations of imagined content, 
no MVPA studies have investigated whether V1 contains representations 
of (non-spatial) features of imagined stimuli such as orientations. Applying 
MVPA to imagery of orientation is especially relevant as both univariate 
and multivariate studies have suggested that involvement of specific visual 
areas depends on the exact stimuli being imagined. Neurons in V1 are highly 
tuned for the processing of orientation, oriented gratings are therefore the 
most likely stimulus to stimulate V1. Combining these two aspects offers 
a great way to determine the role of V1 in mental imagery and to move the 
imagery debate forward. To investigate what a mental image is, in this thesis 
I will therefore use MPVA methods (classification and encoding models) to 
first test whether imagined orientation can be decoded from V1 and then to 
explore some of the factors that determine the involvement of early visual 
cortex during visual mental imagery. 
In chapter 2 I asked whether mental images involve perception-like 
representations in V1 when the to-be-imagined stimuli are designed to 
stimulate V1: oriented gratings. A recent study showed perception-like 
representations of oriented gratings in V1, when the gratings were maintained 
in working memory over several seconds (Harrison & Tong, 2009). As it has 
been suggested that activity in early visual cortex might be related to short-
term memory, but not imagery involving stimuli from long term memory or 
newly created stimuli (Kaas et al., 2010), I adjusted the design from Harrison 
& Tong (2009) and asked participants to first mentally rotate the gratings to 
create stimuli that were not just observed. I found clear representations of 
orientation after rotating in V1, V2 and V3, while overall activity returned to 
baseline. 
In chapter 3 I investigated how it is possible that one can decode mental 
representations if the BOLD signal is close to or at baseline level, as I found 
in chapter 2 and as has also been reported in the literature (Harrison & Tong, 
2009). If BOLD and representational information are independent, this might 
possibly explain the findings of baseline level, or even decreased (Kaas et al., 
2010), activity in V1 during mental imagery. Moreover, it would suggest that 
even if there is a lack of activity, there is not necessarily a lack of involvement. 
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I found that even though overall BOLD was low, we could decode due to 
small but reliable differences in voxels’ response to their preferred and non-
preferred orientations. This suggests that decoding can be a more sensitive 
tool than conventional fMRI analysis as it can, and does, pick up on small but 
reliable BOLD fluctuations. 
In chapters 4 and 5 I explored some of the factors that might determine 
early visual cortex involvement in mental imagery. Firstly, in chapter 4 I 
investigated how dynamic the representations in V1 are by tracking the 
representations at high temporal resolution while participants rotated an 
oriented grating. I showed that representations appear progressively later 
with larger rotation angles, but the findings remained inconclusive as to 
whether V1 linearly tracks, or even supports, the mental rotation process. 
Secondly, in chapter 5, I tested whether involvement of early visual cortex 
depends on the level of detail required (Kaas et al., 2010; Klein et al., 2000; 
Kosslyn et al., 2006). Occipital cortex involvement has been mainly found 
during tasks in which details, such as orientation and shape, of the imagined 
stimulus were required (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). For example, when the 
concept of a dog needs to be imagined, higher visual areas might provide 
sufficient information (Kosslyn et al., 2006) while during imagery of specific 
gratings, V1 might be required. I created stimuli that could be manipulated 
at different levels and tested mental representation space under different 
task demands. I found that task demands determined which higher visual 
areas were involved; while the representations in early visual changed in 
accordance with task demands.
In chapter 6 I bring all the findings together and evaluate what this means 
for the mental imagery debate and for what a mental image is. Finally, I 
discuss the implications for perception and memory and provide an outlook 
to future questions.
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Box 3: Multivariate Pattern analysis
If a region becomes active during some task, say, observing a pink elephant on 
a computer screen, this does not necessarily imply that the region also represents 
the elephant. It could be that the region is involved in directing attention to 
something on the screen, or it could be involved in processing surprise: a pink 
elephant is not a common thing to see. Moreover, even though overall activity 
might be sufficient to infer what kind of object a participant is imagining, (in 
the study by O’Craven and Kanwisher (2000) the activity patterns in PPA 
and FFA reliably indicated whether participants imagined a house or a face), 
overall activity is not informative about which face participants were imagining. 
Even if different faces result in slightly different activity patterns in FFA, these 
differences are lost in conventional fMRI analyses due to spatial smoothing and/
or averaging across voxels (Mur et al., 2009). If in an area a subset of 15 of the 30 
voxels is activated by one stimulus and another subset of 15 by another stimulus, 
the activity patterns are distinct. Yet, overall activity is equally large (15 active 
voxels) in both cases. Multivariate Pattern Analysis (MVPA) aims at finding these 
specific patterns related to individual stimuli or stimulus categories, as they can 
provide more information about representational content in region (Mur et al., 
2009). In this thesis I have used three different MVPA methods: classification, 
representational similarity analyses and forward modeling.
MVPA can be powerful in the study of mental representations, as it allows a 
direct comparison of perception and imagery. In this thesis I make use of this idea 
by training the classifier or model on perception, while testing it on imagery. This 
cross-validation allows inferences about the extent of similarity between mental 
images and perceived content. I always apply the MVPA to pre-defined regions 
of interest (mainly V1, V2, and V3, but, in chapter 5, also left and right VWFA), 
to test specific hypotheses about mental representations in those regions. Finally, 
since anatomy and activity patterns vary extensively over individuals, classifiers 
or forward models are typically trained for each individual participant, while the 
outcomes of the classifications are combined at the group level. 
Classification
Many studies approach MVPA as a classification problem: can we assign 
activity patterns to specific categories? To test classification, a computer learns 
statistical regularities in a data set for which the content of patterns is known (the 
training set) and applies this to an independent dataset of activity patterns (test 
set), to test whether it can assign labels to these new patterns better than expected 
by just chance (Mur et al., 2009). For example, the computer can be trained on 
several presentations of grey and pink elephants and then is tested on a new 
figure to see if it can determine whether the new image is a grey or pink elephant. 
This approach is often called ‘decoding’ or ‘brain reading’ and above-chance 
classification indicates a role for the region in processing a discriminating factor 
between the stimuli. In the case of pink and grey elephants, the regions where 
distinct activity patterns are observed might be involved in processing color (but 
be aware, it might also code for surprise!).
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Figure 1.2 Similarity matrix. The expected results of a Representational Similarity 
Analysis (RSA) for two hypothetical areas that process animal type (left) and color 
(right). The matrices show the similarity in brain activity in a region, for each pair of 
stimuli. Highly similar activity is depicted in cyan; different activity is depicted in blue. 
In a region coding for animal type, seeing two elephants will lead to similar activity, 
regardless of their color, while observing a flamingo will provide a different pattern of 
activity. In a region coding for color, a pink elephant and a pink flamingo will give very 
similar patterns of activity, while activity will be different for the grey animal. Two 
instances of the same stimulus will lead to highly similar activity patterns (diagonal). 
Inspecting and comparing such similarity matrices from different brain regions can 
provide information about the type of information that a region distinguishes. I have 
used RSA in chapter 5. Animal pictures from Noun Project, created by Spotted Paint 
& Joao Santos. 
Classification is simplest done by applying a linear plane in multidimensional 
space to discriminate cases. However, there are many different possible approaches 
that all have their own advantages. Decoding with classification has proven 
especially useful for investigating the representation of orientation in V1-V4 (e.g. 
Harrison & Tong, 2009; Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kamitani & Tong, 2005), where 
the small differences of activity between orientations can remain undetected in a 
univariate analysis. I apply this method in chapters 2 and 3, where I investigate 
imagery of orientation in V1, and in chapter 5.
Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA)
While decoding makes use of differences between patterns, Representational 
Similarity Analysis (RSA) involves comparing activity patterns to investigate 
their similarity. For example, in a region that processes color, two pink elephants 
probably evoke quite similar patterns of activation, while a pink and a grey 
Different activity Similar activity
A region coding for animal type A region coding for color
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elephant will lead to more distinct patterns. By comparing each pair of stimuli 
(or conditions) we can obtain a ‘similarity matrix’ (Figure 1.2) that has higher 
values for more similar patterns and lower values for more distinct patterns. The 
structure of the similarities between stimuli can reveal information about the 
represented features in a region. If we have a pink flamingo next to the pink and 
grey elephant, then a region with that shows a higher correlation in activity for 
the pink elephant and the pink flamingo likely processes color. A region coding 
for animal type, on the other hand, might show more similar patterns for the 
two elephants than for the combination of a flamingo and an elephant, grey or 
pink. The obtained similarity matrices can be visualized; compared to similarity 
matrices obtained from other sources (for example, a monkey observing elephants 
and flamingo’s), or compared to models of predicted similarity. The data-driven 
approach of RSA allows investigation of the representational structure of a large 
set of stimuli, which is useful in chapter 5.
Forward and inverse modeling
With forward and inverse modelling it is possible to reconstruct the mental 
representation from the brain activity. The advantage of this approach it that it 
allows to go beyond discrete stimulus classes and reconstruct stimuli that were 
not in the training set.
First, a theoretical model is postulated that describes the stimulus in terms 
of some features that are relevant for the stimulus and/or appropriate for the 
brain region under study. So to reconstruct which colored animal was seen by the 
participant, the model could contain features that describe the animal such as color 
and size, or whether it can fly. Then a set of parameters (weights) are obtained 
by fitting the model to a training data set where participants see flamingo’s and 
elephants. A straightforward way to obtain the weights that describe how the 
data in each voxel encode the features from the model is linear regression. Finally, 
the model is inverted and the obtained parameters can be used to reconstruct 
(or decode) the stimulus, for example the animal, given a new pattern of activity 
from the brain. To go back to the example of elephants and flamingos: given an 
appropriate model, it would be possible to reconstruct the participant’s mental 
image even if he or she was thinking about a grey flamingo (and yes, grey 
flamingo’s do exist). 
In the visual system, forward models have been instrumental in reconstructing 
i.e. orientation and color, or to predict brain activity for natural images (Brouwer 
& Heeger, 2009, 2011; Naselaris et al., 2015). In this thesis, I use a forward/inverse 
modelling approach in chapter 4, where I track the mental representations of an 
oriented grating during a mental rotation of the stimulus. The advantage is that I 
can create my model based on just 6 orientations but recreate the full spectrum of 
180 degrees while participants rotated their images. 
N.B. Pink elephants in the brain
Although our minds can vividly imagine a pink elephant, and I have used this 
example throughout this section, I do not intend to suggest that the brain contains 
a region specialized for pink elephants. 
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Shared representations for   
working memory and mental   
imagery in early visual cortex
Based on 
A. M. Albers, P. Kok, I. Toni, H. C.H. Dijkerman, F.P. de Lange, 2013, “Shared 
representations for working memory and mental imagery in early visual cortex”, 
Current Biology, 23, 1427-1431.
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Summary
Early visual areas contain specific information about visual items 
maintained in working memory, suggesting a role for early visual cortex 
in more complex cognitive functions (Christophel, Hebart, & Haynes, 2012; 
Harrison & Tong, 2009; Riggall & Postle, 2012; Serences, Ester, Vogel, & Awh, 
2009). It is an open question, however, whether these areas also underlie 
the ability to internally generate images de novo: mental imagery. Research 
on mental imagery has hitherto mostly focused on whether mental images 
activate early sensory areas, with mixed results (Kaas et al., 2010; Klein et al., 
2000; Knauff et al., 2000). Recent studies suggest that multivariate pattern 
analysis of neural activity patterns in visual regions can reveal content-specific 
representations during cognitive processes, even though overall activation 
levels are low (Christophel et al., 2012; Harrison & Tong, 2009; Riggall & 
Postle, 2012; Serences et al., 2009). Here, we use this approach (Haynes & 
Rees, 2006; Kamitani & Tong, 2005) to study item-specific activity patterns 
in early visual areas (V1-V3), when these items are internally generated. 
We could reliably decode stimulus identity from neural activity patterns 
in early visual cortex during both working memory and mental imagery. 
Crucially, these activity patterns resembled those evoked by bottom-up 
visual stimulation, suggesting that mental images are indeed ‘perception-
like’ in nature. These findings provide evidence for a role of visual cortex as 
a dynamic “blackboard” (Bullier, 2001a; Mumford, 1991) that is used both 
during bottom-up stimulus processing and top-down internal generation of 
mental content.
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Results 
Here we investigated whether early sensory regions are similarly recruited 
during the maintenance of previously presented images (i.e., visual working 
memory Baddeley, 2003; Harrison & Tong, 2009), the internal generation of 
images that have not been presented (i.e., mental imagery Kosslyn et al., 
2006), and the perception of visual material (Kosslyn et al., 2001; Pylyshyn, 
2002, 2003b; Slotnick et al., 2005). We used a multivariate analysis approach 
(Haynes & Rees, 2006; Kamitani & Tong, 2005) to determine the information 
contained in the spatial patterns of fMRI responses. Participants (N = 24) either 
kept a grating stimulus in mind (working memory [WM] trials), or internally 
generated a new stimulus by mentally rotating a grating and subsequently 
held this new image in their mind’s eye for a 10 second period (mental 
imagery [IM] trials; see Figure 2.1). Crucially, during the mental imagery 
task, the image kept in mind was not a representation of the physically 
presented grating but generated de novo by mentally transforming the 
stimulus material. We defined early visual cortical areas (V1, V2, and V3) 
using standard retinotopic mapping routines, and extracted activity patterns 
in these regions as the mental imagery process unfolded. 
First, we assessed whether the activity pattern in early visual cortex during 
the working memory period in WM trials reflected the stimulus orientation 
(3 possibilities: 15°, 75°, 135°) that was maintained by the participants, using 
a WM-trained classifier and a leave-one-run-out cross-validation approach. 
We found that early visual cortex (V1-V3) indeed contained information 
about maintained content (WM: decoding accuracy is 54%, chance level is 
33.3%, t(23) = 5.88, p < 1x10-5) in the period 8-12 s after onset of maintenance). 
This increase is comparable in size to earlier studies (Harrison & Tong, 
2009), it reflects a medium to large effect size (Cohen’s d = 1.21; Friston, 
2012), and replicates the finding that early visual cortex contains memory 
representations in the absence of stimulus input (Christophel et al., 2012; 
Harrison & Tong, 2009; Riggall & Postle, 2012; Serences et al., 2009). To 
investigate whether the same voxels in early visual cortex also contained 
information about images that were internally generated and subsequently 
maintained, we repeated this procedure with an IM-trained classifier applied 
to IM trials. Indeed early visual cortex also contained information about 
internally generated images (IM: decoding accuracy is 46%, t(23) = 3.09, 
p = 0.005, Cohen’s d = 0.63), indicating involvement of the visual cortex 
during mental imagery. Moreover, activity patterns for WM and IM trials 
were highly similar: when training the multivariate pattern classifier on the 
delay period during WM and testing on the delay period during IM, we 
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Figure 2.1 Experimental design. At the start of each trial a task cue indicated whether 
participants had to maintain a stimulus in working memory (working memory: WM; top 
row) or create a new stimulus by imagining rotating the stimulus grating and keeping 
the ensuing mental image in their mind’s eye (mental imagery: IM; bottom row). During 
IM trials, mental rotation could be clockwise or counterclockwise (as indicated by arrow 
direction), and 60° or 120° (as indicated by number of arrows). After the task cue, two 
gratings (out of three possible stimuli: 15°, 75°, 115°) were presented briefly, followed 
by a second stimulus cue (A or B, denoting the first or second stimulus respectively) 
that indicated which stimulus grating to select and maintain (WM), or rotate and then 
imagine (IM). After a 10 second delay period in which participants were asked to vividly 
imagine the relevant stimulus, a probe was presented. Participants indicated whether the 
probe was rotated clockwise or counterclockwise with respect to the stimulus they had kept 
in mind and received feedback on each trial. See also Figure S2.1.
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found equally reliable pattern information (WM→IM decoding accuracy: 
45%, t(23) = 3.88, p < 1x10-3, Cohen’s d = 0.78). Training on IM and testing 
on WM also resulted in reliable classification (IM→WM decoding accuracy: 
45%, t(23) = 4.13, p < 1x10-3, Cohen’s d =0.83). All these effects were also 
present when looking at V1, V2 and V3 separately (Supplementary Table S2.1, 
all accuracies > 39%, all p < 0.007).
The similarity between neural representations during WM and IM does 
not necessarily mean that these representations are ‘perceptual’ in nature (i.e. 
resemble the bottom-up activity patterns evoked during actual perception), 
because bottom-up and top-down signals could be encoded differently in 
early visual cortex (Sue-Hyun Lee, Kravitz, & Baker, 2012; Stokes et al., 2009), 
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or the patterns could reflect some other aspect of the task, such as attention. 
To test the perceptual nature of these representations, we obtained activity 
patterns during the actual perception of gratings and trained a classifier to 
discriminate the orientation of these gratings. Since participants performed a 
task at fixation during the perception of the gratings, these activity patterns 
chiefly reflected bottom-up stimulus related activity, while the potential 
effects of top-down attentional processes were reduced by providing 
subjects with a task at fixation. This ‘perceptual’ classifier could also reliably 
discriminate between activity patterns in early visual cortex evoked by 
the different orientations during both WM trials (decoding accuracy 46%, 
t(23) = 4.50, p < 1x10-4, Cohen’s d = 0.90) and IM trials (decoding accuracy 49%, 
t(23) = 5.92 p < 1x10-5, Cohen’s d = 1.21). This indicates that early visual cortex 
not only contains information about internally generated images during IM, 
activity patterns for these images are similar to those evoked during actual 
perception. Interestingly, decoding accuracy was higher for people that 
could more accurately form mental images during both tasks (WM: ρ = -0.51, 
p = 0.0053; IM: ρ = -0.37, p = 0.039, Supplementary Figure S2.2), providing a 
strong link between mental imagery ability and the precision of population-
level responses (Emrich, Riggall, LaRocque, & Postle, 2013; Ester, Anderson, 
Serences, & Awh, 2013). 
The generalization of the content-specific patterns between bottom-up 
stimulation and top-down internal generation suggests that similar neural 
codes are used during these processes in early sensory cortex. To examine the 
time course of this process and assess whether early visual cortex sequentially 
Figure 2.2 Temporal unfolding of mental representations. Proportion of classifier 
choice when testing V1-V3 combined (360 voxels), averaged over the 24 participants. Error 
bars denote standard error of the mean, dashed line indicates chance level (33.3%). A) 
Classifier choice over time during WM trials. Activity patterns during the first time point 
(2 s after WM onset) show a mixture of the two physically presented stimuli (red and pink 
lines), but not presented grating (blue line), after which the pattern activity was consistently 
classified as the cued grating (pink line). B) Classifier choice over time during IM trials. 
On these trials participants mentally rotated the cued stimulus towards the not physically 
presented grating orientation. Again, activity patterns during the first time point (2 s after 
IM onset) show a mixture of the two physically presented stimuli (red and pink lines) while 
the not presented grating (blue line) is least selected. Hereafter, there is a gradual switch 
in classifier choice from the cued grating (pink) to the generated target grating (blue).  
C) Classifier choice over time during IM trials. On these trials participants mentally 
rotated the cued stimulus towards the presented, but uncued grating orientation. A 
transition in the representation occurred at around 8 seconds after delay period onset, 
from the cued grating (pink line) to the created grating that was similar to the presented, 
but not cued grating (red line). See also Figure S2.2 and Table S2.1.
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represents the initial and final target image (cf. S. I. Moro, Tolboom, Khayat, 
& Roelfsema, 2010), we analyzed activity patterns in early visual cortex at 
each time point as the task unfolded, using the independent classifier that 
was trained on stimulus-driven activity. During WM trials the classifier was 
initially at chance, selecting each option about one third of the time. After 
stimulus presentation, visual cortical (V1-V3) activity patterns reflected 
a combination of the two presented gratings. Subsequently, the cued (i.e., 
to be remembered) grating was predominantly selected by the classifier 
(Figure 2.2A). Similarly, during IM trials, initial visual cortical activity 
patterns after stimulus presentation reflected the two presented gratings, 
but not the unpresented grating (Figure 2.2B&C). Again, shortly after this, 
the cued (i.e., starting orientation that had to be mentally rotated) grating 
was predominantly selected by the classifier. Crucially however, there was 
a gradual shift from a representation of the cued (starting) grating towards 
a representation of the internally generated target grating. This target 
grating was not physically presented on that trial, but mentally created by 
the participants and after several seconds became the preferred orientation 
of the classifier. This suggests three sequential stages of representation in 
early visual cortex during the mental imagery process: first, the physically 
presented stimuli are represented; second, one of the presented stimuli is 
selected for transformation; and third, a new representation is formed in 
early visual cortex.
 The time courses of decoding accuracy for the target grating further 
support this notion (Figure 2.3A). During WM, the target could be decoded 
as early as 4 seconds after delay period onset, while during IM the target 
could only be decoded from 8 seconds after delay period onset. This delay 
likely reflects a combination of factors. During imagery trials, participants 
had to select not only the cued grating but also retrieve the task cue, which 
instructed them about the direction and extent of mental rotation. They 
subsequently had to perform the mental rotation, with each of these steps 
contributing to the delay in the formation of the internally generated target 
image. The patterns in Figure 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that participants mentally 
transform the image early in the trial, rather than at the time of the probe. 
Again, similar patterns were present in V1, V2 and V3 in isolation.
There was a dissociation between the time course of stimulus 
representation and the time course of mean neural activity in the early 
visual regions (Figure 2.3B). While information about maintained (WM) or 
internally generated (IM) stimuli increased over the delay interval, overall 
neural activity decreased, in line with previous work on visual working 
memory (Harrison & Tong, 2009). This stresses the difference between overall 
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Figure 2.3: Time course of decoding accuracy and mean neural activity in V1-V3. 
A) Time course of decoding accuracy was different for WM (black line) and IM (red line). 
Accurate decoding of the target image was achieved several seconds later in time for IM 
than for WM trials, due to the intermediate mental operation. Decoding was significant 
from 4-16 seconds for WM trials and from 8-16 seconds for IM trials (all p < 0.001). Error 
bars denote standard error of the mean, dashed line indicates chance level (33.3%), and 
asterisks indicate significant decoding accuracy (p < 0.001) for WM (black), IM (red), or 
a significant difference between the two (grey). B) Time course of mean neural activity 
was indistinguishable between WM (black) and IM (red), as indicated by average blood 
oxygen level-dependent amplitude timecourse (averaged over the 360 selected voxels) 
with respect to average activity immediately preceding trial onset. Neural activity peaked 
around 4 s after presentation of the stimuli, and again around 4 s after presentation of 
the probe, while activity declined in the delay period between the two presentations. Error 
bars denote standard error of the mean. See also Figure S2.3 and Table S2.2.
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activation and information content within activation patterns, and puts the 
results of previous studies that have only looked at overall activity levels of 
sensory cortex during mental imagery in a new perspective. Although early 
sensory areas did not show robust delay-related activity, there were several 
other areas outside visual cortex that showed a robust and sustained neural 
activity increase during the delay period of both imagery and working 
memory trials (Supplementary Figure S2.3 and Table S2.2), including bilateral 
parietal and prefrontal cortex, as well as the pre-supplementary motor 
area. To investigate whether these areas also contained stimulus related 
information, we used the same classification approach as for early visual 
areas. Interestingly, although some of these regions within this network 
(notably left parietal cortex and supplementary motor area) showed some 
evidence of stimulus information when training and testing within the main 
experiment (Table S2.2), generalization from the perceptual classifier to the 
main task resulted in chance-level performance (all p > 0.05). 
Discussion
In this study we used a multivariate pattern analysis approach to directly 
compare the neural representations during visual perception, working 
memory and mental imagery in retinotopically defined early visual cortex. 
We found that activity patterns in early visual areas (V1, V2 and V3) could 
reliably predict which of three oriented gratings was either held in working 
memory or mentally imagined, even though overall levels of neural activity 
were low. We observed similar neural activity patterns during periods in 
which participants either kept visual material in working memory (WM), or 
internally generated a visual stimulus (IM) by mentally transforming it, as 
shown by similarly high decoding performance within and between tasks. 
Crucially, by training on patterns of activity during physical presentation 
of gratings, we show that activity patterns during mental imagery resemble 
those elicited by physically presented stimuli, suggesting analogous neural 
codes for internally generated mental images and stimulus representations. 
The results are in line with other recent findings of representational content 
in the visual cortex during high-level cognitive processes (Harrison & Tong, 
2009; Horikawa, Tamaki, Miyawaki, & Kamitani, 2013; Pasternak & Greenlee, 
2005).
Together, our results suggest that early visual areas may serve as a dynamic 
blackboard that supports information processing during both bottom-up and 
top-down processes (Bullier, 2001a; T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003; S. I. Moro et 
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al., 2010). This fits with proposals that view the primary visual cortex not 
simply as an entry station for subsequent cortical computations in higher-
order visual areas, but rather as a high-resolution buffer in the visual system 
that is recruited for several visual computations (T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003; 
Mumford, 1991; Pasternak & Greenlee, 2005). 
These findings also speak to an age old debate about the nature of mental 
content (Kosslyn et al., 2006; Pylyshyn, 2003b). Depictive theories of mental 
content stress the overlap between representations during perception and 
mental imagery. Studies that assessed whether mental images activate 
primary sensory areas, as proposed by ‘depictive’ theorists, have provided 
mixed results (Kaas et al., 2010; Klein et al., 2000; Knauff et al., 2000; Kosslyn 
& Thompson, 2003). By showing that there is content-specific overlap of 
activation patterns during mental imagery and bottom-up visual stimulation 
in primary visual cortex, we show that mental imagery partly depends on 
the same mechanisms as visual perception, in line with depictive accounts of 
mental representations (Sue-Hyun Lee et al., 2012). 
An open issue relates to the role of non-sensory areas in the maintenance 
and internal generation of sensory material. While we observed strong 
increases in activity in a specific set of regions in prefrontal and parietal 
cortex (Duncan, 2010), we and others (Riggall & Postle, 2012) did not find 
reliable encoding of stimulus-related information in these areas when 
training on perceptual input. This suggests that, while it is very possible 
that these non-visual areas contain stimulus representations, their format 
appears distinct from the automatic, bottom-up representation evoked 
by visual stimulation. Studies using neural recordings in monkeys have 
observed coding of individual stimuli in prefrontal cortex (Rainer, Rao, 
& Miller, 1999) and content-specific synchronization of activity across the 
frontal parietal network (Salazar, Dotson, Bressler, & Gray, 2012) during 
visual working memory. Interestingly, we also obtained evidence for some 
stimulus-related information in parietal and frontal regions when comparing 
stimulus-specific patterns within the main tasks (IM, WM). Together, this 
suggest complementary roles for early visual cortex and fronto-parietal 
regions (E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Salazar et al., 2012), whereby fronto-parietal regions 
create flexible stimulus representations that are in line with behavioral goals 
(Cukur, Nishimoto, Huth, & Gallant, 2013; Riggall & Postle, 2012). However, 
the exact role and representational content of the fronto-parietal regions 
during mental imagery remains to be determined.
The generalization of stimulus information from stimulus-driven activity 
patterns to mental imagery induced activity patterns in early visual cortex 
suggests a common representation of bottom-up and top-down signals in 
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these cortical areas. It should be noted here that generalization was robust 
but not perfect, which may be due to the fact that internally generated 
images may lead to less robust and more variable activation patterns than 
bottom-up visual stimulation, due to internal fluctuations in attentional 
state. These fluctuations are likely reduced during the perceptual localizer, 
although it is also possible here that subjects still paid some attention to the 
stimuli (even though they performed a task at fixation). The current task 
design makes it unlikely that eye movements contributed to the decoding 
of imagined orientations. First, we trained the classifier on the independent 
localizer, during which participants had to perform a task at fixation. 
Secondly, the stimulus gratings were presented very briefly (200 ms), too 
short for systematic eye movement preparation and execution. Additionally, 
the relevant grating was only cued after the stimulus presentation (Harrison 
& Tong, 2009).
It may seem surprising that overall neural activity levels appeared low 
during mental imagery and working memory, even though the patterns in 
early visual cortex carried stimulus information during this period. One 
reason for this may be that visual areas also exhibit an overall high level of 
spontaneous activity during rest (Kenet, Bibitchkov, Tsodyks, Grinvald, & 
Arieli, 2003), the functional significance of which may be quite similar to 
mental imagery (Kosslyn, Thompson, Kim, & Alpert, 1995). Indeed, a recent 
developmental study (Berkes, Orban, Lengyel, & Fiser, 2011) showed that 
spontaneous fluctuations in visual regions become increasingly similar to 
stimulus-evoked patterns, suggesting that activity patterns in visual cortex 
may constitute an internal model that continuously adapts to expected 
upcoming input. Evidence for such an internal, predictive model of the 
world in early visual regions has also recently been obtained in humans 
(Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012). Building on this, mental imagery might entail 
the generation of such an internal model, with top-down biasing signals 
projecting to visual areas in order to sharpen upcoming perception, leading 
to a similar overall level of activation in visual regions during imagery and 
rest. The idea that mental imagery plays a functional role in facilitating future 
perception is supported by a recent study that found that mental imagery 
biases subsequent perception in a binocular rivalry task (Kosslyn et al., 1995; 
J. Pearson et al., 2008), as well as by the correlation between IM performance 
and representational precision (Supplementary Figure S2.2). 
In conclusion, we observe analogous sensory representations during 
visual working memory and mental imagery in early visual cortex. Crucially, 
these activity patterns resembled those evoked by bottom-up visual 
stimulation, suggesting that mental images are ‘perception-like’ in nature. 
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These findings provide empirical support for the notion that visual cortex 
acts as a blackboard that is used both during bottom-up stimulus processing 
and top-down internal generation of mental content.
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Supplementary material
Supplementary Methods
Participants
Thirty right-handed participants with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision were recruited from the student population at the Radboud 
University in Nijmegen. Participants gave written informed consent in 
accordance with the institutional guidelines of the local ethical committee 
(CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) and were paid for their 
participation. All participants were trained on the task in a behavioral setting 
for approximately one hour. After training, six participants were excluded 
from further participation due to a failure to understand the task or to reach 
sufficient performance (inclusion threshold: 75% correct with a difference 
between probe and target of < 30°). The remaining 24 participants (10 male, 
ages 18-30) participated in the scanning session and were included in all 
analyses.
Stimuli 
Stimuli were grayscale luminance-defined sinusoidal gratings generated 
using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA) in conjunction with the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). The gratings were presented in 
an annulus (outer diameter: 15° of visual angle, inner diameter: 3° of visual 
angle) surrounding a central fixation point. The gratings had a spatial 
frequency of 1 cpd, a Michelson contrast of 80% and orientation of either 
15°, 75° and 135° degrees from the vertical axis. Stimuli were displayed on 
a rear-projection screen using an EIKI (EIKI, Rancho Santa Margarita, CA) 
projector (1,024 x 768 resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate).
As there were 3 possible starting orientations, and, for mental imagery 
(IM) trials, two directions (clockwise, counter-clockwise) and rotation 
magnitudes (60° or 120°), there were also 3 final grating orientations: 15°, 75° 
and 135°. Due to the large number of stimulus, task and cue combinations, 
there were 60 unique trials (5 different task cues (0, >, >>, <, <<; representing 
the amount and direction of rotation), 6 combinations of presented stimuli 
([15 75], [15 135], [75 15], [75 135], [135 0], [135 75]) and 2 retro-cues (select 
either the first or the second stimulus). There were 20 trials for each grating 
orientation per task (WM, IM), resulting in a total of 120 trials, which were 
randomly intermixed and divided over 6 runs (20 trials per run). All trials 
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were included in the analyses. To investigate whether participants became 
more familiar with the stimuli over time, we split the experiment in half and 
investigated the separate decoding accuracies. There was no difference in 
decoding accuracy of the neural representations for stimuli presented in the 
first 3 blocks compared to the last 3 blocks in any of the visual areas (all p > 
0.05).
Staircase procedure
We used a staircase procedure to ensure equal task difficulty levels for 
WM and IM trials. After each WM or IM delay period, subjects had to indicate 
whether a probe stimulus was rotated slightly clockwise or counterclockwise 
with respect to the internal image. The staircase procedure estimated the 
difference between probe and mental image that ensured 75% performance, 
using QUEST (Brainard, 1997). The staircase was seeded with an orientation 
difference of 15° and dynamically adapted based on subjects’ accuracy. We 
imposed an upper limit on the orientation difference, ensuring a maximal 
difference between internal image and probe of 30°.
At roughly matched performance levels (WM: 77% ±7.1%; IM: 79% ±4.8%; 
t(23) =-1.57, p = 0.13), the average orientation difference between mental 
image and probe was smaller for WM trials (9.0° ±1.5°) than for IM trials 
(20.4° ±2.8°; t(23) = -7.4, p < 0.001), indicating that participants were a bit more 
accurate when they had to maintain the presented image than when they 
had to mentally rotate and generate a new image. 
Additional localizer scans
After the main experiment, participants underwent two additional 
scanning runs. To obtain data for the perceptual classifier, the same gratings 
that were used during the main experiment were presented for longer 
durations (12 seconds), during which each grating was flashed at 4 Hz. We 
collected fifteen blocks, with pseudo-random order of the orientations. The 
fixation dot changed 8-10 times per block at random time points, leading to 
an average number of changes of 150 (range 142-159), to which participants 
responded on average 94 ±4% (mean ±SD) of the time. After each block of 
three orientations, a baseline period of 15 seconds was presented. Throughout 
the localizer, participants had to monitor the fixation dot for occasional brief 
changes in color, to which they had to respond with a button press. The same 
task was applied during the retinotopic mapping session, in which subjects 
viewed a wedge, consisting of a flashing black-and-white checkerboard 
pattern (3 Hz), first rotating clockwise for 9 cycles and then anticlockwise for 
another 9 cycles (at a rotation speed of 24 s/cycle). 
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fMRI acquisition parameters
Functional images were acquired using a 3T Trio MRI system (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany), using a T2*-weighted gradient-echo EPI sequence 
(FA = 80 degrees, FOV = 64x64x31 voxels, voxels size 3x3x3 mm, TR/TE = 
2000/30 ms). Structural images were acquired using a T1-weighted MP-Rage 
sequence (FA = 8 degrees, FOV = 192x256x256, voxel size 1x1x1, TR/TE = 
2300/3.03 ms).
Data extraction
All analyses were performed on an individual, per subject basis. We used 
Freesurfer (http://surfer/nmr/mgh/harvard/edu/) to draw the borders of V1, 
V2 and V3 (DeYoe et al., 1996; Engel et al., 1997; Sereno et al., 1995; Wandell, 
Dumoulin, & Brewer, 2007). Regions of interest (ROIs) were created for each 
early visual area. Due to confluent foveal representations for V1-V3 (Wandell 
et al., 2007), we excluded the foveal representation from our regions of 
interest. Within each ROI, the 120 most active voxels were selected based 
on the independent localizer. For the combined early visual cortex ROI, all 
the voxels from the individual V1-V3 ROIs were selected. We extracted the 
BOLD time course for each voxel in the ROIs and high pass-filtered the data 
(removing signal with f<1/128 Hz). All reported results are based on V1-V3 
combined, unless specified otherwise. Over all participants, slightly more 
voxels were selected from dorsal than ventral V2 and V3 (V2d: 64 voxels, 
V2v: 56 voxels, t(23) = 1.69, p = 0.105; V3d: 65 voxels, V3v: 55 voxels, t(23) = 
2.60, p = 0.016). 
Classification analysis
For all multivariate pattern analyses (MVPA) we trained linear support 
vector machines (SVMs) to discriminate between the three grating orientations 
based on the pattern of BOLD activity over voxels. Classification accuracy can 
be seen as an indication of the amount of orientation information available 
in the BOLD signal, such that relative changes therein can be informative 
about the stimulus being maintained (WM) or imagined (IM) (Jehee, Brady, 
& Tong, 2011; Kok et al., 2012). When training and testing on WM and IM 
trials we averaged the activity over time points 8-12 seconds after onset of 
the delay period of the working memory trials (2 separate scans). We selected 
8-12 seconds to maximize the temporal distance from stimulus related 
activity evoked by the two stimuli presented at the start of each trial, yet 
avoid contamination with activity elicited by the probe presentation. After 
averaging, data were normalized using a z-transformation. We trained the 
classifier using a leave-one-run-out procedure where we trained on stimuli 
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in 5 out of 6 runs and tested on stimuli in the remaining run when training on 
WM, IM, or performed generalization between WM and IM. For generalization 
from perception to IM and WM we trained the ‘perceptual classifier’ using 
the average BOLD signal 5-13 s after the onset of each block in the localizer. 
When investigating the temporal unfolding of the representations, we tested 
each time point independently, without any averaging.
Given the three-class problem, we combined the classification results from 
independent support vector machine classifiers for each pair of gratings, 
following the procedure described by Kamitani and Tong (2005, 2006). 
To test for significant decoding accuracy we performed one-sample t-tests 
over participants against chance level (33.3%). We also calculated the effect 
size of all our effects using Cohen’s d. To compare the different areas and 
conditions (WM, IM), we performed a 2-way repeated-measures ANOVA 
over participants, with area and condition as factors. To investigate whether 
decoding accuracy was higher for people that could more accurately 
form mental images, we calculated the one-tailed Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient between threshold angle and decoding accuracy for WM and IM 
separately.
Mean activity analysis
To investigate which areas were active during both working memory and 
mental imagery periods, we additionally performed a whole-brain univariate 
analysis, in the framework of the General Linear Model (GLM). Individual 
data were realigned, co-registered, normalized, smoothed and high-pass 
filtered at 128 Hz, using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm, Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK). We separately modeled 
the onset of each trial, the maintenance/imagery (delay) period, and the 
response period, for IM and WM separately. To quantify activity during the 
maintenance/imagery period, we created contrasts between these regressors 
and the implicit baseline (intertrial interval). Head-motion parameters 
were included as nuisance regressors. Second level analysis consisted of a 
conjunction analysis testing for common activity during the delay period 
of WM and IM trials, compared to baseline. We thresholded this map using 
stringent methods for multiple comparisons (voxel-wise family-wise error 
correction p < 0.05) and considered only clusters with a spatial extent of >50 
voxels. To investigate whether there was stimulus information in the pattern 
of activity in the regions that showed activity during this delay period, we 
created ROIs from these active regions, and converted them back to native 
space for each participant, after which we performed the classification 
analysis as described above.
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Figure S2.1 Reaction times and accuracy scores. Reaction times (left) and error rates 
(right), split for working memory (WM, in black), and mental imagery (IM, in red, either 
60 degrees or 120 degrees rotation). Error bars denote standard error of the mean. Reaction 
times increased significantly with rotation angle (F (2, 23) = 19.45, p < 0.001), while there 
were no significant differences in error rate between conditions (F (2, 23) = 1.57, p = 0.22).
Figure S2.3 Areas with increased BOLD response during the delay period. Areas 
with a sustained BOLD response over the delay period during both imagery and working 
memory (WM delay & IM delay > baseline). To investigate whether information was 
restricted to visual areas or present throughout the brain, we created ROIs from these 
regions that showed elevated neural activity during the delay and tried to classify stimulus 
identity in these areas. Size and coordinates of the different areas, as well as decoding 
accuracies in these areas can be found in Supplementary Table 2.2.
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Figure S2.2 Correlation between angle threshold and decoding accuracy. There 
was a monotonic relationship between inter-individual differences in decoding accuracy 
and task performance (measured as threshold angle difference with the probe (staircase 
procedure) for both working memory and mental imagery. Decoding accuracy was higher 
for people that were more accurate when maintaining (WM: Spearman’s rho = -0.51, p = 
0.0053) or imagining (IM: rho = -0.37, p = 0.039) mental content. Dots represent single 
subjects, with one black (WM) and one red (IM) dot per participant.
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Area Decoding within  
condition
Decoding across  
conditions
Decoding based on  
perception
WM-WM IM-IM IM-WM WM-IM VS-WM VS-IM
V1 44.6%** 41.6%** 41.3%*** 38.7%** 40.1** 43.2%***
V2 50.8%*** 44.0%** 43.6%*** 41.7%** 45.2%*** 46.1%***
V3 52.4%*** 46.0%** 44.6%*** 42.5%** 44.4%*** 46.1%***
V1-V3 54.2%*** 46.1%** 45.5%*** 45.2%*** 46.4%*** 48.5%***
Table S2.1 Decoding accuracies for the different classifiers in V1, V2, V3 and V1-
V3. Decoding accuracies calculated over 8-10 seconds after onset of the delay period. 
Significance levels:  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; non-significant classification in 
grey. To check for differences between areas in perception-based decoding, we performed 
a 2-way repeated-measures ANOVA with area and condition (WM, IM) as factors. 
Although there were overall differences in decoding accuracy between areas (F(2,46) 
= 6.48, p = 0.0033;  due to overall slightly better decoding accuracy in V2), there was 
no overall difference in decoding accuracy between tasks (F(1,23) = 0.95, p = 0.34), nor 
an interaction between area and task (F(2,46) = 0.40, p = 0.67). This lack of interaction 
indicates that there were no differences between IM and WM tasks that were specific to 
particular visual areas.
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Area [MNI 
coordinates]
z (k) Decoding within  
condition
Decoding across 
conditions
Decoding based on 
perception
WM-WM IM-IM IM-WM WM-IM VS-WM VS-IM
L intraparietal 
sulcus  
[-42, -46, 52]
6.66 
(620)
35.5% 36.6%* 36.5%* 37.8%*** 33.1% 33.8%
Superior 
frontal gyrus 
[9, 14, 49]
5.81 
(470)
36.0%* 38.6%** 35.5% 37.4%** 33.0% 33.1%
R supramar-
ginal gyrus 
[39, -37, 46]
5.61 
(170)
36.9%* 36.3% 34.8% 34.8% 32.9% 33.9%
R inferior 
frontal gyrus 
[51, 8, 19]
5.52 
(81)
34.2% 35.7% 34.0% 33.9% 34.4% 33.5%
R superior 
parietal gyrus 
[9, -64, 64]
5.47 
(76)
34.4% 37.0%* 35.4% 36.0%** 32.9% 33.7%
L precentral 
sulcus  
[-51, 5, 31]
5.32 
(72)
35.1% 32.9% 36.3%* 35.3% 33.1% 33.0%
R intraparietal 
sulcus  
[27, -70, 22]
5.23 
(60)
36.1% 34.8% 35.8%* 35.8%* 33.3% 33.3%
Table S2.2 Decoding accuracies in the regions showing delay-related activation. 
Decoding accuracies for the different classifiers in areas that showed significant activation 
(p < 0.05 FWE corrected, cluster size > 50 voxels) during the 8-10 seconds after onset of 
the delay period of both working memory [WM > baseline] and mental imagery [IM > 
baseline] trials. MNI coordinates are indicated between square brackets, z-score (z) and 
extent (k) are indicated in the second column. Significance levels:  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; 
*** p < 0.001; non-significant classification in grey.
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Equal magnitude of  
stimulus-specific activity  
for top-down generated and  
bottom-up presented stimuli  
in early visual cortex
Based on
A.M. Albers, T. Meindertsma, I. Toni, F.P. de Lange, “Decoupling of BOLD 
amplitude and pattern classification of orientation-selective activity in 
human visual cortex, submitted.
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Abstract
Multivariate pattern analysis has allowed the investigation of internal 
representations of stimuli from distributed activity patterns within a brain 
region and the ‘decoding’ of the stimulus identity from these activity 
patterns. Several studies have reported reliable decoding of the identity of 
a stimulus that was kept in working memory or internally generated from 
patterns of activity in early visual cortex, while the overall BOLD response 
was low or even at baseline levels. This raises the question of how there can 
be stimulus information in neural activity patterns without a robust overall 
BOLD activation. Here we addressed this issue by dividing voxels from 
early visual cortex into subpopulations based on their stimulus preference, 
and comparing the time course of their BOLD response for preferred and 
non-preferred stimuli with decoding performance over time.
Decoding accuracy was related to a small but reliable difference in 
BOLD response for voxels’ preferred and non-preferred stimuli, the time 
course of which closely corresponded to the decoding time course of 
mental representations. Surprisingly, activity differences between preferred 
and non-preferred stimuli were equally small for visually presented and 
internally generated images, in spite of the large overall BOLD difference 
between these conditions. This was likely due to the presence of a substantial 
BOLD response to visual stimulation that was not stimulus-specific. This 
was corroborated by the spatial pattern of stimulus-evoked activity, which 
included a large retinotopically unspecific part, occurring in both central and 
peripheral regions of the early visual cortex. Together, these results suggest 
that stimulus evoked BOLD signals in visual cortex during a task context 
are an amalgam of small stimulus-specific and larger non-stimulus-specific 
processes. These large non-stimulus specific processes are not apparent 
during the maintenance or internal generation of stimuli, explaining the 
apparent paradox of highly accurate decoding of stimulus orientation while 
overall BOLD signals are low. 
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Introduction
A long standing question is how the brain represents and maintains 
information (J. Pearson & Kosslyn, 2015). While traditional univariate 
fMRI studies have given insight into the activity of brain regions during 
cognitive processes, recently multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) has 
gained popularity as a more sensitive method to investigate representations 
in the brain. MVPA makes use of the distributed patterns of activity within a 
region (e.g.Haynes & Rees, 2006; Kamitani & Tong, 2005), or across the entire 
brain (e.g. Çukur, Nishimoto, Huth, & Gallant, 2013; Kriegeskorte, Goebel, 
& Bandettini, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2008), to infer the presence of information.
MVPA has been especially beneficial in the study of internal (mental) 
representations. Over the past years, it has allowed researchers to show that 
visual regions contain perception-like representations of internally generated 
content during (working) memory, mental imagery and even dreaming 
(Bosch, Jehee, Fernandez, & Doeller, 2014; Harrison & Tong, 2009; Horikawa 
et al., 2013; Chapter 2; Kamitani & Tong, 2006; Naselaris et al., 2015; Serences 
et al., 2009). In many of these studies, there was reliable decoding of stimulus 
identity, even though the overall BOLD response in these regions was close 
to, or even at, baseline levels (Chapter 2: Albers, Kok, Toni, Dijkerman, & de 
Lange, 2013; Bosch et al., 2014; Harrison & Tong, 2009; Serences et al., 2009; 
Sneve, Alnaes, Endestad, Greenlee, & Magnussen, 2012). At the same time, 
regions that showed sustained elevated activity did not contain (decodable) 
stimulus information (Emrich et al., 2013; Riggall & Postle, 2012). 
This apparent discrepancy (Mendoza-Halliday, Torres, & Martinez-
Trujillo, 2014) between a decrease in BOLD activity and an increase in 
represented information, has suggested that information gathered from 
univariate and multivariate measures is qualitatively different. Significant 
decoding results, however, can result not only from an underlying 
multidimensional representation, but also when a number of voxels show 
some variability in their response to an experimental effect: a spatially 
sparse and intermixed univariate effect (Davis et al., 2014; Kamitani & 
Tong, 2005). The discrepancy between sustained representations but low 
overall BOLD response in the studies on internal representations, could be 
due to a combination of excitation and inhibition: the preferred stimulus 
representation is activated and concurrently other stimulus representations 
are inhibited (Kok et al., 2012). This could potentially result in an overall 
BOLD response at or around baseline (see e.g. Harrison & Tong, 2009 who 
have some participants that show BOLD at baseline during the maintenance 
period). Under this hypothesis we expected that if we divide voxels in the 
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early visual cortex into subpopulations based on their stimulus preference 
(‘sub-ROIs’), those voxels would show an increase in activity to their 
preferred stimulus that was sustained over time, while the voxels with a 
different preference might be attenuated (Sneve et al., 2012).
To empirically investigate this issue, we re-analyzed a previously reported 
dataset (Chapter 2), in which participants mentally imagined or maintained 
in working memory an orientated grating. We compared the spatial and 
temporal activity profile of BOLD activity during perception and imagery of 
preferred and non-preferred stimuli in voxels of early visual cortex with the 
decoding accuracy of the stimulus representations based on the multivariate 
patterns of activity. In short, our results show that while the overall BOLD 
signal was massively larger than the differences induced by the different 
stimuli, the stimulus-specific BOLD differences were reliably detectable 
and constituted the likely source of stimulus decoding. Interestingly, 
the stimulus-specific BOLD differences were of equal magnitude during 
top down generation of a stimulus and bottom-up stimulus presentation, 
suggesting that the larger part of stimulus-evoked BOLD signals may be not 
stimulus-specific.
Methods
Participants and task
In the current study we re-analyzed a dataset that was previously 
published as an MVPA study into the role of early visual cortex during 
mental imagery. Details of the task, experimental procedures and decoding 
analyses can be found elsewhere (Chapter 2). 
In brief, 24 participants (10 male, ages 18-30), performed a mental imagery 
(IM) and a working memory (WM) task while in the fMRI scanner (3T Trio 
MRI System, 3x3x3 mm voxels, TR = 2 seconds).  During this task (Figure 
3.1), participants were first shown two orientated gratings and two cues, 
which together instructed them about the imagery or working memory task 
to perform, as well as which orientated grating to use. Subsequently, they 
performed the task and maintained, or mentally rotated and imagined, a 
specific oriented grating for about 10 seconds. Each trial ended with the 
presentation of a visual probe that slightly differed from the imagined or 
maintained orientation. Participants performed a decision task on the 
probe and responded with a button press followed by feedback about their 
performance on that current trial. The period of interest was the maintenance/
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imagery period of 10 seconds. There were three unique orientations (15, 
75 and 135 degrees) that participants were to imagine, but due to the 
different rotation operations (60 and 120 degree rotation, clockwise and 
counterclockwise) and the retro-cueing procedure there were 60 unique trial 
types and 120 trials in total.
After the main task, participants underwent a functional localizer scan 
during which they were presented with the same three orientated gratings 
as in the main task (15, 75 and 135 degrees). The gratings were presented for 
12 seconds while flashed at 4 Hz, and participants pushed a response button 
whenever the fixation dot changed color. Finally, they underwent a scan for 
retinotopic mapping using a rotating wedge (Engel et al., 1997).
Retinotopy 
All analyses were performed on an individual, per subject basis. We used 
Freesurfer (http://surfer/nmr/mgh/harvard/edu/) to inflate the anatomical 
volume of each participant and to draw the borders of V1, V2 and V3 (DeYoe 
et al., 1996; Engel et al., 1997; Sereno et al., 1995; Wandell et al., 2007). Regions 
working 
memory
mental
imagery
maintain
rotate 
120° CW
...
... ?
time (seconds)
onset imagery visual probe
-2 0 10 12...
?
Figure 3.1 Simplified schematic of experimental Design. At the start of each trial, a 
task cue indicated whether participants had to maintain a stimulus in working memory 
(WM; top row) or create a new stimulus by imagining rotating the stimulus grating 
and keeping the ensuing mental image in their mind’s eye (mental imagery [IM]; bottom 
row). During IM trials, mental rotation could be clockwise or counterclockwise and 60° 
or 120°. After the task cue, two gratings (out of three possible stimuli: 15°, 75°, or 115°) 
were presented briefly (only 1 shown), followed by a second stimulus cue (not shown) that 
indicated which stimulus grating to select and maintain (WM) or rotate and then imagine 
(IM). After a 10 s delay period in which participants were asked to vividly imagine the 
relevant stimulus, a probe was presented. Participants indicated whether the probe was 
rotated clockwise or counterclockwise with respect to the stimulus they had kept in mind 
and received feedback on each trial. For a full figure of the task design, please refer to 
Figure 2.1.
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of interest (ROIs) were created for each early visual area. Due to confluent 
foveal representations for V1-V3 (Wandell et al., 2007), we excluded the 
foveal representation from our regions of interest. 
The individually drawn regions only covered the central portions of V1-
V3, as the wedge used for retinotopic mapping was only slightly larger than 
the grating stimuli in the main experiment. To obtain ROIs for the more 
peripheral parts of the visual regions, we obtained the probabilistic maps 
for V1, V2, and V3 from the Anatomy Toolbox in SPM (Amunts, Malikovic, 
Mohlberg, Schormann, & Zilles, 2000; Eickhoff et al., 2005; Kujovic et al., 2013; 
Rottschy et al., 2007), transformed them into a mask and converted these 
mask from MNI to subject-space using the inverse normalization parameters. 
We then defined the peripheral early visual regions as those voxels included 
in the SPM anatomy-masks, but excluding the voxels selected for the central 
visual regions from individually drawn retinotopy.
Preprocessing and voxel selection
Individual data were realigned and co-registered using SPM8 (http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 
London, UK). Within each central ROI, the 120 most active voxels during 
perception of all three gratings (during the independent functional localizer) 
were selected. For the combined early visual cortex ROI, all the voxels from 
the individual V1-V3 ROIs were selected. Within the peripheral ROIs, the 120 
most active voxels during the probe presentation (main task) were selected. 
We extracted the BOLD time course for each voxel in the ROIs and high pass-
filtered the data (removing signal with f<1/128 Hz) and detrended to remove 
slow drifts during the scanner runs.
GLMs and selection contrasts
We obtained activity contrasts to use for voxel selection for individual 
participants using the first level analysis in SPM8. For the localizer, we used 
three regressors to model the activity for each orientation (15, 75 and 135 
degrees, duration = 12 seconds) separately. For the main task we modeled 
the stimuli and cues (duration = 1.9 seconds), imagery period (duration = 
10.4 seconds) and probe with response (duration = 2.3 seconds) for the WM 
trials and IM trials separately. We created the following contrasts:
1. Visual stimulation contrast: a t-contrast of the activity during unat-
tended perception (functional localizer) of all oriented gratings ver-
sus baseline, regardless of orientation. This allowed us to investigate 
which voxels responded best to our stimuli.
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2. Selectivity contrast: for this contrast we looked at the voxels that 
were most selective to visual stimulation (functional localizer) of spe-
cific gratings (either 15 vs. 75 & 135 degrees, 75 vs. 15 & 135 degrees or 
135 vs. 15 & 75 degrees) by taking the voxels with the largest absolute 
t-value for any of these contrasts separately and recombining these 
into a new t-map. This contrast gave an indication of where these vox-
els with strong orientation selectivity are located.
3. Task stimulus contrast: a t-contrast from the main task, with the ac-
tivity during the instruction cues and grating stimuli (WM and IM 
trials combined). This contrast is again for voxels with the strongest 
response to the stimuli, but this time in the context of the main task. 
This contrast corresponds to the activity in the first BOLD peak.
4. Task probe contrast: t-contrast from main task, with the activity dur-
ing the probe presentation (WM and IM trials combined). This con-
trast corresponds to the activity in the second BOLD peak in the time 
course and allowed plotting the spatial distribution of the overall ac-
tivity at that point.
These contrasts were plotted on the inflated surfaces of the anatomical 
volumes using Freesurfer, with a threshold of t = 4.7, which was determined 
based on the p < 0.05 Family-wise error (FWE) corrected threshold as obtained 
from SPM8.
Decoding analyses 
In the original analyses, we trained linear support vector machines (SVMs) 
to discriminate between the three grating orientations based on the pattern of 
BOLD activity over voxels during the localizer (unattended perception). We 
then applied the SVMs to the imagery and working memory data to classify 
imagined orientation from the activity patterns during mental imagery and 
working memory maintenance for each scan (for details, please see Chapter 2). 
To check whether the signals in the peripheral regions of V1, V2 and V3 were 
indeed stimulus specific, we repeated these analyses for the 120 voxels most 
active during presentation of the probe. 
Separating voxels based on their preference
To obtain time courses for preferred and non-preferred orientations, 
we divided the voxels according to whether they preferred the internally 
visualized orientation or the other orientations, and then plotted the mean 
BOLD amplitude difference between preferred and non-preferred voxels 
over time. 
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First, we assigned a preferred orientation to every selected voxel by 
comparing the t-values from the following contrasts: 15 vs. 75 & 135, 75 vs. 
15 & 135 and 135 vs. 15 & 75. degrees The contrast that yielded the highest 
t-value for that voxel was taken as the preferred orientation and assigned 
to the voxel. Every voxel could only be assigned one orientation. Per voxel 
group, we then separated the trials with the preferred stimulus for that group 
(1/3 of the trials) from the trials with a non-preferred stimulus and averaged, 
per time-point, over voxels, trials and scanner runs (6 runs total) but for 
preferred and non-preferred trials separately. At this point in the analysis 
we had 3 ‘orientation-preference’-groups with each one standardized mean 
BOLD time course for their preferred stimulus and one for the non-preferred 
stimuli. We then averaged over voxel groups for preferred and non-preferred 
time courses independently.
Calculating % signal change
To convert the activity time courses to % signal change we used the 
following conversion:
As baseline we took the average activity in a voxel at the first scan of each 
trial, over all WM and IM trials in that run together. First, we standardized 
the activity per selected voxel per session by dividing each time-point (scan) 
by the baseline activity. After separating the time course for imagery of 
preferred and non-preferred stimuli, we multiplied the standardized time 
course by 100 and subsequently subtracted 100, averaged over participants, 
subtracted non-preferred from preferred time course and plotted the original 
time courses and the temporal evolution of the differences between them.
To test whether the difference in BOLD signal between preferred and 
non-preferred voxels was reliable, we used one-sample t-tests against 0. To 
investigate whether there was a relationship between decoding accuracy and 
BOLD differences between preferred and non-preferred orientations during 
the maintenance of stimuli, we calculated Spearman correlation coefficients 
between the BOLD difference and decoding accuracy for WM and IM in the 
period 8-10 seconds after onset of the imagery period. We directly compared 
the magnitude of the activity difference for preferred and non-preferred 
stimuli during stimulus visualization just before the probe (at 8 seconds) 
and after visual presentation of the probe (at 14 seconds) using paired t-tests, 
per region and for WM and IM independently.
% signal change =
task activity
baseline
x 100 - 100( )
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Figure 3.2 Decoding and BOLD over time in early visual cortex (V1-V3 combined). 
A) Time course of mean neural activity, separately for trials at which the preferred 
orientation was the target (solid lines) and trials at which the non-preferred orientation was 
the target (dashed lines); just above the baseline (at zero) the time course of the difference in 
activity for preferred and non-preferred orientations (-.- dashed lines). For both preferred 
and non-preferred orientations the neural activity, as indicated by the average blood-
oxygen-level dependent time course (averaged over the 360 selected voxels from central 
V1-V3) peaked 4-6 seconds after onset of the stimulus presentation and again 4-6 seconds 
after presentation of the probe. In between, the activity decreased substantially. The time 
course of activity for preferred and non-preferred orientations was highly similar: the 
differences between the two hardly differed from zero. Error bars denote SEM; the black 
dashed line indicates baseline; vertical grey lines indicate timing of events in the trial. 
Percent signal change was calculated with respect to the scans immediately preceding each 
trial (time point -2 seconds). B) Amplification of time course of the difference in activity 
between preferred and non-preferred orientations; as in A). The difference was calculated 
by subtracting the activity for non-preferred orientations (dashed lines in A) from the 
activity for preferred orientations (solid lines in A) for WM trials (black line) and IM 
trials (red line) separately. The shape of the time course resembles the shape of the decoding 
time course in C). Asterisks indicate a difference that was significantly different from 0, 
which occurred at 4-16 s for WM trials and at 8-16 s for IM trials (all p < 0.01), exactly 
the same time points as in C). Error bars denote SEM, vertical grey lines indicate timing 
of events in the trial.  C) Time course of decoding accuracy for working memory (black 
line) and mental imagery (red line), replicated from Figure 2.3. Significant decoding 
(indicated by asterisks) of the target orientation occurred at 4-16 seconds for WM and 
at 8-16 seconds for IM trials (all p < 0.001). The later decoding for imagined stimuli 
versus maintained stimuli is expected from the task. Error bars denote SEM; the black 
dashed line indicates chance level (33.3%); vertical grey lines indicate timing of events 
in the trial. D) Correlation between BOLD difference and decoding accuracy. There was 
a monotonic relationship between inter-individual differences in decoding accuracy and 
difference in BOLD activity for preferred and non-preferred orientations, for both working 
memory and mental imagery. Decoding accuracy was higher for people that had a higher 
overall BOLD difference when maintaining (WM: Spearman’s rho = -0.88, p < 0.001) or 
imagining (IM: rho = 0.66, p = 0.0004) mental content. Dots represent single subjects, 
with one black (WM) and one red (IM) dot per participant.
Regional percentages
To quantify the division of activity over central and peripheral early visual 
cortex, we first combined the central and peripheral masks per region (V1, 
V2 and V3). Within these larger masks, we selected the 200 voxels with the 
highest t-value. Subsequently, we counted how many of these selected voxels 
were present in central and peripheral early visual cortex. We performed a 
chi-square test of homogeneity over the average voxel counts per region, to 
calculate whether the number of voxels observed per region were equally 
divided taking into account the size of the region.
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Results
To investigate the apparent discrepancy between decoding accuracy 
and overall BOLD levels reported before, we split voxels into groups with a 
certain preference (‘sub-ROIs’) and analyzed the time course of their BOLD 
response to preferred and non-preferred orientations. We found that the 
average BOLD amplitude time courses for preferred and non-preferred 
orientation largely resembled each other (Figure 3.2A). However, there was 
a small, yet robust difference in BOLD activity to preferred orientation and 
to non-preferred orientations (Figure 3.2A-B). One-sample t-tests on these 
differences, over subjects, showed significant differences at 4-14 seconds 
(WM) and 8-14 seconds (IM) after onset of the imagery period (all p < 0.01, 
two-tailed; * in Figure 3.2B).
The time course of the difference between preferred and non-preferred 
orientations was very similar to the classification performance time course, 
and significant decoding occurred at the time points at which also a 
Figure 3.2
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significant difference in BOLD was observed (Figure 3.2C, * indicate p < 
0.001). Moreover, between-subject variance in BOLD activity differences 
strongly correlated with variance in decoding accuracy in early visual cortex 
(WM: Spearman ρ = 0.88, p < 0.001; IM: ρ = 0.66, p < 0.001; Figure 3.2D). This 
difference between activity for preferred versus non-preferred orientations, 
and the correlation with decoding accuracy was also present in V1, V2 and 
V3 independently (Supplemental Figure S3.1A-C, Table S3.1). Finally, further 
divisions of the time course showed that the effect was independent of visual 
perception: there was also a higher BOLD response to preferred stimuli that 
had not been visually presented (Supplementary Methods and Figure S3.1D-F; 
Chapter 2). Together, these findings suggest that the SVM classification relied 
on activity biases in populations of voxels that were more active during trials 
with their preferred orientation than during trials with their non-preferred 
orientation(s), resolving the apparent paradox between the univariate 
decrease in activity and multivariate increase in information described in 
previous studies (e.g. Albers et al., 2013; Harrison & Tong, 2009; Sneve et al., 
2012).
Interestingly, the differences in activity (and decoding) between preferred 
and non-preferred orientations were equally large during the imagery 
period, when the BOLD decreased, and during the visual presentation of the 
probe, during which there was a strong peak in overall activity (all p > 0.16; 
see the second peak in Figure 3.2A-B). The differences were much smaller 
than the overall BOLD response, both with (probe) and without (imagery/
maintenance) physical stimulus presentation. At the peak of activity in 
response to the probe (14 seconds), which coincided with the peak of the 
difference and the peak of the decoding, the activity difference between 
preferred and non-preferred stimuli was 8% (WM) and 7% (IM) of the overall 
BOLD response. In other words, the bulk of the BOLD signal to the stimulus 
did not appear to be "orientation-specific". 
Some earlier studies have reported a non-stimulus related BOLD response 
in early visual cortex during a decision process and suggested that this signal 
was largely located in peripheral regions of early visual cortex (Donner, Sagi, 
Bonneh, & Heeger, 2008; Jack, Shulman, Snyder, McAvoy, & Corbetta, 2006). 
To investigate whether the overall BOLD response indeed contained a large 
component that was non-specific for the stimulus, we investigated its spatial 
topography. Specifically, we compared the t-maps for bottom-up stimulus 
perception (visual stimulation contrast) and stimulus selectivity (selectivity 
contrast) with stimulus perception in the task context (task stimulus contrast 
and task probe contrast).
The stimulus presentation during the localizer (visual stimulation contrast) 
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resulted in strong, focal activity in early visual cortex, specifically in the 
central regions covered by the stimulus, combined with some deactivation 
in the more peripheral regions of the early visual cortex (Figure 3.3A & 3.3E). 
The most selective voxels (selectivity contrast) also centered in the central, 
stimulus-covered regions of early visual cortex, and thus overlapped with 
the most active regions during stimulus presentation (Figure 3.3B & 3.3F). 
The topography of activity during the stimulus and cue presentation in 
the main task (task stimulus contrast, first peak in the time course) largely 
resembled the activity of stimulus presentation during the localizer (visual 
stimulation contrast): strong activity in central regions and some deactivation 
in peripheral regions of early visual cortex (Figure 3.3C & 3.3G). However, 
activity was more extensive and also covered other parts of the visual system, 
as well as other brain regions.
The neural activity during the probe (task probe contrast, second peak in the 
time course) was less strong in central regions of early visual cortex (Figure 
3.3D & 3.3H), compared to the stimulus presentation during the localizer and 
the main task (visual stimulation contrast and task stimulus contrast). Moreover, 
in response to the probe the peripheral regions of early visual cortex were 
activated instead of deactivated, even though the probe and feedback also 
only presented around or at fixation. This is suggests that the large activity 
peak during probe presentation is retinotopically unspecific.
To quantify the division over central and peripheral regions for these 
contrasts, we took the 200 voxels with highest t-values in each early visual 
brain region (combining central and peripheral) and calculated the division 
of these selected voxels over the central and the peripheral regions (Figure 
S3.2). A larger number of the most active voxels (visual stimulation contrast) 
was found in central V1 than in peripheral V1 (χ2-test of independence, χ2(1, 
N = 1308) = 200.12, p < 1*10-16; Figure S3.2), even though peripheral V1 was 
much larger. The same distribution of voxels over central and peripheral 
visual cortex was found for the most selective voxels (selectivity contrast, χ2(1, 
N = 1308) = 66.32, p = 3.33*10-16) and the most stimulus-responsive voxels (task 
stimulus contrast, χ2(1, N = 1308) = 109.79, p < 1*10-16). There was a comparable 
pattern in V2 (see Supplementary Table S3.2). During the probe presentation 
(task probe contrast), on the other hand, the most responsive voxels were 
found in the peripheral parts of V1 (χ2(1, N = 1308) = 20.03, p = 7.64*10-6).
Finally, we took the 120 voxels in each peripheral region that were most 
responsive to probe presentation and investigated their stimulus specificity 
and time course (Figure 3.4). The probe-peak in the peripheral regions was 
larger than the peak in response to the stimuli, and it was comparable in 
overall height to the stimulus-peak in the central regions. Although visually 
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Figure 3.3 Topography of neural activity during localizer and task on the flat-
brains of 2 representative subjects. A-D) participant 1 left and right hemisphere, 
E-H) participant 2 left and right hemisphere. The white outlines indicate the borders of 
central V1, manually drawn for each participant using FreeSurfer. All contrasts were 
thresholded at t = 4.7, the 0.05 FWE corrected threshold obtained from SPM8. A&E) 
visual stimulation contrast: voxels with larger activity for bottom-up stimulus perception 
of all orientated gratings > baseline during the functional localizer for participant 1 
(A) and 2 (E). Activity was located in the central part of early visual cortex, with some 
deactivation in the peripheral parts. B&F) Selectivity contrast: voxels most selective to 
one of the three orientations during bottom-up stimulus perception (functional localizer), 
for participant 1 (B) and 2 (F). The most selective voxels also clustered in central visual 
cortex, somewhat more in V2 than in V1. This preference for V2 over V1 is in line with the 
decoding difference between the two regions, which was slightly better in V2 (Chapter 2). 
C&G) Task stimulus contrast: areas with more activity during the presentation of the 
visual stimuli and cues > baseline during the IM and WM tasks, for participant 1 (C) 
and 2 (G). There was strong activity in central parts of early visual cortex, with some 
deactivation in peripheral early visual cortex. D&H) Probe contrast: active areas during 
the visual presentation of the probe, button press and feedback in the IM and WM task 
for participant 1 (D) and 2 (H). Again, activity spread out over the full brain, but this 
time there was activation instead of deactivation in peripheral parts of early visual 
cortex. The brain-wide activity during stimulus and probe presentation (task stimulus 
contrast and task probe contrast) compared to perceptual activity in the localizer (visual 
stimulation contrast) was expected from the additional task demands at those time points: 
processing of the cue and stimulus related information during the task stimulus contrast 
and the comparison process, button press and feedback during the task probe contrast. 
The additional task during the localizer (spotting changes in the fixation cross) occurred 
similarly during grating presentation and baseline.
similar to the central regions, the differences in activity to preferred and non-
preferred orientation in the periphery were much smaller and not significant 
(all p > 0.012, except WM at 6 s for peripheral V1-V3 combined; Figure 3.4A-B). 
These findings were also visible in V1, V2 and V3 separately (Figure S3.3): no 
consistent difference in BOLD for preferred and non-preferred orientations 
in either of these regions (all p > 0.023). In line with this, decoding accuracy 
was substantially smaller in these voxels (max ~40%) and only significantly 
present at a few time points (8 and 14 s for WM; 12-14 s for IM, Figure 
3.4C), unrelated to the time points showing a significant difference between 
preferred and non-preferred stimuli. The limited stimulus specificity but the 
high overall BOLD activity suggests that activity in the peripheral regions 
was only partly stimulus specific.
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Discussion
Here we investigated how there can be highly reliable stimulus information 
present in patterns of BOLD activity during mental maintenance of stimuli 
when BOLD amplitude is low or even at baseline levels (e.g. Bosch et al., 2014; 
Emrich et al., 2013; e.g. Harrison & Tong, 2009). We re-analyzed a previously 
reported dataset in which participants mentally imagined or maintained in 
working memory an oriented grating (Chapter 2) and found that although 
the overall BOLD activity in early visual cortex was highly stereotypical 
and independent of stimulus content, there was a slight but robust activity 
increase in voxels that were tuned to the imagined orientation, compared 
to voxels that preferred another stimulus. The size of these differences 
directly correlated with the decoding accuracy that we reported earlier. 
This difference in activity between preferred and non-preferred stimuli 
was about equally large for visually presented (bottom-up) and internally 
generated (top-down) stimuli. The large overall BOLD increase during 
visual presentation of the probe in the main task covered both central and 
peripheral regions of V1, V2 and V3 and showed little stimulus-specificity in 
the peripheral regions. 
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Our results suggests that the stimulus-evoked BOLD signals in visual 
cortex during a task context are an amalgam of stimulus-specific and non-
specific processes whereby a large part of the BOLD response to stimuli 
may be non-specific, both in terms of orientation selectivity and retinotopic 
specificity. On top of this large non-specific contribution is the small but 
reliable difference in stimulus-specific activity.  This small, stimulus-specific 
component of the BOLD response appeared equally large for bottom-up 
visual stimulation and top-down internally generated images. This can 
explain the apparent discrepancy in earlier studies where BOLD was low 
but decoding accuracy high: a decodable stimulus representation can result 
from a highly specific pattern of activity in only the subset of voxels that 
were relevant for the stimulus. 
The small but reliable time course difference between voxels’ response to 
their preferred and non-preferred orientations are in line with our hypothesis 
that only the activity in the relevant voxels remains high(er) during image 
maintenance (Sneve et al., 2012). The matching time courses for decoding and 
BOLD differences also suggest that the stimulus-specific BOLD component 
Figure 3.4 Decoding and BOLD over time in peripheral parts of early visual cortex 
(V1-V3 combined). A) Time course of mean neural activity, separately for trials at which 
the preferred orientation was the target (solid lines) and trials at which the non-preferred 
orientation was the target (dashed lines); just above the baseline (at zero) the time course 
of the difference in activity for preferred and non-preferred orientations (-.- dashed lines). 
For both preferred and non-preferred orientations, the neural activity, as indicated by the 
average blood-oxygen-level dependent time course (averaged over the 360 selected voxels 
from peripheral V1-V3) peaked at 4-6 seconds after onset of the stimulus presentation 
and again ~6 seconds after presentation of the probe. In between, the activity decreased 
substantially. The time course of activity for preferred and non-preferred orientations 
was highly similar: the differences between the two hardly differed from zero. Error bars 
denote SEM; the black dashed line indicates baseline; vertical grey lines indicate timing 
of events in the trial. Percent signal change was calculated with respect to the scans 
immediately preceding each trial (time point -2 seconds). B) Amplification of time course 
of the difference in activity between preferred and non-preferred orientations; as in A). 
The difference was calculated by subtracting the activity for non-preferred orientations 
(dashed lines in A) from the activity for preferred orientations (solid lines in A) for WM 
trials (black line) and IM trials (red line) separately. The resulting time course was not 
significantly different from 0, except at 6 seconds after stimulus onset of the WM trials 
(asterisks indicate p < 0.01). Error bars denote SEM; grey vertical lines indicate timing of 
events in the trial. C) Time course of decoding accuracy for working memory (black line) 
and mental imagery (red line) in peripheral V1-V3. Error bars denote SEM; the black 
dashed line indicates chance level (33.3%); vertical grey lines indicate timing of events in 
the trial; asterisks indicate significant decoding at p < 0.001.
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underlies the above chance decoding in our earlier study (Chapter 2) and 
most likely in some of the other studies that found internal representations 
in early visual cortex (Bosch et al., 2014; Christophel, Cichy, Hebart, & 
Haynes, 2014; Harrison & Tong, 2009). These findings are a reminder 
that decoding can rely on a univariate effect. Subsets of voxels within a 
region might be tuned for a certain orientation and therefore respond also 
slightly stronger to that stimulus, information which the decoder can rely 
on (Kamitani & Tong, 2005). The sensitivity of MVPA decoding to small, 
spatially distributed and sparse univariate effects at the voxel level (Davis 
et al., 2014; Jimura & Poldrack, 2012; Mur et al., 2009) makes it a powerful 
analysis tool for investigating the (inherently) subtle signals related to mental 
representations. However, it does not mean that multivariate methods reveal 
a multivariate code necessarily: if a few voxels show a small univariate 
effect related or unrelated to the effect of interest, this can lead to significant 
decoding. Encoding models that explicitly model how the BOLD patterns 
encode certain features (e.g. Brouwer & Heeger, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2008; 
Vu et al., 2011), might be more informative about the underlying neural code 
(Davis et al., 2014).
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the differences between stimuli were 
relatively small compared to the large overall BOLD increase, even during 
visual stimulation of the probe grating. Moreover, the overall BOLD signal 
was not restricted to stimulus specific areas in visual cortex, but spread 
out peripherally. The signal in the peripheral regions was also largely 
non-specific to the stimulus: there were no significant differences in BOLD 
activity for preferred and non-preferred stimuli; decoding accuracies were 
low and mostly non-significant. This suggests that stimulus-evoked BOLD 
signals in visual cortex during a task context can be partly non-specific (Jack 
et al., 2006).
The stimulus-unspecific activity could also result from voxels that 
are equally responsive to all three stimuli and therefore did not show 
differential activity. As activity in a voxel is pooled from a large number 
of underlying neurons, each voxel is likely to respond to all orientations at 
least to some extent. This might especially hold for the voxels in the central 
regions of early visual cortex, which were selected on the basis of their 
response amplitude for all gratings alike. A highly similar overall response, 
with small differences in preference in different voxels, is in line with the 
original rational for orientation decoding in early visual cortex (Kamitani 
& Tong, 2005). However, if the large difference in overall BOLD between 
perception and imagery is solely due to stimulus-induced activity during 
perception, presenting a stimulus should affect activity in the voxels tuned 
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to the stimulus also slightly more. This should lead to an increased difference 
between voxels with a preference and voxels without a preference for the 
stimulus. However, we found that even when overall BOLD increased 
substantially, the differences in BOLD activity remained equally small and 
decoding accuracy did not increase. Furthermore, during the first BOLD 
peak the difference between preferred and non-preferred orientations was 
very limited, while the difference increased as overall BOLD decreased; it 
then remained stable during probe presentation. Moreover, in the peripheral 
parts of early visual cortex, where there was no physically presented stimulus, 
the overall BOLD signal was at least as high as in the central regions, while 
less stimulus-specific information could be extracted from the signal and 
decoding accuracy was much lower. This suggests that the stimulus specific 
part is equally small during bottom-up and top-down processes.The small 
stimulus-specific signal is supplemented by a relatively large signal that does 
not contribute to stimulus representations, occurs throughout early visual 
cortex, and might serve another, possibly non-visual purpose.
A non-representational role for activity in visual cortex is in line with 
some previous studies that reported a non-visual response in early visual 
cortex and associated it with task transitions (Jack et al., 2006), attentional 
orienting (Kleinschmidt, 2006), temporal selection (Swallow, Makovski, & 
Jiang, 2012) or decision-related processing (Donner et al., 2008; Kloosterman 
et al., 2014; Warren, Nieuwenhuis, & Donner, 2015). The signal might be 
instantiated by a general neuro-modulator boost released from sub-cortical 
sources that serves to stabilize the relevant representation (Donner et al., 
2008; Jack et al., 2006; Swallow et al., 2012; Warren et al., 2015). The findings 
in the current study are in line with those reported in the literature. The 
signal appeared when the participants had to judge the probe and give a 
button press response. Therefore, the event could be described as task 
transition (from maintenance to visual perception and judgment), as well 
as decision related process. Furthermore, we found the signal to be larger 
in the peripheral regions of visual cortex, as also reported in some of these 
studies (Donner et al., 2008; Jack et al., 2006). Together, this suggests that the 
overall BOLD signal during our task consisted of both stimulus-specific and 
non-stimulus specific signals. 
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Conclusion
Our results suggest that stimulus evoked BOLD signals in visual cortex 
during a task context are an amalgam of stimulus-specific and non-stimulus-
specific processes, whereby a part of the BOLD response to stimuli may be 
in fact non-specific, both in terms of orientation selectivity and retinotopic 
specificity. Riding on top of this relatively large, non-specific contribution is 
a small but reliable difference in stimulus-specific activity. This latter activity 
is also present and of equal magnitude during maintenance of material, albeit 
not accompanied by the large non-specific BOLD signal. This may explain 
why decoding of stimulus orientation (which relies on stimulus specific 
BOLD signal differences) can be highly accurate even when overall BOLD 
signals are low.
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Supplementary Material
Supplementary methods
Separating orientations based on their ‘role’ in the task
We were also interested in the difference in BOLD activation time course 
between voxels that were (i) the target orientation of mental rotation, (ii) the 
orientation of the stimulus that was cued and (iii) the orientation that was 
neither cued, nor the target of mental rotation, as this allowed us to investigate 
the activity pattern for stimuli that had not been visually presented at that 
trial. Therefore, we further separated the time course difference based on those 
different ‘roles’ of the orientations and plotted them over time. This analysis 
can be compared to the decoding depicted in Figure S3.1D, adapted from 
Figure 2.2. Finally, we approached this same issue from a slightly different 
point and also looked at (i) stimulus induced activity (time courses of the 2 
orientations that were presented – time course of non-presented orientation); 
(ii) Cue-induced activity (time course of retrocued stimulus – time course 
of non-retrocued stimulus) and (iii) imagery-induced activity (imagined 
orientation – retrocued orientation). We then plotted the difference time 
courses to observe their temporal evolution. Again, the time courses of the 
difference in BOLD response for preferred and non-preferred orientations 
followed the time course of the decoding accuracy (Figure S3.1D-F). 
 
Supplementary Results
V1 V2 V3 V1-V3 combined
WM: Spearman’s rho ρ = 0.47 ρ = 0.80 ρ = 0.80 ρ = 0.88
p-value p = 0.021 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001
IM: Spearman’s rho ρ = 0.60 ρ = 0.67 ρ = 0.75 ρ = 0.66
p-value p = 0.00020 p = 0.00040 p < 0.0001 p = 0.00040
Table S3.1 Spearman rank correlation between decoding accuracy and BOLD 
differences. Decoding accuracy was calculated at 8-10 seconds after onset of the imagery 
period, and the BOLD differences between preferred and non-preferred orientations at the 
same time points, for all areas separately.
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Figure S3.1 Differences in BOLD amplitude between preferred and non-preferred 
stimuli in each region, and when splitting the orientations based on their role in 
the task. A-C) Differences in neural activity (as indicated by the average blood-oxygen-
level dependent time course averaged over the 120 selected voxels per region) between 
preferred and non-preferred orientations for V1, V2 and V3 separately; as in Figure 3.2B). 
Error bars denote SEM; asterisks indicate significant difference from 0 at p < 0.01; the 
black dashed line indicates baseline; vertical grey lines indicate timing of events in the 
trial. Percent signal change was calculated with respect to the scans immediately preceding 
each trial (time point -2 seconds). D-F) The time course of the difference in BOLD can 
also explain the temporal pattern of decoding for the cued, uncued and imagined gratings 
that was presented in Figure 2.2. D) Temporal unfolding of mental representations for IM 
as indicated by the proportion of classifier choice when testing V1-V3 combined, averaged 
over the 24 participants. On these trials, participants mentally rotated the cued stimulus 
toward the not-physically-presented grating orientation. Activity patterns during the first 
time point (2 s after IM onset) showed a mixture of the two physically presented stimuli 
(red and pink lines), while the not-presented grating was the least selected. Thereafter, 
there was a gradual switch in classifier choice from the cued grating (pink) to the generated 
target grating (blue). Error bars denote SEM; dashed black line indicates chance level 
(33.3%); grey vertical lines indicate events in the trial. E) BOLD difference time courses 
separated based on those different ‘roles’ of the orientations during the task: cued stimulus 
(pink), uncued stimulus (red) and target (orientation after rotation, blue), as in D).   
F) Induced BOLD difference time courses, as in E).
V1 V2 V3
Activity  
contrast
χ2(1, n = 1308)= 
200.12
p < 1*10-16
χ2(1, n = 878)= 
100.16
p < 1*10-16
χ2(1, n = 1157)= 
92.34
p < 1*10-16
Selectivity  
contrast
χ2(1, n = 1308)= 
66.32
p =3.33*10-16
χ2(1, n = 878)= 
43.93
p =3.40*10-11
χ2(1, n = 1157)= 
30.11
p =4.088*10-8
Task stimulus 
contrast
χ2(1, n = 1308)= 
109.79
p < 1*10-16
χ2(1, n = 878)= 
48.30
p =3.66*10-12
χ2(1, n = 1157)= 
41.94
p =9.39*10-11
Task probe  
contrast
χ2(1, n = 1308)= 
20.03
p =7.64 *10-06
χ2(1, n = 878)= 
0.02
p =0.89
χ2(1, n = 1157)= 
1.44
p =0.23
Table S3.2 χ2 – test of independence for division over central and peripheral regions. The 
200 most active or selective voxels during the localizer (upper two rows) and the 200 most 
active voxels during stimulus and probe presentation during the imagery task (lower two 
rows). 
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Figure S3.2 Voxel division over center and periphery. Division of the 200 most 
active/selective voxels over central and peripheral parts of early visual cortex, per contrast 
(visual stimulation contrast, selectivity contrast, task stimulus contrast and task probe 
contrast, as in Figure 3.3). Box plots show median (and spread over the 24 participants) of 
the number of the selected voxels that was found in central or peripheral V1, V2 and V3. 
Red dots indicate outliers. A) Division over central and peripheral V1. More of the most 
active and selective voxels were found in central V1, except during the presentation of the 
probe (chi-square tests of homogeneity). B) Division over central and peripheral V2; same 
as A). C) Division over central and peripheral V3. Here, there were about equal numbers 
of voxels located in central and peripheral V3 for the selectivity contrast and the task 
stimulus contrast. Note however, that peripheral V3 generally was larger than central V3. 
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Figure S3.3 BOLD amplitude, BOLD difference and decoding in peripheral parts 
of early visual cortex, V1, V2 and V3 separately. A-C) Time courses of the mean 
neural activity patterns (as indicated by average blood-oxygen-level dependent amplitude 
averaged over the 120 selected voxels per region) in peripheral V1, V2 and V3, with respect 
to the average activity immediately preceding trial onset (t = -2s). The overall BOLD 
amplitude in peripheral V1, V2 and V3 followed a similar pattern, which resembled the 
time course of overall activity in the central parts of V1, V2 and V3. Error bars indicate 
SEM. D-F) Time course of the difference in activity between trials with the preferred 
and non-preferred orientation, also in peripheral V1, V2 and V3. The difference between 
preferred and non-preferred trials was not significantly different from zero at any time 
point in peripheral V1, V2 or V3; as opposed to the difference time courses in the central 
parts of V1-V3 (Figure 3.2 & Figure S3.1). G-I)  Time course of decoding accuracy for 
working memory (black line) and mental imagery (red line) in peripheral V1-V3, the black 
dashed line indicates chance level (33.3%); Error bars denote SEM; the vertical grey lines 
indicate timing of events in the trial.
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Tracking the dynamics  
of mental imagery in  
early visual cortex
Based on
A. M. Albers, P. Mostert, R. Boyacioğlu, I. Toni, F. P. de Lange, “Tracking the 
dynamics of mental imagery in early visual cortex”, in preparation.
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Abstract 
Previous studies suggest that early visual cortex contains information 
about visual content that is kept in working memory, or internally generated 
through imagery. These findings are in line with the notion that early visual 
cortex can operate like a ‘blackboard’: a region that processes high-detail 
information from both bottom-up stimulus input and top-down internally 
generated content. Here we investigated the dynamics of this putative function 
of early visual cortex during mental transformations of visual content. We 
used high temporal resolution fMRI to track brain activity patterns in early 
visual cortex while participants imagined rotating a grating. Mental rotation 
is thought to resemble actual rotation as it takes progressively longer to 
mentally rotate an object over larger angles. We used a forward modeling 
approach to reconstruct the content of mental imagination from BOLD data 
during the rotation process. 
While we could not observe robust representations of intermediate 
orientations in early visual cortex during the mental rotation process, we 
found a clear neural representation of the final stimulus that participants 
imagined after the rotation. The time point at which we could decode this 
representation depended on the rotational angle of the mental transformation, 
with longer rotation angles leading to a later representation of final 
orientation. Furthermore, at the onset of the final imagined representation 
we observed a general, transient increase in BOLD signal, the appearance 
of which also depended on the rotational angle. These findings suggest 
that the orientation-related patterns of BOLD activity in early visual cortex 
are dynamic as they evolve in synchrony with task demands: as a stable 
imagined percept is being generated, early visual cortex functions as a high-
resolution blackboard for visual representations. However, the high-detail 
visual buffer V1 might be recruited differently during transformations of 
mental content than during generation of a stable, imagined percept. 
82
Introduction
Recently, several researchers have shown that early visual cortex contains 
‘perception-like’ representations of internally generated content during 
cognitive processes such as working memory maintenance (Harrison & 
Tong, 2009; Serences et al., 2009), memory recall (Bosch et al., 2014), mental 
imagery (Chapter 2) and even dreaming (Horikawa et al., 2013). These 
findings support the notion that early visual cortex can be characterized as a 
dynamic ‘blackboard’: a region that processes high-detail information from 
both bottom-up stimulus input and top-down internally generated content 
(Chapter 2; Bullier, 2001a; T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003; S. I. Moro et al., 2010; 
Mumford, 1991; Pasternak & Greenlee, 2005; Tong, 2013). 
The previous studies have predominantly investigated representations of 
static content. Often, however, representations are dynamic. For example, 
when we cross a road, we imagine the trajectory and speed of an approaching 
car to assess whether we can still safely cross, or should rather wait. Under 
the assumption that early visual cortex is also relevant for these forms of 
imagery, the dynamic blackboard hypothesis generates several predictions 
regarding the temporal evolution of these dynamic representations in early 
visual cortex: (1) The temporal order of processing should be preserved in 
the representations in early visual cortex. (2) If a mental transformation takes 
more time, the representation of the final product should also occur later 
in early visual cortex. (3) If early visual cortex is involved in intermediate 
calculations during mental transformations, it should also represent these 
intermediate steps from the transformation process. Previous work supports 
the first hypothesis: for example, early visual cortex sequentially represents 
the different processing steps in a sequential task (Chapter 2; Christophel et 
al., 2014; S. I. Moro et al., 2010). However, to the best of our knowledge the 
second and the third hypothesis have not been tested. 
Here we investigated these dynamical aspects of the role of early visual 
cortex during cognitive processing. We used high temporal resolution fMRI 
(Moeller et al., 2010) to track the brain activity patterns in early visual cortex 
while participants imagined mentally rotating a grating. Mental rotation is 
thought to resemble actual rotation and takes progressively longer for 
rotation of objects over larger angles (de Lange et al., 2008; Podgorny & 
Shepard, 1978; Shepard & Metzler, 1971). We used a forward modeling 
approach to reconstruct the content of the mental imaginations over time 
(Brouwer & Heeger, 2009, 2011, 2013), which allowed us to reconstruct 
the represented orientation from the brain activity across the full range of 
possible orientations. High temporal resolution fMRI (210 ms per volume 
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acquisition) allowed us to reconstruct these imagined orientations with 
sufficient temporal specificity to discriminate between the different rotation 
angles. Although the hemodynamic delay renders the BOLD signal a slow 
signal, this delay is highly stable within a region (Dale & Buckner, 1997) and 
hence can be used to temporally discriminate between processes (Sang-Hun 
Lee, Blake, & Heeger, 2005; Menon, Luknowsky, & Gati, 1998).
We found that representations of the end-product of the rotation process 
appeared later in visual cortex when they were the result of a longer mental 
rotation process. Moreover, these stable representations were marked by a 
‘decision-signal’ of which the onset was systematically related to the duration 
of the mental rotation. These findings suggest that V1 is recruited differently 
during transformations of mental content than during generation of a stable, 
imagined percept.
Methods
Participants 
Thirty participants were recruited for participation. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and all were paid or received course 
credits for their participation. The study was conducted in accordance with 
the institutional guidelines of the local ethical committee (CMO region 
Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands). They were trained on the task 
in a behavioral setting for approximately one hour to ensure proper task 
performance. After training, five participants were excluded from further 
participation due to a failure to understand the task (confusing clockwise and 
counterclockwise, problems understanding the angles) or to reach sufficient 
performance (criteria for inclusion were > 75% correct and angle difference 
< 20 degrees for each condition). Two further participants were excluded 
because of incomplete datasets due to scanner failure and one because of 
computer failure. Therefore, twenty-two participants (8 male, ages 18-34, 
mean 24.4 years, 1 left-handed) were included in the analysis.
Stimuli
Stimuli were grayscale luminance-defined sinusoidal gratings generated 
using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA) in conjunction with the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). The gratings were presented in 
an annulus (outer diameter: 15° of visual angle; inner diameter: 2° of visual 
angle; frequency: 1 cycle/degree; contrast: 80%;) surrounding a central 
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fixation point. The gratings had an orientation of either 0°, 30°, 60°, 90°, 120° 
or 150° from the vertical axis. Stimuli were displayed on a rear-projection 
screen using an EIKI projector (EIKI, Rancho Santa Margarita, C.A.) projector 
(1,024 x 768 resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate). 
Task
 The sequence of events in each trial is outlined in Figure 4.1. Each trial 
started with a cue indicating rotation direction ( > for clockwise, < for 
counterclockwise) and amount of rotation required (0°, 60°, 120° or 180° 
degrees). Subsequently, participants received a second cue that indicated 
the orientation they had to start with. Orientation of the starting grating was 
indicated by the numbers 1-6, where 1 denoted a starting orientation of 30° 
from the vertical axis, 2 denoted a starting orientation of 60° from the vertical 
axis, until 6 which denoted 0 degrees from the vertical axis.
Importantly, the grating to be imagined and the rotation angle were 
both symbolically cued, to ensure that all imagery-related activity was 
independent from bottom-up stimulation. Participants had to mentally 
rotate a grating with the indicated start-orientation by the amount indicated 
by the rotation cue. They pressed a button with their right index finger 
whenever they had finished rotating. During the first part of the training 
session, participants received feedback on their rotation speed, to ensure a 
uniform rotation speed of 30 degrees per second in the fMRI session. After 
the mental transformation and button press, the subjects were required to 
keep the rotated image stably in mind for 6 seconds after which a probe 
appeared on the screen. The probe consisted of a grating with the orientation 
of the grating they were supposed to imagine at that moment, with a small 
orientation deviation added in either clockwise (CW) or counterclockwise 
(CCW) direction. Participants had to compare the probe to the stimulus in 
mind and indicate whether it was rotated clockwise or counterclockwise 
using the index finger or middle finger of their right hand.  They received 
feedback on every trial to ensure motivation and attention. Feedback was 
delivered by briefly changing the color of the fixation dot to green (correct), 
red (incorrect) or blue (missed response). The inter-trial interval was 9.6 
seconds to allow the BOLD signal to return to baseline. 
The combination of 6 starting orientations, 2 rotation directions and 
4 amounts of rotation resulted in 48 unique trial possibilities. Each trial 
possibility was presented 3 times; leading to a total of 144 trials pseudo-
randomly divided over 6 blocks. Additionally, each block contained 2 catch 
trials, to promote continuous rotation. These catch trials were similar to task 
trials except that the probe appeared during the rotation period. Whenever 
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this probe appeared, participants had to stop rotating and compare the 
orientation that they currently had in mind with the probe on the screen. 
After the comparison, the trial ended and the inter-trial interval started. The 
catch trials were not included in the analysis. 
Staircase procedure
The difficulty of the comparison was continuously adjusted using a 
staircase procedure. The staircase procedure ensured that the comparison 
task would become more difficult when participants correctly answered, but 
less difficult when participants made a mistake. For the staircase, we used a 
two-up, one-down algorithm (Alcala-Quintana & Garcia-Perez, 2007; Garcia-
Perez, 1998) with step size of 0.45/1. Specifically, the angle difference for the 
rotation would be increased by 1 degree when participants made a mistake, 
and decreased by 0.45 degrees when participants gave two subsequent 
Figure 4.1 Task design. Participants imagined and mentally rotated a symbolically cued 
grating. The orientation of the grating to be imagined was cued using the numbers 1-6, 
which referred to the angle obtained with the arrows of the clock pointing to that hour. After 
the mental transformation they pressed a button and then kept the rotated image in mind 
for 6 seconds. Subsequently they compared their mental image to a probe that appeared on 
the screen and indicated whether the probe was rotated clockwise or counterclockwise with 
respect to the grating in mind. Participants received feedback on every trial to keep them 
motivated. The inter-trial interval was 9.6 seconds.
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correct answers. The staircase was calculated separately for the four different 
rotation amounts (0, 60, 120, 180 degrees) and updated after each trial in the 
main experiment.
Functional localizer scans 
After the main experiment, participants underwent three additional 
localizer runs. To obtain data for the perceptual classifier, we measured 
the brain response to unattended perception of gratings. Gratings with the 
same orientations as those used in the main task were presented for longer 
durations (14.6 seconds), during which each grating was flashed at 4 Hz. We 
presented two scanner runs of 5 blocks, with all the orientations presented 
once per block in a pseudo-random order and with rest periods in between. 
Participants did a demanding task at fixation, where they had to detect the 
presence of an X or Z in a continuous stream of letters (target probability 0.1). 
The letters were presented at 0.35 degrees of visual angle and were presented 
for 250 ms.
fMRI Acquisition Parameters 
Functional images were acquired using a 3T Trio MRI system (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany), using a multiband sequence (Moeller et al., 2010) with 
acceleration factor 8 (FA = 80 degrees, FOV = 64x64x24 voxels, voxel size 
3.5x3.5x3.5 mm, TR/TE = 210/30 ms) positioned over the visual cortex and, if 
possible for the participant, parietal cortex. Structural images were acquired 
using a T1-weighted MP-Rage sequence (FA = 8 degrees, FOV = 192x256x256, 
voxel size 1x1x1, TR/TE = 2300/3.03ms). 
Overall aim and analytical path
To test the three predictions from the hypothesis that early visual 
cortex is a dynamic blackboard, we scanned at a high temporal resolution 
and analyzed the data in the early visual cortex ROIs using the following 
analytical approach:
1. To check the validity of our paradigm, we analyzed the behavioural 
rotation times from our participants. This resulted in two periods 
of interest: the rotational period (variable duration) and the image 
maintenance period (6 seconds).
2. To test whether the temporal order of processing was preserved in early 
visual cortex, we analysed the overall BOLD time courses and compared 
the timing of the responses (peaks) to the onsets and durations of the 
rotational and maintenance periods.
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3. To test whether mental representations appear later in visual cortex 
when the rotation process takes longer, we investigated the maintenance 
period. We reconstructed mental representations using the forward 
model and matched these to the to-be-maintained orientations. We then 
assesed the onset latency of the representation of the to-be-maintained 
orientation, to provide a neural measure of the onset of the maintenance 
period.
4. To test whether early visual cortex is involved in the intermediate 
calculations during mental transformations, we investigated the rotation 
period. We again reconstructed mental representations using the 
forward model and tested whether the reconstructed orientations during 
the rotation period matched those expected from the instructed rotation. 
We did this in two ways: we first tested whether at the midpoint 
of rotation, the mental representation also matched the midpoint 
orientation by looking at the reconstructed tuning cuvers. Subsequently, 
we investigated during the full rotation period, the peak of the tuning 
curves shifted along with the rotation using a circulair fitting procedure.
Behavioral analyses
We calculated rotation time for each trial by taking the difference between 
the onset of the rotation period and the button press and performed a simple 
linear regression to test whether rotation time increased with rotation angle. 
To assess the stability of this increase, we used the jackknife procedure (J. 
Miller, Patterson, & Ulrich, 1998). From the ensuing parameters (jackknife 
partial estimates) we calculated the Standard Error of the Mean (SEM; for 
details see Abdi & WIlliams, 2010). 
To check whether the staircase adjusted the difficulty level appropriately, 
we calculated the accuracy and the average angle difference between 
imagined orientation and probe for the four rotational angles separately. We 
used a one-way ANOVA to test for differences in accuracy and discrimination 
angle between the rotation conditions.
Signal processing and voxel selection
All analyses were performed on an individual, per subject basis. The 
acquired functional images were realigned and co-registered with the 
anatomical image using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm, Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK).
To obtain early visual cortex ROIs, we extracted V1, V2, V3 and V4 
from Maximum Probability Maps included the Anatomy Toolbox in SPM 
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(Amunts et al., 2000; Eickhoff et al., 2005; Kujovic et al., 2013; Rottschy et al., 
2007), and converted these mask back to individual subject-space using the 
inverse normalization parameters.
Within each area (V1, V2, V3 and V4), the 100 most active voxels were 
selected based on the contrast [all gratings > baseline] for the localizer. 
Voxels that belonged to more than one mask were included only once so the 
total number of voxels per participants was slightly below 400. The time-
courses of these voxels were extracted, time-locked to either stimulus or 
probe, high-pass filtered at 128 Hz, and standardized (z-score) for each time 
point individually. 
BOLD analysis 
For the BOLD time-courses, we took the raw activity in the selected voxels, 
high-pass filtered and detrended it, averaged this activity per time-point 
over all trials with the same rotation angle and plotted the time courses for 
the different rotation angles. To determine the peaks we used the MATLAB 
function findpeak, which returns the local maxima from the time course. 
In order to restrict the number of returned peaks we applied a minimum 
distance of 15 scans between peaks (~ half the distance between observed 
peaks) and a minimum peak height of 2.5 (~ half the observed peak height), 
both based on visual inspection of the obtained time courses. Using these 
parameters we found two peaks for each rotation condition and performed 
a simple linear regression to test whether the latency of the BOLD peaks 
increased with rotation angle, for the first and second peak separately. To 
assess the stability of the peak and of this increase, we used the jackknife 
procedure. 
Decoding analysis and forward model
We used a forward modeling approach to probe the representational 
contents of the early visual cortex while participants engaged in mental 
imagery. First, a theoretical forward model was postulated that described the 
measured activity in selected voxels, given the orientation of the presented 
grating. Second, this forward model was inverted, resulting in an inverse 
model, in order to decode the represented orientation from the observed 
data. The forward and inverse models were estimated from perception 
data, specifically, the average of the perception data over 6-14 seconds. The 
decoding was performed on the data from each individual time-point (scan) 
in the imagery trials to obtain a time-course of representations. To test the 
performance of the model we also applied it to each individual scan from 
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the localizer data, using a 10-fold cross validation where we iteratively left 
out one full trial of each orientation from training and tested on these left out 
trials.
Our forward model was based on the work by Brouwer & Heeger (2009, 
2011), adjusted based on the work by Mostert and colleagues (Mostert, Kok, 
& de Lange, 2015), and is described in more detail in the supplemental 
material. We created 180 hypothetical, orientation-selective channels that 
were assumed to reflect the collective activity of a large number of similarly 
tuned orientation-selective voxels. Each channel had a unique tuning curve 
associated with it that prescribed its activity as a function of presented 
orientation; the tuning curves were defined as rectified half-wave cosines, 
raised to the fifth power and whose preferred orientations were equally 
spaced around the circle. Using the training data set (unattended perception), 
we obtained a set of weights that explained the neural data based on this 
hypothetical model.
For the inverse model, we used the weights and the covariance matrix 
of the data to estimate an array of spatial filters that, when applied to the 
data, aimed to reconstruct the underlying channel activities as accurately 
as possible (see supplemental material for details). The estimated channel 
activities for the to-be-decoded data were obtained by applying these 
independently calculated spatial filters to the test data (imagery task). The 
final output was a reconstructed-orientation matrix which, for each time-
point, contained the activities for all 180 channels. This matrix was averaged 
for the different trials in the same condition (same rotation direction and 
amount) and displayed as a time by channels by activity plot. To increase the 
sensitivity and stability of the signal, the reconstructed orientation matrices 
for the different conditions were averaged over all participants. Since we 
were interested in the temporal evolution of the representations, we did not 
apply temporal smoothing.
Analysis of onset latency for the stable imagined orientation
We calculated the population response, or overall reconstructed orientation, 
for each time-point by taking the circular average of the response in the 
hypothetical channels using a kernel. Based on these average reconstructed 
orientations we determined the onset latencies for the stable imagery period 
by searching the first scan after which the orientation was within ±20 degrees 
of the end-orientation, for at least 6 seconds. The onset of the stable period 
marked the end of the rotation period; hence we calculated neural rotation 
time by taking the difference between onset latency for the stable period and 
onset of the stimulus (start of rotation period). To investigate whether onset 
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latency increased with rotation angle, we regressed the onset latencies onto 
the rotation angles using simple linear regression. To assess the stability of 
this increase, we used the jackknife procedure (J. Miller et al., 1998). The 
jackknife allows estimation of the variance from group data from which one 
participant is iteratively left out. This makes it a useful tool in datasets where 
the data from individual participants is relatively noise and (might) preclude 
a stable measurement, as with the onset latency in the current dataset.
Analysis of intermediate representations during mental rotation
To investigate whether the early visual cortex also represented intermediate 
orientations during the mental rotation, we used two different approaches. 
First, we reconstructed the represented orientations halfway through the 
rotation process. To calculate these midpoints, we took half of the trained 
rotation time per condition, and shifted these by 4.5 seconds to account for 
the hemodynamic delay. We then took an interval from two scans before, 
until two scans after this midpoint (1 second in total), averaged these and 
plotted the reconstructed tuning curves for clockwise and counterclockwise 
rotation separately. To formally test whether a tuning shift occurred during 
the rotation process that followed the direction of rotation, we extracted the 
values of the tuning curves at six points (30, 60, 90, 120, 150 and 180 degrees) 
and compared the tuning strength at the different orientations for clockwise 
and counterclockwise rotation in a two-way within subjects ANOVA.
Secondly, we assessed the gradual transformation of the tuning curves 
during the whole rotation period. We selected the rotation periods based 
on the trained rotation times (2, 4, 6 or 8 seconds) and shifted these by 4.5 
seconds to adjust for the hemodynamic delay. We then fitted a line through 
the reconstructed orientations (group averages) for the selected time-points 
and compared the slopes for clockwise and counterclockwise rotations. 
Given that we had circular data, where 180 degrees is equal to 0 degrees, 
simple linear fitting was not applicable. More specifically, with circular 
data the points might gradually increase over time up to 180 degrees and 
then jump back to around 0 degrees. This would result in an image with a 
broken line, while the data in fact continuously changed in one direction. 
Linear fitting would not capture the temporal changes well in such a case. 
Therefore we used a circular regression method as implemented by the FMA 
toolbox for MatLab (Freely Moving Animals Toolbox, http://fmatoolbox.
sourceforge.net/), which takes into account the circular nature of the dataset. 
The resulting slopes for clockwise and counterclockwise mental rotation on 
the group level were then tested for stability using the jackknife procedure.
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Results
Behavioral results
Overall, participants were well able to perform the mental rotation task. 
The average rotation time, as indicated by the button press, increased with 
rotation angle (reaction times (±SEM): 0 degrees = 2.15 (±0.18) s; 60 degrees 
= 4.31 (±0.19) s; 120 degrees = 6.47 (±0.23) s; 180 degrees = 8.25 (±0.27) s), as 
expected from the instructed constant rotation speed. We calculated a simple 
linear regression, to predict mental rotation time based on rotation angle. 
Mental rotation time was equal to 2.23 + 0.034*rotational angle, indicating 
that mental rotation time increased by 0.034 seconds for each degree of 
rotation, (R2 = 0.99; Figure 4.2A). Using the jackknife procedure we calculated 
the between-subject variance of this effect and found that it was stable over 
participants and was highly significant (t(21)= 22.7, p = 1.29*10-16).
The imagined, final orientation after rotation was quite accurate, as evident 
from the small angle differences with which participants could discriminate 
the probe from their mental image (difference in degrees (±SEM): 3.65 (±0.42) 
for 0 degree rotation, 7.90 (±1.06) for 60 degree rotation, 7.84 (±1.15) for 120 
degree rotation and 5.55 (±0.99) for 180 degree rotation). The different rotation 
angles were not equally difficult (F(3,84) = 4.62, p < .005), but the staircase 
procedure ensured equal performance (% correct (±SEM): 69% (±1.2%); 75% 
(±2.2%); 71% (±1.8%) and 71% (±2.6%); F(3,84) = 1.3, p = 0.28).
Overall activity in early visual cortex during mental rotation
First, we looked at the overall BOLD response from the selected voxels 
in early visual cortex during mental rotation. The BOLD activity increased 
after the onset of the stimulus cue (trial onset) for all conditions, but 
peaked progressively later for larger rotation angles (peak time (±SEM): 
7.14 (±1.22*10-14), 8.82 (±1.21), 11.97 (±1.80) and 12.81 (±3.03) seconds for 0, 
60, 120 and 180 degrees resp.). A simple linear regression showed that the 
peak latency increased with rotation angle by 0.0336 seconds per degree 
of rotation (R2 = 0.96, Figure 4.2C) and that this effect was significant over 
participants (jackknife procedure, t (21) = 2.06, p = 0.026, one-tailed). The first 
peak was followed by a second, higher peak that appeared approximately 
six seconds after the first peak (peak time (±SEM) 13.65 (±0.40), 15.96 (±0.33), 
17.64 (±0.75) and 19.32 (±0.96) seconds for 0, 60, 120 and 180 degrees resp.) 
and 4 seconds after the presentation of the probe (Figure 4.2B) for all four 
conditions. Again, the peak latency increased with rotation angle by 0.031 
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seconds per degree (R2 = 0.99) and this effect was significant over participants 
(jackknife procedure, t(21) = 6.24, p = 1.9*10-6, one-tailed).
The first peak, however, occurred before the visually presented probe, 
in the middle of the imagery period, while there was no visual stimulation. 
The latencies of these intermediate BOLD peaks temporally aligned with 
the button press that indicated the termination of the rotation process, but 
shifted by 4.5-5 seconds. This delay matched the hemodynamic delay we 
observed for visual stimulation (Figure 4.3A), as well as other reports on the 
hemodynamic delay in early visual cortex (Cavusoglu, Bartels, Yesilyurt, 
& Uludag, 2012). This suggests that there is a top-down activation of early 
visual cortex when participants make a transition from mentally rotating to 
maintaining the grating in their minds eye.
Decoding neural activity patterns
To check whether our forward model could reconstruct orientation from 
the multiband MRI data, we first applied it to perceived orientations during 
the localizer task. The tuning curve recreated from the average activity in 
early visual cortex during the localizer centered at the presented orientation 
(0 degrees; difference between tuning height at presented orientation 
(0 degrees) versus not presented orientation (90 degrees): t(21) = 15.17, 
p = 8.71*10-13; Figure 4.3B), which indicated that the activity in early visual 
cortex contained information about the perceived gratings. We also created 
tuning curves for each scan separately and plotted those over time (Figure 
4.3C; the color indicates the height of the tuning curve). The tuning curves 
of the population preference peaked (yellow) at the perceived orientation 
from 4.5 seconds onwards and tuning remained for the duration of the 
presentation. The onset time of this sustained representation matched the 
BOLD peak during perception (Figure 4.3A). The forward model not only 
allowed accurate reconstruction of perceived orientation on the group level, 
but also for individual participants (Figure 4.3D). Reconstructed orientations 
were close to the perceived orientation (mean absolute deviance (±std) = 2.45 
(±3.53) degrees, max absolute deviance = 16 degrees) and the reconstructed 
orientations did not significantly differ from the perceived orientation 
(t(21) = 1.68, p = 0.10). Together, these results indicate that the forward model 
could appropriately reconstruct information from early visual cortex and 
that the signal-to-noise ratio in the multiband data was sufficient for tracking 
orientation signals over time.
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 Figure 4.2 Behavioural and univariate results. A) Average reaction time per rotation 
angle. The average RT (±SEM) for the 22 participants linearly increased with rotation angle 
by 1 second per 30 degrees (0.034 s/degree), indicating that participants learned to rotate 
at the required speed. Green dashed line: predicted reaction time from linear regression. B) 
BOLD response in V1-V4 during mental rotation. The grand average of the raw BOLD 
response in the selected voxels in V1, V2, V3 and V4 (100 voxels per region), during the 
mental rotation of an oriented grating. The BOLD response peaked at different points in 
time for the different rotation angles. Left panel: the data time-locked to the stimulus; right 
panel: data time-locked to the probe. Time-lock point is indicated by the black line. The 
first peak appeared well before the visual probe. C) The latencies of the BOLD peaks versus 
rotation angle, for the first peak (circles) and the second peak (triangles). Green dashed line 
indicates the predicated BOLD latencies from linear regression, which was significant for 
both the first and the second peak. Error bars indicate SEM.
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Figure 4.3 Reconstructing perceived orientation from neural activity. A) Grand 
average of the raw BOLD response in the selected voxels in V1, V2, V3 and V4 (100 
voxels per region) during perception of an oriented grating (block design, stimulus 
flickering at 4 Hz). The BOLD peaked at approximately 4 seconds after stimulus onset.  
B) Reconstruction of perceived orientation from V1-V4. The output of the forward model: 
the represented orientation in the voxel population, averaged over 6.30-14.7 seconds. 
There is a clear preference for the presented orientation: the curve peaks at 0 degrees. 
C) Grand average reconstructed orientation of perceived gratings. Orientation can be 
reconstructed from multiband data for the perceptual localizer task. The activity (average 
of 22 participants) in the 180 channels (y-axis) over time (x-axis) is indicated using color: 
yellow indicates higher activity in the specific channel, blue indicates low activity in 
the channel. The higher this value is, the higher the preference of the population for that 
orientation. Colors align with B). All trials are shifted to center perceived orientation at 
0 degrees. The average onset of the sustained representation is around 4 seconds. This 
aligns with the HRF latency in A) and indicates here that perceived orientation can 
reliably be reconstructed around 4 seconds after stimulus onset. D) Average reconstructed 
orientation for a representative subject. Same as in B), but reconstruction is averaged over 
the 60 perceptual trials for one representative subject. 
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Reconstruction of mental representations
To track the representations during the mental transformation, we 
used the forward model constructed with the BOLD response to perceived 
orientations also to reconstruct imagined orientations. We reconstructed 
the imagined orientation from each scan individually, to be maximally 
sensitive to changes in the represented orientation over time. For 0 degree 
rotation (i.e. working memory maintenance) the tuning curve centered at the 
designated orientation from 4.5 seconds after stimulus onset (Figure 4.4A, 
left panel). The pattern was not induced by visual presentation of the probe 
grating: reconstructing orientation from data time-locked to the visual probe 
indicated that this peak originated before the visual stimulation (Figure 4.4A, 
right panel). This indicates that the activity pattern in early visual cortex 
accurately reflected the imagined/maintained orientation, even when it was 
not visually presented. 
Longer transformations lead to later representations
For 60, 120 and 180 degree rotations (CCW and CW, Figure 4.4B-D) it was 
also possible to reconstruct the orientation that resulted after rotation. Again, 
the mental representations were independent of the visually presented 
probe (Figure 4.4B-D right panels) and appeared progressively later for larger 
rotation angles. This is in line with a prediction of the dynamic blackboard 
hypothesis that mental transformations that take more time, also appear 
later in visual cortex. To formally test this notion, we selected the preferred 
orientation at each time-point and calculated the first stability point after 
which the reconstructed orientation remained within +20 and -20 degrees of 
the supposed orientation, for the period that participants were required to 
maintain their end orientation (6 seconds). 
The peaks of the tuning curves indeed stabilized at different points in 
time for the different rotation angles (stabilitzation times (±SEM): 4.62 
(±4.07*10-15), 8.19 (±1.45), 10.92 (±1.18) and 12.60 (±40.8) seconds for 0, 60, 
120 and 180 degrees resp.; Figure 4.4E) and these onsets were stable over 
participants, as evident from the small errors around the mean, obtained 
with the jackknife procedure (except for 180 degree rotation). These onsets 
were also comparable to the delays in the BOLD peak (Figure 4.2B), but 
appeared slightly earlier, and resembled the increase in mental rotation time 
with rotation angle (Figure 4.2A). A simple linear regression was calculated, 
to predict onset latency of the stable period based on the rotation angle. The 
onset latency was equal to 5.08 + 0.044*rotational angle, indicating that the 
onset of the stable period was delayed by 0.044 seconds for each degree of 
rotation (R2 = 0.98; Figure 4.4E). Using the jackknife procedure we found that 
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Figure 4.4 Reconstructing imagined orientation from neural activity. 
A) Reconstructed population responses over time for 0 degrees. Grand average of the 
reconstructed orientation, collapsed over CCW and CW. Left panel: data time-locked to 
the stimulus (solid black line). Right panel: data time-locked to the probe. As in 4.3C): the 
population activity for each orientation (180 channels, y-axis) is plotted per time point 
(x-axis) and the strength of each orientation is indicated in color, with blue indicating 
low values and yellow indicating high values. Data are aligned with the start-orientation 
at 0 degrees. The preferred orientation of the voxel population aligns well with the 
orientation of the to-be-imagined grating (black dashed line). Blue dashed line: average 
timing of the button press. Red dashed line: average timing of the probe (fixed at 6 seconds 
after the button press). The imagined orientation can be reconstructed before the visual 
probe appears, indicating that this information is not driven by perception (right panel).  
B) Rotate 60 degrees CCW (upper panel) and CW (lower panel); same as in A). Green 
dashed line indicates end orientation after rotation. C) Rotate 120 degrees CCW (upper 
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panel) and CW (lower panel). D) Rotate 180 degrees CCW and CW. For 60 degrees CCW, 
orientation changed by -9.16 degrees/second and for 60 CW by 11.18 degrees/second 
(slope = -1.92/scan, R2 = 0.53; and slope = 2.35/scan, R2 = 0.97). For 120 degrees CCW 
orientation changed by -11.45 degrees/second and for 120 CW orientation changed by 
15.84 degrees/second (slope = -2.40/scan, R2 =0.71; and slope = 3.33/scan, R2 = 0.96). For 
180 degrees, there seemed to be no transition over time, and the slopes were correspondingly 
small (rotation of -0.74 degrees/second, slope = -0.15, R2 = 0.97; and rotation of -1.96 
degrees/second, slope = -0.41, R2 = 0.05). None of these slopes was significant. E) BOLD 
reconstruction latency for the sustained representation, per rotation angle. Green dashed 
line: predicted latency using a linear regression approach. Cyan: standard error of the 
mean as calculated with the jackknife procedure. Latency is calculated as the first time 
point after which the peak is, for ≥ 29 scans, between -20 and +20 degrees, and divided by 
TR to calculate time since stimulus onset. The increase in time until stable orientation 
aligns well with the RTs in Figure 4.2A), taking into account a hemodynamic delay.  
F) Stability of latency versus reaction times. Onset latency of the sustained representation 
versus reaction times (blue), ± SEM (cyan).
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the increase in onset latency with rotation angle was statistically significant 
over participants (t(21) = 2.25,  p = 0.036). This indicates that the neural onset 
of the representations of the orientation after rotation were in line with the 
behavioral indication of the participants that they had finished rotating, 
shifted by about 4.5 seconds (Figure 4.4E). Theoretically, participants could 
have ‘jumped’ to the final orientation immediately, and then waited with 
their button press according to the instructed delays. Some participants 
might have done this for 180 degree rotation, where there is a larger variance 
around the onset latency for the stable period and around the time of the first 
BOLD peak. However, for 60 and 120 degree rotation we did not observe 
representations of the final orientation immediately, but rather after an 
angle-dependent delay, which makes it unlikely that participants followed 
this strategy.
Intermediate representations during mental rotation
The correspondence between behavioral rotation time and onset latency 
in the neural data suggested that participants performed the mental rotation 
at the instructed speed. Therefore we expected intermediate representations, 
if present, to appear at regular intervals during the rotation period and along 
the direction of rotation. Based on the reaction times we could therefore 
determine when participants should have been halfway through the rotation.
During the interval of 1 second around this midpoint, the patterns in 
the brain reflected intermediate orientations during rotation. For both 60 
degree rotation and 120 degree rotation, the tuning curves for CW and 
CCW peaked at their supposed intermediate orientations (Figure 4.5B-C). 
This suggests that participants actively rotated the stimulus and that the 
brain contained a representation of the intermediate steps in this process. 
For 180 degree rotation, the tuning curves peaked at the start (and end) 
Figure 4.5. Tuning curves for the midpoint of the rotation. The tuning curves have 
been shifted such that the start orientation was always at 0 degrees, and the supposed 
orientations of the midpoints have been indicated on the x-axis. Red line: tuning curve 
for intermediate during counterclockwise rotation (negative direction), blue line: tuning 
curve for clockwise rotation (positive direction). A) 0 degree rotation or working memory 
maintenance: the orientation should not shift and indeed the tuning curves line up nicely 
at 0 degree. Shaded areas indicate SEM. B) 60 degree rotation: the tuning curves for 
clockwise and counterclockwise rotation are significantly different and peak around the 
supposed orientation of the intermediate representation. C) 120 degree rotation: although 
nosier, the peaks are around the supposed orientation. D) 180 degree rotation: it appears 
that participants did not really rotate the grating mentally, as the midpoint aligns with 
the start and end orientations (which were similar in this case).
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orientation, suggesting no intermediate orientations when participants had 
to rotate 180 degrees (Figure 4.5D). However, when we compared the tuning 
curves for clockwise and counterclockwise rotation, in none of the rotation 
conditions there was a significant interaction between rotation direction and 
represented orientation (0 degrees: F(5,105) = 0.24; 60 degrees: F(5,105) = 1.25; 
120 degrees: F(5,105) = 0.66; 180 degrees F(5,105) = 0.46; all p > 0.29), which 
indicated that there was no evidence for a shift in tuning depending on the 
direction of rotation (Chong, Familiar, & Shim, 2015).
Subsequently, we investigated how the tuning curves evolved over time 
during the full rotation period. The pattern of transformation appeared to 
proceed along opposite directions for CCW and CW rotation for 60 and 120 
degree rotation, exactly as expected (Figure 4.4B-C). The reconstruction of 
the 180 degree rotation (CCW and CW, Figure 4.4D), was different from 60 
and 120 degree rotation, because the reconstructed orientation remained 
around the start- and end-orientation (which were similar in this case), 
as already suggested from the tuning curves at the midpoint. To formally 
test whether the intermediate representations of the mental rotation were 
present in the visual cortex, we applied circular regression to fit a line to the 
preferred orientation of the voxel population in the grand averages over the 
rotation period. Based on our definition of orientation between 0 and 180, 
we expected a decrease for CCW rotation, hence a negative slope, and an 
increase, or positive slope for CW rotation. 
Time point in the rotation process predicted the reconstructed orientation 
as expected for 60 and 120 degree rotation (Figure 4.4B-C). In all cases the 
slope direction (positive or negative) matched the direction of rotation and 
the rate of change was approximately similar for 60 and 120 degree rotation 
clockwise and counterclockwise. When we assessed the stability of this slope 
over participants using the jackknife procedure, none of the ensuing slopes 
was significantly stable (60 CCW: t(21) = -0.86, p = 0.20; 60 CW: t(21) = 1.09, p 
= 0.14; 120 CCW: t(21) = -0.69, p = 0.25; 120 CW: t(21)= 0.78, p = 0.22; 180 CCW: 
t(21) = -0.14, p = 0.44; 180 CW: t(21) =  -0.48, p = 0.32). This means that although 
the data visually were suggestive of a continuous transformation (Figure 
4.4B-D), there was no robust indication of intermediate representations in 
early visual cortex.
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Discussion
We used high temporal resolution fMRI and a forward modeling approach 
to investigate the dynamics of early visual cortex during mental rotation of 
imagined gratings. We found representations of an imagined stimulus in early 
visual cortex which resembled the representations during perception, after 
the stimulus had been mentally rotated. This representation of an imagined 
stimulus appeared after a variable period, the length of which depended 
on the rotational angle. The onset of this perception-like representation 
was immediately followed by a general, transient increase in BOLD, which 
was not specific to the imagined orientation. During the rotation process, 
however, we did not find robust representations of intermediate orientations 
in early visual regions. 
These findings replicate earlier findings that early visual cortex contains 
representations of imagined orientations after mental rotation (Chapter 2; 
Christophel et al., 2014), and extend them by showing that this is the case 
even when a stimulus is only symbolically cued and not visually presented. 
This again suggests that stable mental images, regardless of how they are 
generated, are perception-like and ‘depictive in nature’ (Kosslyn et al., 2006). 
How do these findings relate to the idea that visual cortex is a dynamic 
blackboard? The activity patterns in early visual cortex evolved in synchrony 
with task demands: the latency of the sustained representations increased 
with rotation angle, and there was a transient increase in BOLD that 
correlated in time with the onset of the sustained representation. That is, the 
final orientation appeared only after the rotation process of variable duration. 
This supports our predictions that the temporal order of processing should 
be maintained in early visual cortex and that mental transformations that 
take more time, should appear later in the representations in early visual 
cortex. These findings are also in line with the idea that mental imagery 
is a simulation process that employs the same mechanisms as perception 
(Kosslyn et al., 2006; Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009) and visual cortex might 
support this process by providing a ‘dynamic blackboard’ (Bullier, 2001a; 
T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003). Although the tuning curves, the directions of the 
slopes and the data were visually suggestive of intermediate representations, 
none of the measures did survive the test for significance. This suggests that 
intermediate representations were not robustly present in all participants.  
Possibly, some participants might have not rotated, but ‘jumped’ to the 
final orientation (Liesefeld & Zimmer, 2011), since it was not necessary to 
continuously rotate to solve the task, as it was in earlier studies (de Lange 
et al., 2008; Podgorny & Shepard, 1978; Shepard & Metzler, 1971), especially 
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during the 180 degree rotation condition. Moreover, participants might have 
rotated at slightly different speeds or used different ‘sampling intervals’ 
along the rotational curve, thus ‘blurring’ the signal.
Even if all participants rotated continuously at similar speeds, as they 
reported, the intermediate steps in the rotation process were not functionally 
relevant for the participants to eventually solve the task. Therefore, (some) 
participants might have put less weight on intermediate representations 
and not have created these images as actively during intermediate steps, as 
for the final orientation. Possibly, early visual cortex only represents task 
relevant features in a stable fashion (S. I. Moro et al., 2010; Mostert et al., 
2015). Similarly, a recent study by Chong and colleagues (2015) did report 
intermediate representations in early visual cortex during a specific apparent 
motion task, in line with the blackboard hypothesis. However, they did 
not find intermediate representations during mental imagery of apparent 
motion. This could suggest that visual cortex handles visual illusions, 
induced by actual stimulation, differently from mental images. However, 
their participants also performed a concurrent spatial attention task during 
mental imagery, and this different task demand might have weakened or 
removed the imagery representations in early visual regions. 
It has also been suggested that internally generated representations 
are inherently sparse compared to representations of perceived stimuli 
(Christophel et al., 2014). Future studies could investigate the automaticity of 
visual cortex involvement by making the rotational process itself relevant and 
probing for representations in early visual cortex, or by replacing the visual 
comparison process with a verbal process and probing the representations in 
speech and auditory regions along with visual cortex.
With weak or sparse representations, a good signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 
is important. In the current study, SNR might have not been sufficient to 
investigate such a subtle cognitive process. Although SNR might be a problem 
for any study trying to decode cognitive processes, it might be specifically 
problematic in the current dataset. First of all, due to the high temporal 
resolution of the multiband data, physiological noise (heartbeat, breathing) 
could have a larger influence on the signal. Contrary to this notion however, 
stable imagined orientations were reliably decoded from the BOLD patterns 
in the current dataset (Figure 4.4A). Secondly, the temporal resolution 
might still have been insufficient to obtain ‘individual orientations’. Since 
participants rotated at 30 degrees per second, there could have been around 
6 different orientations per scan. As these were neighboring orientations, 
different orientations might have blurred the signal in the (limited) spatial 
resolution of the MRI. 
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From the current data, therefore, it was not possible to determine whether 
the early visual cortex contained representations of intermediate orientations 
in the transformation process. The lack of clear intermediate representations 
in early visual cortex might also indicate that the mental transformation 
happens somewhere else in the cortex. A region that has often been implicated 
in the process of mental rotation is the posterior parietal cortex (e.g. Gogos 
et al., 2010; Podzebenko, Egan, & Watson, 2002). Recently, researchers have 
also found that the activity patterns in parietal cortex contain representations 
of items hold in working memory (Bettencourt & Xu, 2016; Christophel et al., 
2014; Ester, Sprague, & Serences, 2015). Possibly, the dynamical aspect is 
handled by these posterior regions while only the end product is represented 
with high detail in the early visual cortex. Unfortunately, we could not test 
that prediction in the current data as the multiband sequence did not cover 
the parietal regions.
A somewhat surprising finding was the transient BOLD peak in visual 
cortex at the transition from mental rotation to stable maintenance, which 
appeared without any change in visual stimulation. Most interestingly, the 
peak temporally aligned with the onset of the sustained imagery period 
(as indicated by the button press), and with the appearance of stable 
representations in the activity pattern over voxels. What could be the role of 
this non-specific BOLD increase in visual cortex? Such a general increase in 
BOLD in visual cortex that is independent of visual stimulation has first been 
reported by Jack and colleagues (2006), who observed it during transitions 
from one task state to another. Later studies found a BOLD increase during 
temporal selection of behaviorally relevant stimuli (Swallow et al., 2012), or 
at the onset of motion-induced blindness epochs (Donner et al., 2008). In 
chapter 3 of this thesis, where we investigated the BOLD activity during 
stimulus and probe presentation, we also suggested that part of the signal in 
early visual cortex is non-specific to the stimulus. The transient signal 
might function as a (neuro-modulatory) boost that leads to stabilization of 
the cortical network and subsequent stabilization of the representations in 
early sensory cortex (de Gee, Knapen, & Donner, 2014; Kloosterman et al., 
2014; Schurger, Sarigiannidis, Naccache, Sitt, & Dehaene, 2015; Warren et 
al., 2015). Together, these studies fit nicely with the current results: a non-
specific, transient increase in BOLD that marks the onset of a period with 
(more) stable representations. The sustained representations in visual cortex 
in the current study could have been due to a modulation in stability during 
the transient BOLD peak. Moreover, this boost could have been initiated 
by the participant’s decision that the final orientation had been reached 
(instantiated in the act of pressing the button). Future studies have to 
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determine the exact temporal and causal relationship between stabilization 
of mental representations and the transient increase in overall BOLD activity.
Conclusion
The current findings suggest that the activity patterns in early visual 
cortex evolved in synchrony with task demands: the latency of the sustained 
representations increased with rotation angle, and there was a transient 
increase in BOLD that correlated in time with the onset of the sustained 
representation of imagined orientation. This supports the idea that visual 
cortex can function as a dynamic blackboard that processes both bottom-
up stimulus input and top-down internally generated content. However, the 
stability of the representations might differ between sustained maintenance 
and mental rotation, possibly dependent on the weight of stimulus in the task. 
Whether early visual cortex is necessary in the calculation of intermediate 
steps in the transformation remains to be determined. 
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Supplemental Material
Supplementary Methods
The forward and inverse model
The forward model was based on the work by Brouwer & Heeger (2009, 
2011) and Mostert et al. (2015), and involved a number of hypothetical, 
orientation-selective channels. Each of these channels was assumed to reflect 
the collective activity of a large number of similarly tuned orientation-selective 
voxels. As a consequence, each channel had a unique tuning curve associated 
with it that prescribed its activity as a function of presented orientation. 
We used 180 channels, whose tuning curves were defined as rectified half-
wave cosines, raised to the fifth power, and whose preferred orientations 
were equally spaced around the circle. Arranging the hypothesized channel 
activities for each trial along the columns of a matrix C (size K × R, where 
K is the number of channels and R the number of repetitions), the observed 
data could be described by the following linear model (Brouwer & Heeger, 
2009, 2011):
 X WC N= +  (1)
where X (size F × R, where F is the number of voxels) contains the observed 
data, W (size F × K) is a weights matrix that specifies how channel activity is 
transformed into voxel activity and N is noise. 
For the inverse model, we estimated an array of spatial filters that, when 
applied to the data, aimed to reconstruct the underlying channel activities as 
accurately as possible. In doing so, we departed from Brouwer & Heeger’s 
(2009, 2011) approach in three respects (Mostert et al., 2015). First, we actively 
suppressed noise by taking into account the correlational structure of the 
noise, which resulted in an improved sensitivity. Secondly, we estimated a 
spatial filter for each orientation channel independently. This allowed us to 
decode an unlimited number of channels, whereas the maximum number 
of channels would otherwise be dependent on the number of presented 
orientations. In practice, this resulted in smoothing in orientation space, 
because the channels were not truly independent. Thirdly, each filter was 
normalized such that the magnitude of its output matched the magnitude of 
the underlying channel activity it was designed to recover. Prior to estimating 
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the inverse model, X and C were demeaned such that their average over 
trials equaled zero, for each voxel and channel, respectively. Let the vector 
cj contain the hypothesized activity of the j-th orientation channel over all 
trials (i.e. the j-th row of C), then its corresponding weights vector wj can be 
obtained using least-squares estimation:
 
 
w X c ccj j j j= ( )
T T T
 
(2)
in which (...)T denotes the matrix transpose. Subsequently, the optimal spatial 
filter vj to recover the activity of the j-th channel was calculated as follows:
 vj=
∑
-1
wjj
∑ w
-1
jjw
T
j   
(3)
where Σj is the noise covariance matrix associated with the j-th channel. 
The rationale for equation (3) came from two lines of reasoning (Mostert et 
al., 2015). First, it has been used in linear discriminant analysis (Blankertz, 
Lemm, Treder, Haufe, & Müller, 2011) to find the weights that are maximally 
discriminative between two discrete classes while taking into account the 
noise correlational structure. Here, we generalized this method to decode 
a continuous latent channel, instead of a binary one as used in a two-class 
classification problem. Secondly, equation (3) is equivalent to the calculation 
of linearly constrained minimum variance spatial filters (Van Veen et al., 1997), 
which are used for source localization in electrophysiological data analyses. 
However, rather than defining the latent channels on the basis of spatial 
locations, we defined them on the basis of features, namely orientations. 
The numerator in equation (3) is a normalization factor that ensures the unit 
mapping between the amplitude of the hypothesized channel activity and 
the filter’s output (known as the unit-gain constraint; Van Veen, 1997). 
The noise covariance matrix Σj can be calculated from the noise, which 
can be estimated by regressing out the part of the data that can be explained 
by the j-th orientation channel. However, this procedure has to be carried 
out for each individual channel and is therefore computationally demanding 
- especially when a large number of channels are used. Moreover, the noise 
covariances are likely to be highly similar across channels. Therefore, in order 
to improve computational efficiency, we approximated all noise covariance 
matrices by using the data covariance:
  ∑ = XXTj 1R   (4)
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The data covariance is a good approximation of the noise covariance in the 
case where the effect of interest is small relative to the noise — a condition 
that is likely satisfied for (multiband) fMRI. To improve estimation of the 
data covariance matrix, we made use of regularization by shrinkage (for 
details, see Blankertz et al., 2011). Covariance matrices were estimated and 
regularized for each presented orientation in the training set separately, and 
subsequently averaged to obtain the final covariance matrix that was entered 
in equation (3).
Finally, the estimated channel activities Ctest for the to-be-decoded data 
were obtained by arranging all independently calculated spatial filters along 
the columns of a filter matrix V and applying this matrix to the test data:
 C V Xtest test=
T
  (5)
The final output, a reconstructed-orientation matrix which, for each time-
point, contained the activities for all 180 channels, was used for further 
analyses as described in the main paper.
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Abstract
Mental images give a perception-like experience, but whether mental 
images also involve neural representations in early sensory regions such as 
V1 is the topic of a long-standing debate. Neuroimaging and decoding studies 
investigating V1 involvement have provided mixed results, suggesting that 
V1 involvement might depend on specific experimental factors. Here we 
directly test the influence of the type of stimuli and stimulus familiarity 
on the involvement of V1 and the Visual Word Form Area (VWFA) during 
mental imagery. We created letter and pseudoletter stimuli that were 
composed out of small oriented Gabor patches and asked participants to 
either imagine the global letter shape or the local orientation elements, while 
in the MR-scanner. We investigated overall activity differences in V1 and 
VWFA using univariate analyses, and probed for differences in local activity 
patterns using representational similarity and classification analyses. We 
found that VWFA was overall more active during imagery of shapes than 
during imagery of orientation. In left VWFA there was also a difference 
in the activity patterns between letters and pseudoletters, whereas right 
VWFA was sensitive to stimulus shape. In V1, on the other hand, internally 
generated representations were created to represent the imagined stimulus 
feature: during imagery of orientation, V1 distinguished between stimuli 
with different orientations while during imagery of shape, it distinguished 
between stimuli with a different shape. These results suggest that V1 is 
sensitive to task demands; however the presence of higher order stimulus 
representations does not determine the involvement of early visual cortex. 
The task dependent employment of V1 during mental imagery is in line 
with the enhanced representation of attended features during perception. 
Our findings show that during mental imagery, the top-down influences on 
neural populations in V1 are specific to the imagined stimulus, which can 
explain part of the inconsistencies in the mental imagery literature. 
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Introduction
Mental imagery is a constructive process that can lead to the experience of 
perception, even though there might not be any physical stimulation of the 
senses (Kosslyn et al., 2006). Whether internally generated mental images 
also involve neural representations in early sensory regions such as V1 is the 
topic of a long-standing debate (Kosslyn et al., 2001; Pylyshyn, 2002, 2003b; 
Slotnick et al., 2005). Neuroimaging studies investigating V1 activity during 
mental imagery have provided mixed results: while some studies reported 
increased activation in sensory cortex during mental imagery (e.g. Cui, Jeter, 
Yang, Montague, & Eagleman, 2007; Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004; Klein 
et al., 2000), others found equal (e.g. Formisano et al., 2002; Ishai, Ungerleider, 
& Haxby, 2000; Knauff et al., 2000) or even reduced activity in V1 (Kaas et 
al., 2010). Multivariate Pattern Analysis (MVPA) has revealed that V1 can 
contain stimulus specific representations during imagery or maintenance of 
orientated gratings; moreover, these representations resemble the activity 
patterns during perception (Chapter 2; Albers et al., 2013; Christophel et al., 
2012; Harrison & Tong, 2009; Serences et al., 2009). However, representations 
in V1 are not reported during imagery or maintenance of objects and faces 
(Sue-Hyun Lee et al., 2012; Reddy et al., 2010; Stokes et al., 2009). This suggests 
that V1 involvement might be conditional on circumstances surrounding the 
imagery task (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003).
Various factors appear to influence whether V1 is implicated during 
imagery. First of all, early visual cortex involvement might depend on the 
specific stimulus being imagined. Specific visual areas are implicated when 
that region’s preferred stimuli are being imagined: imagery of faces activated 
FFA while imagery of houses involved PPA (O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000); 
imagined scenes could be decoded from the PPA and other place areas 
(Johnson & Johnson, 2014). Human motion area MT+ was activated during 
imagined motion and imagined rotation (Kaas et al., 2010; Seurinck et al., 
2011; Slotnick et al., 2005). Representations in V1 were found during mental 
imagery of orientation (e.g. Chapter 2; Harrison & Tong, 2009), a feature to 
which V1 is highly responsive. Likewise, early visual cortex activity has been 
mainly found during tasks in which orientation, checkerboards or details 
of shapes were imagined (Klein et al., 2004; Klein et al., 2000; Kosslyn & 
Thompson, 2003). 
A second factor that might influence whether V1 carries representations 
of mental images is the level of detail at which stimuli are imagined (Kosslyn 
& Thompson, 2003). Neurons in V1 have small receptive fields and a high-
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resolution; therefore they might be ideally suited for imagery of fine stimulus 
details. Moreover, several studies have reported a positive correlation 
between imagery vividness and V1 activity (Amedi et al., 2005; Cui et al., 
2007), as well as with other primary sensory regions (Olivetti Belardinelli 
et al., 2009). Finke and Kosslyn (1980) found that vivid imagers performed 
more similarly on perception and imagery tasks of visual acuity than non-
vivid imagers.
Finally, imagery related activity is generally reported to be weaker than 
perceptual activation (Johnson et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2004; Klein et al., 2000; 
O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Reddy et al., 2010), which is corroborated by 
introspective reports that imagery is just a faint version of actual perception 
(O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000). While external, perceptual stimulation 
induces activity in relevant neural populations, neural activity during mental 
imagery could be sparser and possibly only reflect those features required 
for the imagery task. The studies on imagery of objects and faces mostly 
investigated object categories or more abstract object features (e.g. Reddy 
et al., 2010), accordingly, imagery of common objects under such conditions 
might rely on object areas such as LOC, but not V1 (Sue-Hyun Lee, Kravitz, 
& Baker, 2013). Here the Reverse Hierarchy Theory for visual perception 
(Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002) is also of interest. This theory suggests that 
conscious perception first arises at the level of overall shape, while stimulus 
details reach awareness only later and if needed. Extending the idea to mental 
imagery, where there is only the reverse, top-down pattern of activation, 
leads to the hypothesis that the overall stimulus shape might always be 
imagined, while the lower level details are only scrutinized when needed for 
the task. However, whether imagery in higher order areas is sufficient, might 
also depend on whether a higher order representation of a stimulus exists – 
hence novel stimuli might rely more heavily on V1.
Together, these studies suggest that V1 involvement depends on 
specific circumstances: the type of stimuli and the level of stimulus details 
required; this last one due to either the task or the absence of a higher 
order representation. For example, when the concept of a dog needs to be 
imagined, higher visual areas might provide sufficient information, while 
imagery of the specific shape of the dog’s ears might require earlier visual 
areas (Kosslyn et al., 2006). Here we directly test the influence of these factors 
on the involvement of V1 during mental imagery using the following two 
sub-questions: (1) Are the regions involved in mental imagery dependent on 
the specific stimulus features being imagined? (2) Does availability of higher 
order stimulus representations affect the mental representation?
To investigate these questions we created letter and pseudoletter 
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stimuli that were composed out of small oriented Gabor patches and asked 
participants to either imagine the global letter shape or the local orientation 
elements, while in the fMRI scanner. Using MVPA methods we tested the 
mental representations of these stimuli in selected visual regions during 
imagery of the global letter shapes (object level) and imagery of the local 
orientation (detail level). The use of letters and pseudoletters has several 
advantages. First of all, letter processing is associated with a specific region in 
the occipito-temporal cortex: the Visual Word Form Area, or VWFA (Cohen 
et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2002). This area has been reproducibly located 
across individuals and scripts, (Bolger, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2005; Dehaene 
& Cohen, 2011; Planton, Jucla, Roux, & Demonet, 2013) and shows activation 
in response to letter strings (Vinckier et al., 2007), and single letters (Flowers 
et al., 2004; Rothlein & Rapp, 2014). We expected this area to be more strongly 
involved during the shape imagery task than during the orientation imagery 
task. Secondly, literate adults are highly experienced with letters while they 
have no experience with our novel pseudoletters. We will call this distinction 
between highly common shapes and their novel counterparts ‘familiarity’. 
The VWFA is thought to be sensitive to this ‘familiarity’ distinction: it 
responds stronger to letters than to symbols (Flowers et al., 2004), it is sensitive 
to frequency of occurrence and to orthographic constraints (Vinckier et al., 
2007), and, for English speakers, prefers Roman characters over Chinese 
characters (James, James, Jeobard, Wong, & Gauthier, 2005; Szwed et al., 
2011). Therefore, although pseudoletters look like real letters, it is unlikely 
that VWFA contains a representation of these stimuli. Hence, we expected 
that during the shape task, the imagined letters could be decoded in VWFA 
(Stokes et al., 2009); while we expected imagery of pseudoletters to rely more 
on V1
We explored how visual cortex represents letters and orientations for 
familiar and unfamiliar stimuli during mental imagery, using univariate 
analyses, a classification approach and representational similarity analyses. 
In brief, we found that VWFA and V1 responded differently to the tasks and 
stimuli. Left VWFA was involved during imagery of shapes and contained 
representational information about stimulus shape and familiarity, regardless 
of task. V1, on the other hand, was equally active during both tasks but the 
representations in early visual cortex shifted towards the relevant stimulus 
features. This suggests that V1 involvement during mental imagery is 
intricately dependent on stimuli, task goals and experience
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Methods
Stimuli
We created stimuli that could be manipulated at different levels by 
building letters out of oriented Gabor patches. There were two letters, ‘F’ and 
‘H’, and two pseudoletters (Figure S5.1), all subtending 16.7*11.4 degrees of 
visual angle. The letter textures were made up of small, grayscale sinusoidal 
gratings, 0.75 cm in diameter. The gratings had a spatial frequency of 0.18 
cycles per degree (cpd), a Michelson contrast of 1, and an orientation of either 
63 or 142 degrees from the vertical axis. All gratings had a random phase 
(between 0 and 2π) with respect to the other gratings of that stimulus and 
changed phase randomly each time a new stimulus was presented. Stimuli 
were generated using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli & 
Farell, 2010), running in MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA) and were 
presented on a rear-projection screen using an EIKI projector (EIKI Rancho 
Santa Margarita, CA; 1.024x768 pixel resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate). 
Task
A trial started with the brief presentation of two stimuli of the same type 
(i.e. two letters or two pseudoletters), followed by a retro-cue that indicated 
whether participants had to keep the first (number 1) or second (number 
2) stimulus in their minds eye (Figure 5.1). The cue was colored red or blue 
to indicate whether participants would have to perform an orientation or 
a shape comparison, respectively, at the end of the trial. Then, participants 
had to visually imagine the cued stimulus as accurately as possible for a 
ten second imagery period, after which a visual probe was presented. 
Participants indicated whether the probe was the same or different from the 
imagined stimulus by pressing a button with either the index or the middle 
finger of the right hand. Changes in orientation and shape of the probe 
occurred in 50% of the trials in each task, such that, per task, in 25% of the 
trials the probe was exactly the same as the imagined stimulus; in 25% of 
the trials only the orientation of the small Gabor patches changed clockwise 
or counterclockwise; in 25% of the trials only the shape of the letter was 
stretched or compressed in the vertical or horizontal direction and in 25% 
of the trials both the orientation and the shape changed. Performance was 
based on making a correct response in the cued dimension only. Participants 
received feedback on their performance on every trial.
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Staircase procedure
In order to match difficulty across the two tasks, a two-down/one-up fixed-
step-size (FSS) adaptive staircase procedure was used to determine the size 
of the change in the probe (Alcala-Quintana & Garcia-Perez, 2007; Garcia-
Perez, 1998). Whenever participants would make a mistake, the difference 
would increase by 1 degree or 1/5th of a grating. Whenever participants had 
two correct responses in a row, the difference would decrease by 0.5488 
degrees, or 0.5488*1/5th of a grating. The ratio of 0.5488 was chosen such that 
the staircase would converge at a performance level of 75-80% (Garcia-Perez, 
1998). There were separate staircases for orientation, and for the horizontal 
and vertical shrinkage/stretches. For the training session, the staircase was 
seeded with an orientation difference of 20 degrees and a shape difference of 
cue
1000ms
ITI ~11s
fixation
400ms
stimulus 1
200ms
400ms
stimulus 2
200ms
400ms
10.1s
probe
200ms
response
1800ms
300ms
feedback
correct
.....
delay period 
Figure 5.1 Experimental design. Each trial started with the presentation of two stimuli, 
followed by a cue that indicated which stimulus the participant had to imagine (1 = first 
stimulus, 2 = second stimulus). The cue also indicated the task to perform: if the cue was 
blue the participants had to perform the shape task, if the cue was red participants had 
to perform the orientation task. After imagining the stimulus for 10 seconds, a probe 
appeared on the screen. The participants had to judge whether the probe was the same as 
the stimulus, or differed from the stimulus on the orientation dimension (orientation task) 
or shape dimension (shape task). Participants pressed a button with their right index finger 
(same) or middle finger (different) to give their response and received feedback on every 
trial (‘correct’, ‘wrong’, ’miss’), after which the screen was blank for 11 seconds until the 
next trial. The depicted trial is a shape-task real letter trial: both stimuli and the probe 
were real letters. On pseudoletter trials, both stimuli and the probe were pseudoletters. An 
overview of all stimuli can be found in figure S5.1.
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1.5 grating for the horizontal and vertical staircase. The staircase values were 
fed from each block to the next so that convergence could be reached both 
within and across training and testing.
Participants and procedure
Thirty-seven healthy, right-handed participants were collected from 
the student population of the Radboud University. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no reading problems. Participants 
gave written informed consent in accordance with the institutional 
guidelines of the local ethical committee (COM region Arnhem-Nijmegen, 
The Netherlands) and received either payment or course credit for their 
participation. To ensure proper performance of the difficult task in the fMRI 
session, all participants were trained on the task in a 45-minute behavioral 
session in a dark, sound-attenuated room with a PC running on Linux. They 
first practiced the two tasks independently and subsequently intermixed. 
During training, the duration of the imagery period gradually increased, 
while the stimulus presentation duration decreased. In total, they performed 
6 blocks of 16 trials.
Participants were excluded from further participation if they failed to 
understand the task or did not reach sufficient performance in the last two 
training blocks (inclusion criteria: a minimum of 11/16 correct trials in the 
last block or on average over all blocks; orientation staircase value max 30 
degrees and vertical and horizontal shape staircase values max 3 gratings). 
Fourteen participants were excluded based on the behavioral performance 
criteria; three further participants were excluded because they underwent 
an initial sub-optimal stair casing procedure (2) or took medication with 
possible side-effects on memory and attention (1).
fMRI scanning proceeded in two sessions: in the first session participants 
performed eight blocks of the task (16 trials each, 128 trials total); in the 
second fMRI session, held within 14 days of the first, there was an anatomical 
scan and participants performed a localizer task in which each task stimulus 
was presented 12 times for a duration of 12 seconds each, followed by a 
Population Receptive Field mapping session. These last two runs were not 
analyzed for the current study. Twenty participants started the scanning 
session. Three participants had incomplete datasets (one due to scanner 
failure, and two participants who did not complete the second fMRI session 
due to personal circumstances). The two earliest participants were excluded 
due to technical failure with the fMRI projector when used in conjunction 
with a PC running with Linux OS; for all subsequent participants we used 
a stimulus PC running on Windows. Therefore, complete analyses were 
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performed on the data of the remaining fifteen participants (five male, ages 
18-31, mean age 23.8 years).
fMRI acquisition parameters
Functional images were acquired using a 3T Trio MRI system (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany) using a T2* weighted 3D gradient-echo EPI sequence 
(FA = 15 degrees, FOV = 224x224x52, voxel size = 2x2x2 mm, TR/TE = 
1500/25ms). Structural images were acquired at 1 mm isotropic resolution 
using a T1-weighted Magnetization Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo (MP-
RAGE) sequence (FA = 8 degrees, FOV = 192x256x256, TR/TE = 2300/3.03 
ms). We used AAScout to ensure consistent selection of the volume to be 
acquired across sessions and participants. 
Behavioral analysis
We calculated reaction times (RTs) per task and stimulus for the comparison 
process of imagined stimulus and probe, by taking the difference between 
the time at which participants pressed the response button and the onset 
time of the probe on the screen. We calculated accuracy as the % correct 
responses (same or different) per task and stimulus type independently. To 
test whether RT or accuracy was dependent on the stimulus or task we used 
three-way ANOVA’s over task, shape and orientation.
Overall activity analysis
To investigate which areas were more active during imagery of shape 
or imagery of orientation, we performed a whole-brain univariate analysis 
in the framework of a general linear model. Using SPM8 (http://www.fil.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK), 
individual data were realigned, co-registered with the anatomical volume, 
normalized to MNI space, smoothed (at half-width full max kernel at 8 
mm) and high pass-filtered at 192 Hz. We modeled the stimulus and cue 
presentation (stimulus period), image maintenance period (imagery period) 
and probe with feedback (probe period) for the two tasks and the real and 
pseudo-letters separately. Next to these twelve task regressors, the six head-
motion parameters were included as nuisance regressors.
To quantify activity during the imagery period, we created a contrast 
between the four imagery-period regressors combined and the implicit 
baseline (the intertrial interval). To quantify unique activity for orientation 
imagery and shape imagery, we contrasted the imagery period for the 
orientation task with the imagery period for the shape task, and vice versa. 
To investigate areas involved in processing either real or pseudo-letters, we 
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contrasted imagery of real letters and imagery of pseudo-letters, for the two 
tasks independently. We repeated all these contrast for the stimulus period 
as well as for the probe period. At the second level, we performed t-tests over 
the 15 participants using the contrasts obtained from the individual levels 
as input. We threshold these maps at p < 0.001 and only considered clusters 
with an extent of at least 100 voxels.
ROI definition
The contrast shape imagery > orientation imagery yielded clusters of 
activation around a peak voxel at MNI coordinates -50 -60 -20, which 
corresponds well to the VWFA coordinates as reported in the literature (e.g. 
Cohen et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2002). We extracted the cluster of activity 
around these coordinates in the left and right hemisphere using SPM and 
converted these ROIs back to the individual subject space with the inverse 
normalization parameters. Furthermore, we obtained an early visual cortex 
ROI, by extracting V1 from Maximum Probability Maps included in the 
Anatomy Toolbox in SPM (Amunts et al., 2000; Eickhoff et al., 2005; Kujovic 
et al., 2013; Rottschy et al., 2007), and again converted this mask back to 
subject-space using the inverse normalization parameters. Within each of 
the three ROIs the 120 most active voxels during stimulus perception were 
selected based on the contrast stimulus period > implicit baseline.
Data extraction for MPVA analyses and BOLD time course
All MVPA analyses were performed on an individual, per subject basis. 
The functional volumes were realigned to account for head movement and 
co-registered with the anatomical volume. The time-courses of the selected 
ROI voxels were extracted, high-pass filtered at 192 Hz, and standardized 
(z-scored) over time for each voxel individually. We defined trials as the 
period from one scan before (-1.5 seconds) until seventeen scans after (27 
seconds) the trial onset. These time courses for 120 voxels, per ROI, formed 
the input for all subsequent analyses.
For analysis of the BOLD time course for real and pseudo-letters we 
converted the BOLD amplitudes into % signal change using:
 
Subsequently, we plotted the time courses per ROI and used a three-way 
ANOVA over ROI, task and stimulus type (real leters vs. pseudoletters) at 
the time point immediately preceding probe onset to test for any differences 
over regions or tasks.
% signal change =
task activity
baseline
x 100 - 100( )
120
Decoding analyses
To investigate of there was a differential representation of stimuli in the 
ROIS, we performed a decoding analysis of relevant stimulus features per 
ROI and per task. We independently trained and tested SVM classifiers 
for orientation (142° vs. 63°), stimulus type (real letters vs. pseudoletters) 
and stimulus identity for the two letter types independently (F vs. H and 
pseudo1 vs. pseudo2), using a leave-one-out cross-validation procedure 
where we iteratively left out one trial of each type (e.g. one stimulus with an 
orientation of 142 degrees and one with an orientation of 63 degrees). First, 
we tested the obtained decoding accuracies against chance (50%) using one-
sample t-tests. Subsequently, we compared decoding accuracy for the two 
tasks and the three ROIs using a two-way ANOVA over task and ROI for 
decoding of orientation and letter type, and a three-way ANOVA over task, 
ROI and letter type for the decoding of stimulus identity.
Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA)
To investigate the representational structure in the ROIs we calculated 
similarity matrices. We obtained average responses in the selected voxels 
for each of the eight stimuli (2 letters and 2 pseudoletters*2 orientations) by 
taking the mean of the activity patterns of all occurrences of a stimulus, for 
the shape and orientation tasks independently. Then we calculated, again per 
task, the similarity between patterns for all pairs of stimuli using Spearman 
rank correlation. This resulted in two correlation matrices of 8*8 cells (one 
for each task), per participant.
To test whether the obtained similarity matrices differed depending 
on the task, we applied a decoding procedure to see if a classifier could 
discriminate between the two similarity matrices. We used a leave-one-
out cross-validation procedure were we iteratively trained Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) classifiers on the matrices from all but one participant, and 
classified the matrices from the left-out participant as belonging to either 
the orientation or the shape task. To test if obtained classification accuracies 
were significantly different from those expected by chance, we used a 
permutation test where we shuffled the labels (orientation task or shape 
task) of the similarity matrices and performed the cross-validated decoding 
procedure. We repeated this procedure 1000 times and calculated the % of 
obtained classification accuracies that was similar to, or higher than, the 
accuracy obtained with the correctly labeled data.
To qualitatively asses the similarity between the stimuli, we applied rank-
order multidimensional scaling (MDS) to the average correlations, using 
the non-metric MDS algorithm in MATLAB (mdscale). We scaled onto three 
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dimensions as this provided a better fit than scaling over two dimensions (as 
indicated by the reduced the stress: Borg & Groenen, 2005). To ensure that 
the results from the MDS analyses were projected into a common space that 
would allow (visual) comparison, we subjected the basic model (see below) 
also to MDS and used the resulting dimensions as a backbone to project the 
outcomes from the MDS of the data into the same space using data projection 
algorithm procrustes in MATLAB. Finally, we plotted the results from the 
MDS into a 3D plot for visual comparison.
To more formally evaluate the obtained similarity matrices, we made 
three models (Figure 5.4) of the expected similarity of the stimuli. The first 
model was for letter shape, with ones for pairs with the same letter (or the 
same pseudoletter) and zeros everywhere else. The second model was 
a letter type model, with ones for pairs of letters of the same type (real or 
pseudo) and zeros for the pairs of a different type. The third model was an 
orientation model, with ones for pairs of stimuli with the same orientation 
and zero for stimulus pairs with different orientations. Additionally, we 
created a basic model were we combined all three models by summing them 
and subsequently dividing by three, that we only used to reorient the MDS 
results. To assess whether the models appropriately described the data, we 
correlated the models with the average similarity matrices using Spearman 
Rank correlation.
Finally, we also correlated the similarity matrices from the individual 
participants  with the models using Spearman rank correlation. With a three-
way ANOVA over ROI, task and model (orientation, letter type and letter 
shape) we tested for any differences in the model fit. 
Results
Behavioral results
Overall, participants were equally fast in comparing the imagined and 
presented stimuli for both tasks (RT (±SEM) orientation task = 0.95 (±0.03) 
seconds and RT shape task = 0.94 (±0.04) seconds). A three-way ANOVA 
over task, letter shape and orientation did neither reveal any main effects, 
nor any interactions between the stimuli or tasks (all F ≤ 1.78, all p ≥ 0.20). 
Although we used a staircase procedure to minimize differences in task 
difficulty, participants performed better on the orientation task than on the 
shape task (accuracy (±SEM): orientation task = 76% (±0.023) correct; shape 
task = 62.60% (±0.023) correct, main effect of task: F(1,14) = 15.17, p = 0.0016). 
Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between stimulus shape (the 
letter identity) and the stimulus orientation (F(3,98) = 3.88, p = 0.016).
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The VWFA is more active during shape imagery than during 
imagery of orientation
During the perception of the stimuli and cues at the beginning of each 
trial, there were large clusters of activation in early visual cortex, occipito-
temporal regions and parietal and frontal cortex (Figure S25.A), including 
the visual word form area (Glezer & Riesenhuber, 2013; Szwed et al., 2011). 
Activity induced by the presentation of the probe and feedback at the end of 
each trial largely overlapped with the activity during stimulus presentation 
and also encompassed the VWFA (Figure S5.2B). Activity common to the 
imagery of shapes and orientations included large regions of bilateral parietal 
and frontal regions (Table 5.1 and Figure S5.2C), and resembled the imagery 
related activity that we reported during a comparable task (Chapter 2). 
The Visual Word Form Area was more active during imagery of shapes 
than during imagery of orientation, extending anteriorly along the fusiform 
gyrus (Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1). The corresponding region in the right 
hemisphere also showed higher activity during imagery of shape than 
imagery of orientations (peak voxel (MNI): 56 -62 -18). This suggests that 
when people imagine letter shapes, they use the brain regions that are also 
relevant when observing those letter shapes. There were no regions that 
were more active during the orientation task than during the shape task. 
There were also no regions that were more strongly activated for imagery of 
real letters than for pseudo-letters, or the other way around.
 
Figure 5.2: The involvement of the Visual Word Form Area during mental imagery. 
A) Regions that were more active during imagery of shape than during imagery of 
orientation over the 15 participants, plotted on a standard brain. There were clearly defined 
clusters of activity in left and right VWFA. The reverse contrast, orientation imagery > 
shape imagery, did not yield any significant regions of activity. All SPM t-maps were 
thresholded at p = 0.001 uncorrected with a voxel extent of at least 100 consecutive voxels.  
B) The anterior-posterior location of the 5 slices in A). The slices (at Y = -70; -60; -48; 
-38; -22) correspond to the peak coordinates in the left VWFA activity cluster (Table 5.1). 
C) BOLD activity for real (solid lines) and pseudoletters (dashed lines) in left VWFA, for 
the orientation task (black lines) and shape task (red lines) separately. Neural activity, 
as indicated by the average blood-oxygen-level dependent time course (averaged over the 
120 most active voxels in the ROI), calculated as percent signal change with respect to 
the first scan (t = -1.5 s), plotted over time. Mean neural activity increased after stimulus 
presentation and probe presentation; in between it returned towards baseline. Error bars 
indicate SEM, the grey dashed lines indicate 0 (horizontal line) and important events in 
the trial (vertical lines). D) BOLD activity in right VWFA, as in C). For the temporal 
pattern of BOLD activity in V1, see Figure S5.2D. The interaction between ROI, task and 
letter type was significant over participants at 10.5 seconds after trial onset (F(2,154) = 
3.37, p = 0.049). 
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Contrast Location
X Y Z z (Extent) Region name
Imagery activity 
(both tasks)
-18 -70 60 5.90 (1506) Right superior parietal
p ≤ 0.001; cluster 
size ≥ 100 voxels
-40 -34 38 5.53 (5885) Left inferior parietal
36 22 8 5.03 (431) Right insula
-40 18 2 4.66 (638) Left insula / left frontal inferior operculum
-54 10 34 3.91 (239) Left precentral cortex
-42 28 24 3.85 (169) Left frontal inferior cortex pars triangularis
Shape imagery  > 
orientation imagery
-24 36 -16 4.55 (282) Left frontal medial orbital cortex
p ≤ 0.001; cluster 
size ≥ 100 voxels
56 -62 -18 4.51 (328) Right inferior temporal / RVWFA
52 -38 58 4.46 (900) Right inferior parietal cortex
-28 -38 -26 4.10 (266) Left fusiform
-56 -70 -10 3.87 Left VWFA
-38 -22 -24 3.78
-50 -48 -20 3.73 Left VWFA
-36 -30 -22 3.59
-38 -36 -22 3.54
-42 -44 -24 3.58
-50 -60 -20 3.48 Left VWFA
-40 -16 -26 3.26
Table 5.1 Clusters of significantly activated voxels during imagery versus 
baseline. Activity common to imagery of shapes and orientations included large clusters 
of activation in bilateral parietal and frontal regions (significantly activated clusters in 
black). During imagery of shapes, there was more activity in left and right temporal cortex, 
specifically fusiform cortex, including regions reported as the VWFA. For the VWFA, also 
subpeaks are reported (in grey). There were no areas that were more active during imagery 
of orientation than during imagery of shape.
Build-up of shape activity during shape imagery
To further investigate the role of the VWFA area during imagery of 
shapes, we created functional ROIs (left VWFA and right VWFA) from 
the activated clusters and selected within these ROIs the 120 most active 
voxels during stimulus presentation (letter perception). We analyzed the 
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temporal evolution of the Blood-Oxygen-Level Dependent signal (BOLD) in 
the ROIs for imagery of letters versus pseudoletters during the two tasks. 
BOLD increased in response to the visually presented stimuli and cue at the 
beginning of the trial and again after the (visually presented) probe at the end 
of the trial. In between, the activity returned towards baseline (Figure 5.2C-D). 
This decrease was stronger for the orientation task than for the shape task, 
as expected from the contrast from which the VWFA ROIs were derived 
(imagery of letter shapes > imagery of orientation). In V1, on the other hand, 
there were no visible differences in BOLD for the two tasks (Figure S5.2D). 
A three-way ANOVA of ROI by task by stimulus type, on the BOLD activity 
at the time point immediately preceding probe onset, did confirm the task 
effect in left and right VWFA, and the lack thereof in V1 (main effect of task: 
F(1,14) = 18.93, p = 0.0007; interaction ROI and task: F(2,70) = 6.95, p = 0.0035). 
Pseudoletters appeared to activate the VWFA slightly stronger than did 
real letters, especially during the shape task in left VWFA (Figure 5.2C-D). 
There was indeed a trend towards an interaction between ROI and letter 
type (interaction ROI*letter type: F(2,70) = 2.61, p  =  0.092) and a marginally 
significant interaction between ROI, task and letter type (F(2,154) = 3.37, 
p = 0.049). This suggests that the left VWFA distinguishes between letters and 
pseudoletters, especially when this is task relevant.
Decoding of information in V1 and VWFA
To investigate whether the VWFA and early visual cortex also contain 
distinct representations for the imagined stimuli, we performed a decoding 
analysis of relevant stimulus features per region and per task. We 
independently trained and tested classifiers for orientation (142° vs. 63°), 
stimulus type (real letters vs. pseudoletters) and stimulus identity (F vs. 
H and pseudo1 vs. pseudo2). The average decoding accuracies per region, 
task and decoded feature can be found in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3. Overall, 
decoding accuracies were only slightly above chance level, with a few weakly 
significant effects. There was a trend of significant orientation information in 
V1 during the orientation task (t(14) = 1.82, p = 0.091). Letter shape could be 
decoded for real letters in right VWFA during the orientation task (t(14) = 2.27, 
p = 0.039). Letter type (real letters vs. pseudoletters) could be decoded better 
than chance in the left VWFA during both the orientation task and the shape 
task (t(14) = 3.23, p = 0.0061; t(14) = 2.20, p = 0.046).
To quantify if the decoding accuracies varied systematically depending on 
task and region, we used ANOVA’s to directly test this for the three decoded 
features independently. A two-way ANOVA over ROI and task showed that 
there was no main effect on the decoding accuracy of orientation, nor any 
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Figure 5.3: Decoding accuracies for the different decoded features in the three 
ROIs. A) Average accuracies for decoding shape of letters (blue), shape of pseudoletters 
(cyan), letter type (green) and orientation (yellow) in left VWFA, for the orientation task 
(left) and the shape task (right). B) Average decoding accuracies in right VWFA, as in A). 
C) Decoding accuracies in V1, as in A). The dashed lines indicate chance level (50%); error 
bars denote SEM.
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interactions (all F ≤ 1.72, all p ≥ 0.20). A three-way ANOVA over ROI, task 
and stimulus type showed that there were also no differences in decoding 
accuracy for stimulus shape for region, task or letters vs. pseudoletters (all 
F ≤ 1.77, all p ≥ 0.21). A two-way ANOVA over ROI and task on decoding 
accuracy for stimulus type showed a main effect of ROI (F(2,28) = 3.58, 
p = 0.041): decoding stimulus type was better possible in left VWFA (~55.5%) 
than in right VWFA (~50.5%) and V1 (~50%). This last result is in line with 
the observed, but non-significant difference in BOLD activity in left VWFA 
(Figure 5.2).
Representational similarity depends on the task
That the obtained decoding accuracies in VWFA and V1 were only slightly 
above chance might be partly explained by the large number of stimuli (8) 
and the fact that when we discriminated on one feature (e.g. orientation), 
we collapsed over the other (e.g. letter shape). To fully take advantage of the 
large number of stimuli and the possible structure in the stimulus set, we 
used a Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA).
To investigate the representational structure within the three different 
ROIs during the two tasks, we calculated the similarity between stimuli. We 
took the pair-wise Spearman rank correlation between the average voxel 
activity patterns for each stimulus, again at the time point right before the 
probe comparison. To test whether the patterns in the obtained similarity 
matrices from the two tasks differed at all, we first trained a Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) on the matrices to see if a classifier would be able 
to discriminate between the two tasks. We used a leave-one-out procedure 
where we trained on the patterns in the matrices from all but one participant, 
and classified the matrices from the left-out participant as belonging to either 
the orientation or the shape task. Classification was possible for similarity 
matrices from V1 (63.33% correct, p = 0.08; permutation test). In left VWFA 
it was around chance (56.67% correct, p = 0.32), while for right VWFA it 
was below chance (33.33% correct, p = 0.07). This suggests that in V1, the 
representations were detectably different depending on the task, while in 
VWFA the representations did not differ, or at least differed less than they 
varied between participants.
 To qualitatively investigate the structure of the representational space we 
averaged the similarity matrices over participants (Figure 5.4A), and applied 
non-metric multidimensional scaling (Figure 5.4B). In V1, the representation 
changed according to task: the stimuli clustered according to orientation in 
the orientation task (Figure 5.4B, left panels) and according to letter shape 
during the shape task (Figure 5.4B, right panels). In left and right VWFA there 
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was also some clustering according to orientation during the orientation 
task, albeit weaker than in V1. During the shape task, left VWFA showed 
weak clustering according to letter type and right VWFA according to letter 
shape. However, these clusters were not as pronounced in the VWFA as in 
V1.
Subsequently, we compared the average similarity matrices to the formal 
model matrices (Figure 5.5A). Specifically, we expected similar letters with 
different orientations to be more distinct in V1 (orientation model) during 
the orientation task than during the shape task. Furthermore, in VWFA we 
expected the individual letters to be more distinct (letter shape model) during 
the shape task than during the orientation task, or the real letters to be more 
similar to each other than to the pseudoletters (letter type model) and vice 
versa, or both. We separately correlated the matrices from the two tasks and 
the three ROIs using Spearman rank correlation. In the left VWFA, the letter 
type model provided the best fit, regardless of the task, while the orientation 
model negatively correlated with left VWFA during the shape task. In right 
VWFA, the letter identity model was the best fit during the shape task and 
the orientation model the worst fit, while during the orientation task the 
letter type model showed a higher correlation. In V1, the correlations of 
the models reversed with task: during the orientation task, the orientation 
model positively correlated with the similarity matrix while the shape model 
showed a negative correlation. Conversely, during the shape task, the letter 
identity model showed the highest positive correlation, while the orientation 
model negatively correlated with the obtained matrix.
To statistically test whether the models matched the similarity matrices 
better depending on task or ROI, we also obtained Spearman rank correlations 
Figure 5.4 Representational similarity during imagery of orientation and imagery 
of shape. A) The average similarity matrices (N = 15) in the three ROIs (left and right 
VWFA, V1) for the orientation task and the shape task at 10.5 seconds after trial onset. 
Yellow indicates higher similarity; blue indicates lower similarity between the stimuli. 
The matrices are symmetrical along the diagonal, therefore only the lower triangle is 
presented. Each combination of stimuli is one cell, the individual stimuli are labeled with 
their identity (H, F, pseudo1 (‘P’) and pseudo2 (‘?’)); their orientation is indicated by 
color (black = 142° and red = 63°). B) Multidimensional scaling along 3 dimensions in left 
VWFA (upper row), right VWFA (middle row) and V1 (lower row), for the orientation 
task (left) and the shape task (right). Multidimensional scaling was performed on the 
similarity matrices and plotted in 3D. The dots indicate the individual stimuli and are 
labeled as in A). In V1 there was clustering according to orientation during the orientation 
task, and according to shape during the shape task. The clusters were reoriented towards 
a basic representation derived from combining all three models (Figure 5.5A-C) to ensure 
they were in the same space.
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between the similarity matrices from the individual participants and the 
three models and averaged these (Figure S5.3). The average correlations 
were qualitatively largely comparable to those obtained from the averaged 
matrices: in left VWFA, the letter type model provided the best fit, regardless 
of task. In right VWFA, the letter shape model was the better model, again 
regardless of task. In V1 the similarity matrix matched the shape model 
during the shape task, but not during the orientation task, in line with the 
finding that in V1, similarity matrices differed between tasks. A three-way 
ANOVA over ROI, task and model revealed no significant main effects, nor 
interactions between the model correlations for tasks or ROIs (main effect 
of model: F(2,28) = 1.37, p = 0.27; interaction model*ROI: F(4,112) = 1.8, 
p = 0,14; all other F ≤ 0.9, all other p ≥ 0.42). It must be noted, however, that 
the correlations between matrices and models were relatively small and 
somewhat variable over participants, compared to the correlations with the 
less noisy, averaged matrices.
 Left VWFA Right VWFA V1
Decode orientation
Orientation task 49.17% 52.81% 52.92%
Shape task 51.56% 49.06% 49.48%
Decode letters 
shape for real letters
Orientation task 49.38% 54.37% * 52.50%
Shape task 50.21% 51.88% 50.42%
Decode letter shape 
for pseudo-letters
Orientation task 50.62% 48.54% 47.92%
Shape task 47.92% 49.17% 46.67%
Decode letter type
Orientation task   55.63% ** 51.77% 51.25%
Shape task 55.52% * 49.48% 50.42%
Table 5.2 Decoding accuracies for the different tasks and ROIs. Classifiers 
were trained to discriminate between orientation (142° vs. 63°), letter type (real vs. 
pseudoletters) or letter identity (F vs. H and pseudo1 vs. pseudo2) on all trials but one of 
each class, and tested on the left-out trials. Chance level was 50% in all cases, black values 
indicate decoding accuracy significantly higher than chance over all participants (N = 15) 
at p < 0.1; grey values indicate non-significant, * indicates p < 0.05; ** indicates p < 0.01.
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Discussion
Here we studied how and when early visual cortex contributes to mental 
imagery by exploring the effect of stimulus features and stimulus familiarity 
on the representational content of V1 and VWFA. In brief, we found that V1 
was equally active during imagery of shapes and imagery of orientation, 
while VWFA was more active during shape imagery than orientation 
imagery. In left VWFA there was also a difference in the representation of 
imagined letters and pseudoletters, whereas right VWFA was sensitive to 
stimulus shape. In V1, on the other hand, the patterns switched to represent 
the imagined feature: during imagery of orientation, it distinguished 
between stimuli with different orientations, while during imagery of shape, 
it distinguished between stimuli with a different shape. These results suggest 
that V1 is sensitive to stimulus and task demands in the way it supports 
mental content. How do these findings inform us about the influence of 
stimulus features and stimulus familiarity on the involvement of V1 during 
mental imagery? 
(1) Are the regions involved in mental imagery dependent on the specific 
stimulus features being imagined? The Visual Word Form Area showed 
more activity during imagery of letters than during imagery of orientation, 
which suggests that when people imagine letter shapes, they use the brain 
regions that are also relevant when observing those letter shapes. This 
has also been shown for other stimulus-specific higher visual areas (such 
as FFA, PPA and MT) during perception, mental imagery and working 
memory (Johnson & Johnson, 2014; O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Seurinck 
et al., 2011). V1, on the other hand, was equally active during both tasks; 
speaking against the idea that the imagined stimulus matters for activity 
in the early visual cortex. Representational similarity analyses were in line 
with the activity patterns and showed that VWFA consistently represented 
stimulus type and distinguished between the types of letter being imagined. 
In V1, the representations were dependent on the imagined features: during 
the orientation task V1 showed its orientation sensitivity, while during the 
shape task its retinotopic organization supported shape discriminations. 
This is in line with the findings reported by Serences et al. (2009) that 
during image maintenance, V1 represented the task-specific feature; and 
with findings from Riggall and Postle (2012) that when participants had to 
maintain two stimulus features in working memory both could be decoded, 
but if participants were subsequently instructed to drop one, the information 
about this feature completely disappeared from the brain signal. It suggests 
that while stimulus features determine the involvement of higher visual 
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areas during mental imagery, this is not the case for V1. The stable presence 
of representations in V1 is in contrast to predictions from Kosslyn and 
Thompson (2003) that V1 is only involved in imagery when required by the 
object of imagination. 
(2) Does availability of higher order stimulus representations affect the 
mental representation? Interestingly, the VWFA distinguished between 
letters and pseudoletters during both tasks. During the shape task, overall 
BOLD activity also differed between letters and pseudoletters; during the 
orientation task there was no overall BOLD difference, yet the letter type 
could still be decoded.  This suggests that VWFA always processes the letter 
shape of the stimuli, even though this was not needed to solve the orientation 
task. V1, in contrast, showed a task-dependent effect. During shape imagery, 
V1 did not represent the orientation, but the shape of the individual letter 
stimuli, which was the relevant task dimension. The lower order feature, 
orientation, was not represented during shape imagery (there was even a 
negative correlation with the orientation model during the shape task in V1). 
These findings are not in agreement with our hypothesis that during shape 
imagery, only the higher visual areas contain stimulus representations. 
The clustering according to stimulus shape during the shape task in V1, 
Figure 5.5 Modeling the representational similarity. A) Letter shape model: the same 
letters, but with different oriented gratings, are more similar to each other than other 
letters with the same orientation. This model was expected in both VWFA and V1 during 
the shape task. Yellow indicates high similarity; blue indicates low similarity between a 
pair of stimuli. The matrices are symmetrical along the diagonal. Each combination of 
stimuli is one cell, the individual stimuli are labeled with their identity (H, F, pseudo1 
(‘P’) and pseudo2 (‘?’)); their orientation is indicated by color (black = 142° and red = 
63°).  B) Letter type model: real letters are more similar to each other than to pseudoletters, 
and vice versa. This type of representational structure was expected in left VWFA during 
the shape task. C) Orientation model: stimuli with a similar orientation have a higher 
correlation than stimuli with a different orientation, even though they might form the 
same overall letter shape. This model was expected in V1 during the orientation task. D-F) 
Correlations of the models (A-C) with the representation matrices obtained from the brain 
data (Figure 5.4A) at 10.5 seconds after trial onset in the three ROIs. D) Left VWFA 
correlations with the letter shape model (blue), letter type model (cyan) and orientation 
model (yellow) during the orientation task (left) and the shape task (right). During both 
tasks, the highest correlation was observed with the letter type model. E) Correlation of the 
representational data with the models in right VWFA, as in A). During the orientation 
task (left) the highest correlation was with the letter type model, while during the shape 
task the highest correlation was with the letter shape model. F) Correlations with the 
models for V1, as in A). Here, the orientation model gave the highest correlation during 
the orientation task while the letter shape model fitted best during the shape task.
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suggests that a representation in early visual cortex was created during 
shape imagery even though a higher representation existed in the VWFA. 
Representations were not more dependent on V1 for the unfamiliar stimuli 
either: the unfamiliar shapes where not better decoded from V1 than the 
familiar shapes; if anything, the reverse was the case. This suggests that the 
presence of a higher order representation does not influence the presence of 
representations in V1.
The automatic categorization of stimuli by the higher visual area VWFA 
and the task-dependent involvement of V1, are partly in line with predictions 
from the Reverse Hierarchy Theory of perception (Hochstein & Ahissar, 
2002) that the overall shape reaches conscious perception first, and the more 
effortful processing of details only occurs when needed. A recent study by 
Campana, Rebollo, Urai, Wyart, and Tallon-Baudry (2016) using stimuli with 
local and global task features, showed that participants indeed preferentially 
focused on the global shape when they were free to choose between the global 
or the local aspect of the stimulus. Moreover, global shape information could 
be decoded even if their participants were instructed to focus on the local 
elements. Likewise, in the current study, we could decode the letter type 
from VWFA during both tasks, regardless of behavioral relevance.  The task 
specific representations in V1 during the shape task, however, are not as 
predicted by the Reverse Hierarchy Theory of perception, which suggests 
that lower visual areas are only implicated when needed. Instead, in the 
current imagery task the top-down effects reach unto the lowest levels of the 
hierarchy.
There is an alternative explanation for the consistent involvement of 
V1, which would be in line with the prediction by Kosslyn and Thompson 
(2003) that V1 involvement is dependent on the level of detail at which the 
stimulus is processed. The lack of a difference in activity for the two tasks in 
V1 could indicate that V1 is active during both tasks; the multivariate results 
could indicate that it represents the imagined feature in both tasks. Although 
involvement of V1 during the shape task might seem surprising at first, the 
staircase procedure in the shape task could have required participants to 
discriminate small changes in the overall shape when they did well in the 
comparison process. The detailed retinotopic organization of V1 makes it 
very suited for processing such fine features and the current data do not 
preclude that participants used this strategy instead of focusing on the overall 
shape. To answer the question whether V1 is also involved when a detailed 
representation does not contribute to subsequent behavior, would require a 
task in which the participants truly can rely on a higher order representation. 
Such a task could involve detecting a change in letter identity or font, and 
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would render the experiment more comparable to studies that look into 
object-representations (e.g. Sue-Hyun Lee et al., 2013). Such an experiment 
with manipulations on the level of stimulus details and conceptual object 
identity has, to our knowledge, not been performed in the context of mental 
imagery. 
Regardless of whether the continuous involvement of V1 is due to 
our task or a general feature of mental imagery, the internally generated 
representations in V1 can differ depending on the imagined stimulus. It 
shows that top-down induced representations can be stimulus specific 
(Riggall & Postle, 2012; Serences et al., 2009). This effect bears resemblance 
with the specific enhancement of attended features in neural representations 
during perception (Jehee et al., 2011; Reddy, Kanwisher, & VanRullen, 2009; 
Serences & Boynton, 2007). It has also been suggested that image maintenance 
is closely related to sustained attention to an internal representation (e.g. 
Chun, 2011). The top-down influence on specific neural populations within 
a region might be a general mechanism in the perceptual system. Such a 
system allows specific preparation for, or prediction of (Kok et al., 2012; 
Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003), an upcoming stimulus or task by enhancing the 
relevant feature. During perception, none-relevant features automatically 
activate early visual regions; during mental imagery, these aspects of the 
stimulus might not be created. 
 The task-dependent employment of the visual cortex during mental 
imagery of specific features of a stimulus bears resemblance to the attentional 
enhancement of relevant features during perception. This supports the idea 
that mental imagery employs perceptual regions in a manner comparable to 
perception (Chapter 2; Kosslyn et al., 2006). The dynamic role of V1 during 
imagery is also in line with the idea of visual cortex as a dynamic blackboard 
(Bullier, 2001b; Mumford, 1991). Since we trained and tested the classifiers on 
the imagery task only, from the current data we cannot determine whether 
the imagery-related representations in V1 and VWFA are also perception-like 
in nature. For V1, it has been shown before that the representations during 
imagery and working memory are perception-like (Chapter 2; Harrison 
& Tong, 2009). For the VWFA, it remains to be determined whether the 
representations are truly stimulus related: as the shape task was harder, effort 
might play a role in the distinction between tasks and stimuli. However, it 
is unlikely that effort can solely explain the increase in activity in VWFA for 
two reasons. First, the activity in VWFA during the shape task was stimulus 
specific: it was stronger for the pseudoletters. Secondly, during shape 
imagery, classical task-effort related regions were not reliably more active, 
although this would be expected if the shape task was significantly harder. 
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To fully exclude such an explanation, future studies could incorporate an 
independent measure of the neural patterns during perception of letters, in 
order to train the classifier on perception of the stimuli or to compare the 
RSA matrices from imagery with those from perception. 
Although the distinction between letters and pseudoletters in VWFA 
was consistently found, we could not determine whether VWFA also 
distinguished between individual stimulus shapes. This is in contrast to 
earlier findings of stimulus representations in the visual word form area 
(Baeck, Kravitz, Baker, & Op de Beeck, 2015; Stokes et al., 2009). There are 
several possible explanations for the lack of, presumably more fine-grained, 
distinctions between individual letters. First of all, the number of participants 
was limited (N = 15); practical limitations regarding task difficulty, inclusion 
criteria, technical difficulties and overall length of the experiment led to the 
exclusion of a relatively large number of participants. Secondly, our definition 
of the visual word form area might not be optimal. The Visual Word Form 
Area has been consistently reported around the coordinates where we also 
find information; however, VWFA might consist of several sub-regions that 
process symbols, single letters, (pronounceable) letter strings and meaningful 
words (James et al., 2005; Vinckier et al., 2007). Possibly, our VWFA did not 
properly cover the region involved in individual letter identity. Moreover, 
the exact location of VWFA differs per individual and might have be better 
defined at the individual level (Glezer & Riesenhuber, 2013). Interestingly, 
we found consistent activity in the right VWFA, even though this region is 
not reported in the classical literature on letter or word processing. Right 
VWFA might not process letters preferentially but play a general role in 
visual shape extraction (Ben-Shachar, Dougherty, Deutsch, & Wandell, 
2006). Although left VWFA also seems sensitive to line drawings of objects, 
it is most responsive to words (Dehaene & Cohen, 2011; Szwed et al., 2011). 
In a future study, it will be important to test whether the VWFA is concerned 
with the familiarity distinction per se, or whether it represents individual 
letter shapes. Moreover, as the distinction between letters and pseudoletters 
occurred both when overall BOLD was higher (during the shape task) and 
when it was lower (during the orientation task), in a future study it could 
be interesting to test the relationship between overall BOLD activity and 
specific representational activity patterns, as we also did in chapter 3 of this 
thesis.
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Conclusion
 Together, the current findings show that V1 is involved whenever the 
imagery task involved features that V1 is sensitive to, such as orientation 
and the fine details of stimulus shape. Moreover, the V1 representation was 
specific to the task demands, which bears resemblance to the effect of 
attention on V1 processing during perception. This suggests that the top-
down influences on specific neural populations within a region might occur 
through a general mechanism in the visual system that prepares for upcoming 
perception of relevant stimuli. VWFA contained information about the type 
of letters (real or pseudoletters), regardless of whether participants imagined 
the overall shape or the orientation but was more active during the shape 
task. The combined findings from V1 and VWFA suggest that the presence of 
higher order stimulus representations does not determine the involvement 
of early visual cortex. It might be worth to further investigate the role of 
higher-order representations during mental imagery with a task that 
genuinely allows both conceptual and detailed representations (Dehaene & 
Cohen, 2011). Here we showed that during mental imagery, the top-down 
influences on neural populations in V1 are specific to the imagined stimulus, 
which can explain part of inconsistencies in the mental imagery literature. 
Insight into the specific conditions that determine the format and content of 
mental images could be crucial for understanding the role of visual cortex 
in many cognitive functions and, ultimately, the nature of thought (Kan, 
Barsalou, Solomon, Minor, & Thompson-Schill, 2003).
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Supplementary Material
Supplementary Figures
Figure S5.1 The four stimuli used in the experiment. Two different letters (A-B) 
and two different pseudoletters (C-D) were used during the task session. Each letter was 
build out of small Gabor patches with the same orientation. To make the probe different 
from the stimuli, either the orientation was changed in counterclockwise or clockwise 
direction, or the letters and pseudoletters were stretched or compressed in the horizontal or 
vertical direction. The amount of change was determined using a continuous stair-casing 
procedure. The fixation dot is enlarged for illustrative purposes.
A B
DC
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Figure S5.2 Activity during imagery and stimulus presentation. A) Activity during  
stimulus presentation compared to the (implicit) baseline. All SPM t-maps were 
thresholded at p = 0.001 uncorrected with a voxel extent of at least 100 consecutive voxels. 
Yellow indicates higher activity. B) Activity during probe presentation and comparison 
process, compared to (implicit) baseline; as in A). C) Activity during imagery of shapes 
and orientation, compared to (implicit) baseline; as in A). D) BOLD activity for real 
letters (solid lines) and pseudoletters (dashed lines) in V1, for the orientation task (black 
lines) and shape task (red lines) separately. Mean neural activity increased after stimulus 
presentation and probe presentation; in between it returned towards baseline. Activity 
was indicated by the average blood-oxygen-level dependent time course (averaged over the 
120 most active voxels in the ROI), calculated as percent signal change with respect to the 
first scan (t = -1.5 s). Error bars indicate SEM, the grey dashed lines indicate 0 (horizontal 
line) and important events in the trial (vertical lines).
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Figure S5.3 Average correlations of the individual similarity matrices for the 15 
participants. A) Left VWFA correlations with the letter shape model (blue), letter type 
model (cyan) and orientation model (yellow) during the orientation task (left) and the 
shape task (right). B) Right VWFA correlations with the models; as in A). C) Correlations 
with the models in V1; as in A). 
142
6
General Discussion
144
6145
Summary of the findings
Mental imagery, ‘seeing something with the mind’s eye’, is a perception-
like experience for many people. In the literature, there has been a long 
standing debate about the nature of mental images and their relationship to 
actual perception, but whether primary sensory regions are actually involved 
in the generation of mental content has remained unresolved. In this thesis, 
I used fMRI and multivariate pattern analyses to investigate whether early 
visual cortex contains mental images and under which circumstances V1 is 
involvement in imagery. 
First, I addressed the issue of whether V1 can contain mental images 
at all. To this end, in chapter 2, I asked people to mentally imagine an 
oriented grating, as cells in early visual cortex have been shown to be highly 
orientation selective. I found that it was possible to decode, from the brain 
activity pattern, which orientation people were imagining. These neural 
activity patterns resembled those elicited by actual perception, suggesting 
that mental images are indeed perception-like. Moreover, the representations 
tracked the task demands in time: when participants first had to rotate the 
stimulus, the neural representations appeared later than when an orientation 
could simply be maintained. These findings suggest that early visual cortex 
can function as a ‘dynamic blackboard’ for both bottom-up external input 
and top-down internally generated content. The findings also raised several 
questions about the limits of this ‘blackboard’ which I addressed in the 
subsequent chapters.
First of all, since in chapter 2 the early visual cortex contained information 
about the imagined orientation even though overall BOLD returned to 
baseline, in chapter 3 I asked how mental imagery representations relate to 
overall BOLD activity. For this I reanalyzed the data set collected for chapter 
2 and showed that decoding of these images was possible because of a 
slightly elevated BOLD response in voxels that were tuned to the imagined 
orientation. These small but reliable differences indicate selective activation 
of relevant neuronal populations. Interestingly, during actual perception 
these orientation-specific responses were equally small, suggesting that part 
of the BOLD response elicited by a stimulus might be non-specific (Jack et 
al., 2006).
Secondly, since in chapter 2 the mental representations transformed 
over time, first representing the starting orientation and subsequently 
representing the final orientation after rotation, in chapter 4 I investigated 
whether early visual cortex also represents intermediate orientations 
throughout the mental rotational process. Therefore I tracked activity in 
early visual cortex using ultra-fast (TR = 210 ms) fMRI while participants 
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mentally rotated oriented gratings. Replicating the results of chapter 2, I 
found that representations in V1 changed over time. Furthermore, longer 
rotations led to a later neural representation of the end-orientation. Although 
the reconstructed orientations during rotation itself appeared to track the 
mental stimulus, we could only find a statistically robust representation of 
the static end-orientation. This suggests that V1 robustly represents stable 
mental images but possibly not the intermediate calculations in dynamic 
imagery. The onset of the static imagery was accompanied by a BOLD peak 
in visual cortex. Since the peak appeared while there was no stimulus on the 
screen, this BOLD response was likely not specific to perceived or imagined 
content, but a nonspecific response as we also found in chapter 3. 
Finally, in chapter 5 I tested how V1 involvement depends on the specific 
stimuli being imagined: if stimuli allow a higher order representation, 
imagery might not depend on V1 (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Kosslyn & 
Thompson, 2003; Sue-Hyun Lee et al., 2013). To investigate this, I created 
letter and pseudoletter stimuli that were build out of small gratings and 
asked participants to imagine either the overall (letter) shape or the local 
details (orientation). I found that representations in V1 discriminated 
between stimulus orientation when participants imagined the orientation of 
the small gratings but also discriminated shape when participants imagined 
the overall letter or pseudoletter shapes. Imagery of shape also activated the 
Visual Word Form Area (VWFA) – a letter responsive area in the occipito-
temporal cortex. This suggests that early visual cortex is indeed sensitive to 
task demands and dynamically represents the relevant feature, regardless of 
whether a higher order representation is present.
Together, these findings show that early visual cortex consistently carries 
representations of imagined content – at least when participants imagine a 
stimulus feature that is processed by V1. Moreover, these representations are 
perception-like in nature: the same neural populations code for imagined and 
perceived orientations. These findings provide a step forward in the quest 
for the nature of mental imagery, but also have implications for perception, 
memory, and the role of visual cortex in these processes, which I will discuss 
below.
Can we close the mental imagery debate?
The findings in this thesis provide a strong indication that mental 
imagery involves perception-like representations in V1 and resembles actual 
perception to a remarkable extent. Overlapping activity in V1 for imagery 
and perception had been suggested by several earlier studies. However, the 
(novel) MVPA approach that I took in this thesis allowed a direct comparison 
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of neural populations (or, as a proxy, voxel populations) involved in 
imagery and in perception. With this method I showed that the activity 
patterns for imagery and perception were highly similar, at least similar 
enough to generalize from perception to imagery. Moreover, I showed that 
the decoding accuracy was independent of overall BOLD activity in visual 
cortex. This might explain some of the inconsistent findings of V1 activation 
(Klein et al., 2004; Klein et al., 2000; Mazard et al., 2005), deactivation (Kaas 
et al., 2010) and lack of effect (Knauff et al., 2000): overall activity is not the 
most appropriate measure of imagery related involvement. Instead, the 
spatially distributed, small activity differences between preferred and non-
preferred stimuli provide a better indication of visual cortex involvement 
during mental imagery.
Several other recent studies support the idea that early visual cortex is 
involved during mental imagery. First of all, in a study very comparable 
to the one in chapter 2, Christophel et al. (2014) showed that early visual 
cortex contained information about complex flow field patterns before and 
after mental rotation. Furthermore, Naselaris et al. (2015) explicitly modeled 
low-level features in V1 and showed that with this model it was possible 
to determine which artwork participants were imagining. Emmerling, 
Zimmermann, Sorger, Frost, and Goebel (2016) could decode the direction 
of imagined motion from early visual regions. Using MVPA, these studies 
consistently replicated the finding that V1 contains representation of 
internally generated content. Complementary evidence comes from a study 
that showed a top-down flow of information during mental imagery, a 
reversal compared to the direction of information flow during perception 
(Dentico et al., 2014).
The use of MVPA has provided data that allow a large step ahead in 
the imagery debate. The perception-like involvement of early visual cortex 
during mental imagery (Chapter 2-4; Christophel et al., 2014; Naselaris et 
al., 2015) is in line with predictions from the depictive account of mental 
imagery: if imagery is depictive, it should involve regions that maintain 
a spatial coding of the outside world (Kosslyn et al., 2006). The consistent 
neural representations in retinotopically organized V1 are a strong showcase 
that mental images are consistent with the depictive account. Obviously this 
does not mean that mental images are literally like photographs – the visual 
information is coded in neural signals as soon as light reaches the retina. 
Arguably, this renders all neural coding abstract; yet as mental images are 
processed in V1, the brain activity resembles that elicited by actual perception. 
Hence, in the brain mental images can be as depictive as visual information 
can be depictive, due to the spatial layout of the cortex. 
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The notion that the recent neuroimaging findings may have settled the 
imagery debate has recently also been suggested by J. Pearson and Kosslyn 
(2015), who proposed to move on to characterizing when mental images are 
depictive. This logical step is indeed the approach that I took in chapter 5, 
where I investigated the role of task and stimuli, and in chapter 4, where 
I investigated whether visual cortex is involved in the calculation of 
intermediate representations during imagery of dynamical stimuli.
That the involvement of V1 is determined by the specific stimulus features 
and level of details had been suggested before (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003), 
but not explicitly tested for mental imagery. I found representations for 
imagined orientations in early visual cortex in chapters 2 and 4, suggesting 
that V1 is implicated when imagery involves stimuli that V1 neurons are 
tuned to, such as oriented gratings. In chapter 5, where I specifically looked 
at this issue, I found that shape and orientation information could both be 
represented in V1, but only when the feature was task-relevant. In a study that 
compared working memory for specific objects and object categories, higher 
order regions (notably prefrontal cortex) contained stimulus representations 
when it was sufficient to remember the stimulus category, but visual object 
areas carried representations when the specific object was to be remembered 
(Sue-Hyun Lee et al., 2013). In a subsequent review of working memory 
studies using MVPA (Sue-Hyun Lee & Baker, 2016), these authors also 
argued that V1 contained representations when stimuli were chosen that V1 
is tuned to. Unfortunately, the stimulus features I used in Chapter 5 might 
have inadvertently forced the participants to rely on the early visual cortex 
as the shape information in this task had a detailed spatial component as 
well. Therefore, although the findings from chapter 5 are informative about 
the role of stimulus features for the involvement of higher visual regions, 
their influence on V1 remains to be further characterized. 
In chapter 4 the mental representations appeared stronger for static 
images than for dynamic images during mental rotation. This likely can be 
explained by the fact that the intermediate representations were only briefly 
present in the participants’ minds. Moreover, these brief presentations could 
have varied a bit between participants due to small differences in rotation 
speed. A combination of these effects might have made the intermediates 
less ‘detectable’. A differential representation of a stable versus a temporary, 
intermediate mental image, might explain the non-significant decoding 
results. An alternative way of looking at the findings from chapter 4 is that 
behavioral relevance determined whether V1 contained images (S. I. Moro et 
al., 2010; Mostert et al., 2015): only the stable end product was task relevant 
and had to be compared to the probe. Similarly, in chapter 5 only the task-
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relevant feature was represented. This could be an economic situation given 
that small activity differences seem to drive the possibility to decode mental 
content and activity, in turn, requires energy. That the strength of the mental 
images can be behaviorally important is also suggested by the findings from 
chapters 2 and 3, where behavioral performance related to the strength of 
decoding and the size of the difference in activity for preferred and non-
preferred stimuli in early visual cortex. Furthermore, decoding performance 
has been related to scores on the VVIQ, a behavioral questionnaire that 
assesses the vividness of mental imagery (Sue-Hyun Lee et al., 2012). 
Vividness (VVIQ scores), in turn, has been found to correlate to the strength 
of mental imagery on subsequent perception (J. Pearson, Rademaker, & 
Tong, 2011). 
To fully determine the role of V1 in mental imagery, several important 
questions regarding vividness of mental imagery remain to be tested. First 
of all, is vividness a matter of brightness of the mental image? Or does 
vividness also relate to the level of details being imagined? Secondly, do 
better images mean that there will be a more vivid experience, or is vividness 
an effort that determines the quality of the images that are created? And do 
people use vivid images consistently, or only when they are asked to, as 
in the studies in this thesis? Were the intermediates in the rotation process 
(Chapter 4) also perceived as less vivid, or were they created less vivid since 
they were task irrelevant? Related, is imagery vividness a stable trait that can 
vary per individual (Nishimura, Aoki, Inagawa, Tobinaga, & Iwaki, 2015), 
possibly depending on visual cortex anatomy (Bergmann, Genc, Kohler, 
Singer, & Pearson, 2014, 2015)? If that turns out to be the case, it might explain 
why some people are unfamiliar with the experience of a mental image (a 
condition called aphantasia; de Vito & Bartolomeo, 2016; Zeman, Dewar, 
& Della Sala, 2015, 2016) and why there are large individual differences in 
V1 activity during imagery (e.g. Emmerling et al., 2016; Klein et al., 2004; 
Mazard et al., 2005) and decodability (Chapter 2 and 3; Emmerling et al., 2016; 
Sue-Hyun Lee et al., 2012). Some further support for this idea comes from 
studies that find a relation between VVIQ scores and overall activity in 
visual cortex (Amedi et al., 2005; Cui et al., 2007; Olivetti Belardinelli et al., 
2009). To fully explain whether images are depictive, such questions need 
to be answered with clever designs and methods that allow tapping into the 
inherently private mental images. 
Finally, on a more philosophical note, one could wonder how the experience 
of imagery as perception-like is dependent on the involvement of early 
perceptual regions. Strictly speaking, the definition of mental imagery from 
Kosslyn et al. (2006, p. 4) “when a representation of the type created during 
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the initial phases of perception is present but the stimulus is not actually 
being perceived” already implies early visual cortex involvement. In other 
words, would imagery without a representation in a perceptual region be 
still experienced as imagery or would we describe this differently?
How does mental imagery relate to working memory?
In chapter 2 I showed that mental images resemble the representation in 
V1 during actual perception. Moreover, I showed that the same holds for 
images that are held in working memory and that the representations during 
working memory resembled those during perception. These findings are in 
line with several other studies that showed perception-like representations in 
working memory (Christophel et al., 2012; Harrison & Tong, 2009; Riggall & 
Postle, 2012; Serences et al., 2009) Are mental imagery and working memory, 
although generally treated as separate in the literature, one and the same 
thing (Tong, 2013)?
Mental imagery has been implicated as the mechanism used to recall 
information from long-term memory, arguably putting the information from 
long-term memory into working memory (Baddeley, 2003). Indeed, there are 
reports of sensory reactivation during memory recall  (Waldhauser, Braun, 
& Hanslmayr, 2016) and recalling oriented gratings from long-term memory 
resulted in perception-like representations in early visual cortex (Bosch et al., 
2014). Moreover, in chapter 4 the participants construct the oriented gratings 
to start with essentially from their long their memory and this also resulted 
in V1 involvement. 
Working memory and imagery are also closely related in some definitions: 
both systems allowing maintenance and manipulation of mental content (e.g. 
Baddeley, 2003). Therefore, imagery and working memory are not always 
explicitly distinguished in the literature. What I call working memory in 
chapter 2, some might call imagery (Cattaneo, Pisoni, Papagno, & Silvanto, 
2011); what I call imagery some call working memory (e.g. Christophel 
et al., 2014; Sue-Hyun Lee & Baker, 2016). However, working memory is 
broader than imagery as it allows maintenance of more than perception-like 
information (e.g. in linguistic code). Mental imagery, in turn, goes beyond 
working memory in that it allows the creation of novel images. In our mind’s 
eye we can see things that we have never perceived, and this creative aspect 
has been suggested to be the prerequisite for human creativity and intelligence 
(Kozhevnikov, Kozhevnikov, Yu, & Blazhenkova, 2013) – although it 
would be interesting to test whether monkeys can generate new images 
too. The creational aspect defines imagery as a process that is distinct from 
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working memory maintenance or recall from long-term memory. In chapters 
2 and 4, I therefore explicitly distinguished imagery (creation through 
rotation) from working memory (pure maintenance of an image) and 
simulated the creational aspect of imagery by having participants rotate the 
gratings towards a novel orientation. Nevertheless, working memory and 
imagery representations in V1 were similar enough to allow generalization of 
decoding, suggesting that the two different processes rely on similar neural 
substrates. Working memory and mental imagery thus share a common 
machinery and their representations can be the same.
Whether the creational aspect in the task in chapters 2 and 4 rendered 
truly novel images can be debated – all orientations might have been seen at 
some point before, even though participants were unaware of this. However, 
it could be questioned whether we can at all imagine truly new things: as 
the brain probably only contains information it has previously encountered 
through perception, our imagery capacities might create a novel combination 
of old information. 
A common representative system suggests that rules that govern one 
process (e.g. working memory) also govern another (e.g. mental imagery). 
Stimulus features determine where in the brain information in working 
memory is represented (Sue-Hyun Lee & Baker, 2016) and this predicts 
that mental imagery also depends on stimulus features. In a similar vein, 
if imagery can be equated to the visuospatial sketch path suggested for 
working memory (Baddeley, 2003), then the imagery findings from other 
sensory modalities (e.g. Meyer et al., 2010; Schmidt, Ostwald, & Blankenburg, 
2014) suggest that systems supporting information from somatosensation 
and olfactation should be added to Baddeley’s model of working memory. 
Secondly, although mental imagery is inherently private, it can then be 
studied using the more controlled conditions often applied in working 
memory. I took this approach in chapter 5, where the task used could be 
considered a working memory task, as the participants did not create novel 
stimuli in their minds. However, the given overlap between mental imagery 
and working memory described in chapter 2, I propose that the findings 
from chapter 5 will also generalize to creational mental imagery. On the 
other hand, as recall is important for storing information in memory (Larsen, 
Butler, & Roediger, 2009; van den Broek et al., 2016), then knowledge of 
mental imagery can provide a template to follow encoding processes online. 
With mental imagery, representations at various levels of abstractness can 
possibly be consciously induced and studied. In the future, these could then 
be used to decode memory retrieval, manipulation and (re)storage.
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Is the early visual cortex a dynamic blackboard?
The perception-like representations in V1 that I have found during mental 
imagery, have led to the suggestion in chapter 2 that early visual cortex can 
function as a dynamic blackboard (Bullier, 2001a; T. S. Lee, 2003; T. S. Lee & 
Mumford, 2003; S. I. Moro et al., 2010; Mumford, 1991; Pasternak & Greenlee, 
2005), that processes both bottom-up input and top-down internally 
generated content. The consistent finding of mental representations in early 
visual cortex in chapters 2, 4 and 5 support the idea that this high-resolution 
buffer represents static content. The close relatedness of (working) memory 
and imagery are also in line with the idea that the brain has one common 
system of representing (visual) information. Further support for visual 
cortex as a dynamic blackboard in between the internal and external world 
for any computation involving visual information comes from studies that 
report that V1 represents the content of dreams (Horikawa et al., 2013); from 
studies that showed that visual cortex actively predicts expected input (Kok, 
Failing, & de Lange, 2014; Kok et al., 2012); and from a study that showed 
that visual cortex contained information that distinguished between different 
auditorily presented scenes (Vetter, Smith, & Muckli, 2014).
This blackboard is also dynamic in the sense that it represents both 
external input and internal representations at a high level of detail using 
the same neural populations (Bullier, 2001b). Furthermore, it dynamically 
represents stimulus features in accordance with task demands (Chapter 5), 
and representations evolved in synchrony with the different steps in the task 
(Chapters 2 and 4; S. I. Moro et al., 2010). Whether the blackboard is involved 
in the intermediate calculations for mental transformations remains to 
be determined. Intermediate representations might be represented in a 
different quality, as they might not necessarily need the high-resolution 
buffer provided by V1. 
To what extent the dynamic blackboard is functionally relevant, also 
remains to be determined. It has been suggested that top-down feedback 
connections to early visual cortex are necessary for conscious perception 
(Bullier, 2001a; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000), but this does not necessarily hold 
for mental imagery, which is purely top-down initiated. During the mental 
rotation that participants performed in chapter 4, I did not find stable mental 
images. A few other studies suggest that representations in V1 are only an 
epiphenomenon of the imagery process: presenting distracters during the 
delay period also leads to a decrease or even disappearance of working 
memory representations in  V1 (Bettencourt & Xu, 2016); and some patients 
with V1 lesions have spared imagery capabilities (de Gelder, Tamietto, Pegna, 
& Van den Stock, 2015). On the other hand, that there is some functional 
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relevance for the representations on the mental blackboard is suggested 
by cases where perception goes awry: a dependence on the blackboard by 
both imagery and perception can explain reported interactions between 
perception and imagery, such as in hallucinations (Pajani, Kok, Kouider, 
& de Lange, 2015; Weßlau & Steil, 2014) and false memories (Gonsalves 
et al., 2004; Lindner & Echterhoff, 2015; Patihis & Loftus, 2016). Moreover, 
the quality of the neural representation in V1 correlates with behavioral 
performance (Chapter 2; Ester et al., 2013). rTMS over the occipital cortex 
disrupted performance on an imagery task, suggesting that activity in V1 is 
not epiphenomenal (Kosslyn, 1999). However, as it is difficult to selectively 
target V1 with TMS (Thielscher, Reichenbach, Ugurbil, & Uludag, 2010), it 
remains to be determined whether this effect is attributable to V1 or other 
occipital regions.
The perception-like mental representations in visual cortex offer a new 
view on representations in the brain. Instead of consisting of many sub-regions 
that have their own specialization for different psychological processes, 
there might be one general representational workspace, distributed over the 
brain, where specific regions are used whenever specific aspects of a stimulus 
need to be processed (D'Esposito & Postle, 2015; Sue-Hyun Lee & Baker, 
2016). Visual regions are then involved whenever visual or spatial aspects of 
a stimulus need to be represented or processed. On the other hand, linguistic 
or abstract codes might be used whenever more appropriate. For example, 
the influence of motion words on motion perception is not mediated by 
visual areas but instead by language areas in the left hemisphere (Francken, 
Kok, Hagoort, & de Lange, 2015; Francken, Meijs, Hagoort, van Gaal, & de 
Lange, 2015). The extent to which people rely on a visual representation 
versus a language-like code, might differ per individual and per situation 
(Keogh & Pearson, 2011; Nishimura et al., 2015). Flexible employment of 
the cortex for image maintenance is in line with the state-based models that 
have been proposed for memory (D'Esposito & Postle, 2015), but also bear a 
relationship with theories of embodied cognition (Barsalou, 2005; van Dam, 
Rueschemeyer, Bekkering, & Lindemann, 2013), and with suggestions that 
the ventral visual pathway is also involved in more abstract representations 
(Amedi, Raz, Azulay, Malach, & Zohary, 2010; Pietrini, 2004).
If all internal processes - memory, dreaming, imagery, and prediction – 
draw on the same representational system as perception, and if even the 
earliest perceptual regions can be manipulated by internal mechanisms, the 
strict distinction between internal and external origin and between bottom-
up and top-down input disappears. The overall activity of the blackboard, 
however, might dependent on where the stimulation derives from. In chapter 
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2 I suggested that mental imagery might be the voluntarily building of an 
internal model to predict upcoming sensory stimulation; as this process is 
continuous, it can explain the low overall activity during imagery: imagery 
and baseline are very similar. In later chapters, I again showed this low 
overall activity during image maintenance. Possibly, the level of stimulus-
specific V1 activity, or the level of details of the mental image, depends on 
the ratio between internal and external input to the representations in early 
visual cortex. Externally induced representations from actual perception 
might be stronger than fully internally generated representations such as 
from dreams or mentally created concepts. Recently, Stokes (2015) suggested 
that information can also be maintained in synaptic weights – invisible in 
measures of neural activity. An overall activity boost, whether generated 
internally or externally, might allow changing the weights of the connections 
and a shift of representation (Kloosterman et al., 2014; Warren et al., 2015). 
In chapter 3, I suggested that BOLD can be partly non-specific; in chapter 4 
there was indeed a peak in activity around the onset of the stable, mental 
representation. However, how large, possibly nonspecific BOLD activity 
and small, stimulus specific BOLD changes exactly relate to internally versus 
externally initiated mental representations remains to be determined.
The distinction between fully internally generated representations and 
externally induced representations is one way of characterizing the input 
to the general purpose machine in V1; another way is by distinguishing 
voluntary and involuntary image creation. Kosslyn et al. (2006) defined 
mental imagery as the the voluntary creation of representations in sensory 
regions. Dreaming and prediction are not voluntarily initiated and, although 
similar in visual representations, might be initiated by other brain processes. 
In line with this, the aphantasia patients described by Zeman et al. (2015, 
2016), who do not have an experience of mental imagery, a poor episodic 
memory and compensatory mechanisms for working memory, do dream. 
Although it has not been tested, they likely also predict upcoming sensory 
stimulation as this might be crucial for normal daily functioning. Together 
with the voluntary aspects of the recall of memories from long-term memory 
and the temporary maintenance of visual information, mental imagery is the 
voluntary ‘drawing’ on the neural blackboard in V1. 
Conclusions – What is a mental image?
In this thesis I have shown that early visual cortex consistently carries 
representations of imagined content. Moreover, these representations are 
perception-like in nature: the same neural populations code for imagined 
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and perceived orientations. As MVPA makes a direct comparison between 
imagery and perceptual representations possible, multivariate pattern 
analysis has allowed an important step forward in the imagery debate: we 
can now say that mental images are depictive and perception-like. Moreover, 
other studies using similar methods have suggested that all (working) 
memory, prediction and dreaming draw on the same visual representations 
and thereby provide new views on perception, visual cortex and the brain 
in general. As such, mental imagery might be an essential feature for our 
cognitive functioning. The internal representations of external events might 
allow us to move beyond the here and now and allow planning and goals 
of events in the future (D'Esposito & Postle, 2015). Visual mental imagery is 
the internal, voluntary generation of such representations that can use the 
high-resolution buffer in V1 so that the eventual experience of imagery can 
literally be like actual perception. It is this faculty that allows daydreaming 
of tropical beaches and the creation of novel, non-existing things like pink 
elephants.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Stel je voor dat je op vakantie gaat naar een tropisch eiland met prachtige 
stranden met wuivende palmbomen en een helblauwe hemel. Je vormt je een 
beeld van jezelf op het strand: hoe zou het zijn om daar werkelijk te staan? 
Zoals je wellicht merkt kan dit beeld heel levendig zijn: je hoort het rollen van 
de golven, je ruikt het zout van de zee, je ziet de palmbomen bewegen in de 
wind en je voelt de zon op je blote armen. Terwijl je het je inbeeldt, is het net 
alsof je daar al bent en je zintuigen alles kunnen waarnemen.
In dit proefschrift heb ik onderzocht hoe inbeelding werkt: welke 
hersengebieden zijn er bij betrokken en hoeveel lijkt iets inbeelden op iets 
werkelijk waarnemen? Ik heb mij uitsluitend gericht op het visuele systeem 
omdat er al veel bekend is over de visuele waarneming; daarnaast zijn de 
ogen het dominante zintuig van de mens. Dit proefschrift gaat dus over de 
vraag in hoeverre of iets in gedachten zien, hetzelfde is als iets met de ogen 
waarnemen. Specifiek heb ik daarbij gekeken of de primaire visuele cortex (een 
deel van de hersenschors van de grote hersenen) betrokken is bij het inbeelden.
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De primaire visuele cortex (ook wel V1 genoemd) is een gebied achter in het 
brein, vlak boven de nek (Figuur 7.1), waar informatie die binnenkomt vanuit 
de ogen, als eerste wordt verwerkt. In het brein bevinden zich bijvoorbeeld 
ook een primaire auditieve cortex (een gebied waar informatie uit het oor 
voor het eerst binnenkomt) en een primaire olfactorische cortex (een gebied 
voor het ruiken). De primaire visuele cortex is een heel interessant gebied 
voor wetenschappers omdat het netjes georganiseerd is: wat naast elkaar 
te zien is in de buitenwereld, activeert ook naast elkaar gelegen neuronen 
in V1. Zo ontstaat in de hersenen een soort kaart van het gezichtsveld. De 
primaire visuele cortex houdt zich vooral bezig met oriëntaties (richtingen) 
en lijnen. Vanuit V1 gaat de informatie naar hogere visuele gebieden, die 
betrokken zijn bij steeds complexere informatie: eerst hoeken, dan vormen 
en vervolgens ook volledige objecten zoals gereedschappen, meubels of 
gezichten (voor meer informatie zie Box 1 op p.16). Omdat de primaire visuele 
cortex het eerste gebied is in de hersenen waar informatie vanuit de ogen 
binnenkomt, zou betrokkenheid van dit gebied bij inbeelden, betekenen dat 
waarneming en inbeelding in de hersenen grotendeels hetzelfde zijn.
De vraag of V1 betrokken is bij inbeelding is bepaald niet nieuw; al zo’n 
40 jaar wordt hier door wetenschappers hevig over gediscussieerd (het 
zogenaamde ‘imagery debate’). Tot eind jaren ’90 was het echter niet mogelijk 
om hersenactiviteit in dit gebied direct te meten en was men afhankelijk van 
indirecte meetmethoden zoals reactietijden bij psychologische taken en van 
patiënten met hersenbeschadigingen. De opkomst van functionele Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI), waarmee hersenactiviteit van de visuele cortex 
gemeten kan worden terwijl proefpersonen zich iets inbeelden, leek een 
uitkomst voor het ‘imagery debate’. Met fMRI wordt het brein onderverdeeld 
in vele kleine stukjes van zo’n 2 bij 2 bij 2 mm groot, voxels genaamd. 
Daardoor is het mogelijk om te zien of een bepaald gebied (één zo’n voxel of 
een groepje van voxels) méér activiteit laat zien tijdens het uitvoeren van een 
taak dan tijdens een rustperiode: je neemt eenvoudigweg het verschil tussen 
de activiteit in beide situaties (voor meer informatie zie Box 2, p.18).
Hoewel sommige onderzoekers met fMRI lieten zien dat V1 inderdaad 
méér actief wordt tijdens inbeelding dan tijdens rust, waren er ook 
verscheidene wetenschappers die geen effect vonden, en een enkeling 
vond zelfs de-activatie van de visuele cortex! Betrokkenheid van de visuele 
cortex bij inbeelding kon daardoor niet definitief vastgesteld worden en het 
‘imagery debate’ kon niet worden beslecht. Daarom heb ik fMRI data op 
een andere manier geanalyseerd en gekeken naar het ruimtelijke patroon van 
activiteit binnen een groep voxels. Daarbij gaat het er dus niet om of een gebied 
in zijn geheel meer of minder actief wordt, maar om welke voxels binnen 
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het gebied precies activatie of de-activatie laten zien. Deze patronen kunnen 
veel informatie bevatten: bij het zien van verschillende stimuli (plaatjes en 
beelden die we gebruiken in het onderzoek om de hersenen op verschillende 
manieren te stimuleren) zijn er kleine verschillen in activatiepatronen. 
Hoewel die verschillen met het blote oog meestal niet goed waarneembaar 
zijn, kan een computer in sommige gevallen wel onderscheid maken tussen 
de hersenactiviteit horend bij verschillende stimuli. Zo kan een computer 
bijvoorbeeld op basis van de activatiepatronen in het brein bepalen of 
proefpersonen naar een huis of een gezicht kijken (dit noemen we ook wel 
‘brain reading’). In dit proefschrift heb ik bekeken of we tijdens inbeelding 
ook ‘brain reading’ konden doen en heb ik met behulp van verschillende 
analysetechnieken de patronen tijdens inbeelding en waarneming van 
dezelfde stimuli vergeleken (voor meer informatie zie Box 3, p.24). Zo 
konden we iets te weten komen over de overeenkomsten en verschillen in 
activatiepatronen tijdens inbeelden en waarnemen.
Om te onderzoeken of de primaire visuele cortex belangrijk is bij het 
inbeelden heb ik veel mensen (in totaal wel zo’n 100) in de fMRI scanner 
gelegd en hun hersenactiviteit gemeten terwijl ze inbeeldingstaken deden. 
In de experimenten in hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 heb ik gebruikt gemaakt 
van stimuli die optimaal zijn voor dit gebied, namelijk gratings (letterlijk 
vertaald: traliewerk; zie Figuur 7.2). De lijnen in een grating wijzen allemaal 
dezelfde richting op, dit is de oriëntatie van de grating. V1 is heel gevoelig 
voor oriëntaties. In hoofdstuk 2 liet ik proefpersonen zich deze gratings 
inbeelden terwijl ze in de fMRI scanner lagen. Soms mochten ze zich een 
grating inbeelden die ik op het scherm had laten zien en die ze onthouden 
hadden, in andere gevallen moesten ze de grating in gedachten eerst 60 of 120 
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graden draaien en daarna nog een poosje in gedachten houden (Figuur 7.3). 
Terwijl ze dit deden mat ik de hersenactiviteit in hun primaire visuele cortex. 
Ten slotte moesten ze ook nog naar gratings kijken, zodat ik ook wist wat het 
hersenactiviteitspatroon was tijdens het waarnemen. 
Toen heb ik een computerprogramma getraind om onderscheid te 
maken tussen de activatiepatronen tijdens het zien van de drie verschillend 
georiënteerde gratings die ik in de inbeeldingstaak gebruikt had. Vervolgens 
testte ik of de computer óók onderscheid kon maken tussen de hersenactiviteit 
van de ingebeelde gratings. Het bleek goed mogelijk om op basis van de 
hersenactiviteit te bepalen welke van de drie oriëntaties de proefpersonen 
zich hadden ingebeeld, ook als de grating eerst in gedachten gedraaid was. 
‘Brain reading’ is dus ook mogelijk tijdens inbeelden. Hoewel de computer 
alleen getraind was om onderscheid te maken tussen de patronen als de 
proefpersonen de gratings ook werkelijk zagen, kon deze ook de patronen 
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onderscheiden tijdens het inbeelden. Hieruit kon ik concluderen dat inbeelden 
activatiepatronen geeft die zeer vergelijkbaar zijn met de activatiepatronen 
tijdens het waarnemen.
In hoofdstuk 3 heb ik verder onderzocht wat voor informatie de computer 
gebruikte voor ‘brain reading’. Het bleek dat de verschillen in activatie-
patronen tussen de oriëntaties heel klein waren, maar wel heel consequent. 
Bovendien was het niet van belang of het hele hersengebied weinig of veel 
activiteit vertoonde. Dit kan verklaren waarom de eerdere fMRI studies 
geen duidelijk antwoord konden geven op de vraag of de primaire visuele 
cortex betrokken is bij inbeelding: het zoeken naar méér activiteit in een 
gebied is niet de goede maat, omdat inbeelding slechts zorgt voor kleine maar 
consistente verschillen tussen activatiepatronen.
In hoofdstuk 2 veranderden de patronen gedurende de taak: als de 
proefpersonen de oriëntaties net gezien hadden, bevatte de hersenactiviteit 
informatie van de oriëntatie waar ze mee begonnen waren, enige tijd later 
bevatte de hersenactiviteit informatie over de oriëntatie waar ze naar toe 
gedraaid hadden. In hoofdstuk 4 heb ik daarom verder onderzocht of de 
mentale rotatie, het in gedachten draaien van de grating, óók terug te zien 
was in de activiteit van V1. Daarvoor heb ik een nieuw soort scan gebruikt 
waarbij we veel meer beelden per seconde konden maken (5 per seconde, in 
plaatst van 1 per 2 seconden). Ook heb ik de proefpersonen getraind om in 
gedachten langzaam te kunnen roteren. Vervolgens heb ik met behulp van de 
computer een model gemaakt waarmee ik op basis van de hersenactiviteit, 
per scan kon reconstrueren welke oriëntatie de proefpersonen op dát moment 
in gedachten hadden. Dat was handig, want daardoor kon ik alle mogelijk 
oriëntaties (360 voor de hele cirkel) reconstrueren vanuit de hersenactiviteit 
en zo de ingebeelde draaiing direct volgen (voor meer informatie, zie 
Forward and inverse modeling in Box 3, p.26).
Ik vond dat de visuele cortex inderdaad de rotatie volgt, en bij langere 
rotaties ook pas later het patroon van de eindoriëntatie laat zien, precies 
wanneer je het op basis van de rotatiesnelheid zou verwachten. De 
representaties van de tussenstappen in de rotatie waren wel veel minder 
duidelijk dan de representatie van de uiteindelijke oriëntatie ná de rotatie. 
Wellicht is er minder informatie omdat iedere oriëntatie tijdens de draaiing 
maar kort relevant was. Doordat we zoveel metingen per seconde deden, zat 
er ook meer ruis in de data, waardoor het moeilijker was om de patronen te 
kunnen herkennen.
In hoofdstuk 5, ten slotte, heb ik onderzocht of de primaire visuele cortex 
altijd betrokken is bij inbeelding. Het zou namelijk zo kunnen zijn dat je V1 
alleen gebruikt als je je een oriëntatie in wilt beelden, terwijl andere gebieden 
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in het brein zich, net als tijdens waarneming, bezig houden met het inbeelden 
van vormen, gereedschappen en gezichten. Daarom hebben ik proefpersonen 
letters laten inbeelden, die opgebouwd waren uit kleine gratings (Figuur 7.4). 
Daarbij moesten ze zich óf vooral de oriëntatie inbeelden, óf vooral de vorm 
van de letter. Nadat de proefpersonen de taak geleerd hadden, gingen ze 
ook weer in de fMRI scanner. Ditmaal gebruikte ik een techniek waarbij ik 
de activatiepatronen voor de verschillende letters en oriëntaties direct met 
elkaar vergeleek. Als patronen meer op elkaar leken, kregen ze een hogere 
score en die scores konden we vervolgens met elkaar vergelijken (voor meer 
informatie, zie Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA) in Box 3, p.25). 
Daarmee vond ik dat als mensen zich de oriëntatie inbeeldden, de 
activatiepatronen voor letters met dezelfde oriëntatie van de gratings meer 
vergelijkbaar waren dan letters met verschillend georiënteerde gratings, 
ongeacht de vorm van de letter. Als mensen zich de vorm van de letter 
inbeeldden, dan leverden letters met dezelfde vorm meer vergelijkbare 
activatiepatronen op, ongeacht de oriëntatie van de gratings waar de letters 
uit opgebouwd waren. Hieruit kon ik concluderen dat de primaire visuele 
cortex flexibel is in wat ze representeert en dat activatiepatronen afhankelijk 
zijn van wat je je inbeeldt.
Deze vier studies (hoofdstuk 2-5) helpen met het beantwoorden van 
de vraag in hoeverre je iets inbeelden vergelijkbaar is met iets werkelijk 
waarnemen. Samengevat heb ik gevonden dat de visuele cortex betrokken 
is bij het inbeelden van informatie: tijdens het inbeelden van oriëntaties 
zijn de activatiepatronen in V1 zeer vergelijkbaar met de activatiepatronen 
tijdens het werkelijk zien van de oriëntaties. Deze activatiepatronen ontstaan 
door zeer kleine verschillen in activiteit en zijn onafhankelijk van absolute 
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activiteit. De activatiepatronen volgen de oriëntatie tijdens de inbeelding 
van draaiing en representeren het eindresultaat van de draaiing vanaf het 
moment dat de proefpersonen klaar zijn met roteren. Ten slotte zijn de 
activatiepatronen afhankelijk van wat je je precies inbeeldt: de informatie in 
de primaire visuele cortex is afhankelijk van waar je tijdens het inbeelden de 
aandacht op richt.
De vier hoofdstukken samen leren ons dat iets inbeelden veel lijkt op 
werkelijk iets zien. Dat is zeer interessant voor neurowetenschappers, 
omdat het ons iets leert over de vorm van onze gedachten: inbeelding 
heeft ook echt met beelden te maken en minder met abstracte informatie 
zoals taal, wat sommige wetenschappers in het ‘imagery debate’ lang 
hebben gedacht. De bevindingen passen ook goed bij een andere, recente 
wetenschappelijke studie van het Donders Instituut, waarin gevonden is 
dat als je je iets herinnert van langer geleden (uit je langetermijngeheugen) 
dit ook leidt tot specifieke activatiepatronen in de primaire visuele cortex. 
Mijn bevindingen passen ook goed bij bevindingen van wetenschappers uit 
Japan dat als je droomt, er ook informatie over de inhoud van je dromen 
uit de activatiepatronen van de visuele cortex gelezen kan worden. De 
bevindingen zijn daarnaast interessant voor onze kennis over waarneming: 
als zelfs de primaire visuele cortex, het eerste hersengebied dat betrokken is 
nadat licht de ogen heeft bereikt, geactiveerd kan worden door inbeelding 
(dus van binnenuit), wat voor effect heeft dat dan op waarneming? Kan 
de waarneming ook beïnvloed worden door inbeelding? En bestaat er dan 
wel zoiets als objectieve waarneming of is alles wat we zien gekleurd door 
onze gedachten, herinneringen en overtuigingen? Ten slotte betekenen deze 
bevindingen dat als je dat tropische strand met de palmbomen voor je ziet, 
het visuele deel van je brein ook aan het werk is. Daardoor is het, zelfs in 
gedachten, ook echt een beetje alsof je er werkelijk bent.
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